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Applied Mechanics and Materials

Weakness and Improvement of an Efficient Key Agreement Protocol

Shuang Qing Liu, Liang Xia, Meng Zi Zhang, Bao Ling Xie

Published Aug 1, 2014• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Xiao and Li proposed protocol XKAS and claimed it to be an efficient and secure two-party authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. In this letter, we show that the protocol is vulne- rable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. We also proposed XKAS+, which can withstand such attacks. The new protocol enjoys this property at the expense of a slight increase in computational workload with respect to the original version.

DOI
10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.599-601.1816

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Xiao and Li proposed protocol XKAS and claimed it to be an efficient and secure two-party authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. In this letter, we show that the protocol is vulne- rable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. We also proposed XKAS+, which can withstand such attacks. The new protocol enjoys this property at the expense of a slight increase in computational workload with respect to the original version.
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A recently proposed authenticated key agreement protocol is shown to be insecure. In particular, one of the two parties is not authenticated, allowing an active man in the middle opponent to replay old messages. The protocol is essentially an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme, and the lack of authentication allows an attacker to replay old messages and have them accepted. Moreover, if the ephemeral key used to compute a protocol message is ever compromised, then the key established using the replayed message will also be compromised. Fixing the problem is simple - there are many provably secure and standardised protocols which are just as efficient as the flawed scheme.
To overcome the key escrow issues of the identity based cryptography, Shi Yijuan and Ll Jianhua [11] proposed a new Certificateless Two-party Authentication Key Agreement (CL-2AKA) protocol. In this paper an improved CL-2AKA Protocol has been proposed. The proposed protocol CAKA (Certificateless Authentication Key Agreement Protocol) is based on the algebraic properties of the pairing. The proposed protocol attempts to mitigate the man-in-the middle and Keycompromise impersonation attacks. is found to be more efficient on computation and has more compact cipher text than the existing schemes.
Abstract. Recently, He et al. (Computers and Mathematics with Applications, 2012, 64(6): 1914-1926) proposed a new efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol. They claimed their protocol was provably secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. In this paper, we will show that their protocol is insecure. A type I adversary, who obtains one party’s ephemeral private key, can impersonate the party to cheat the other party and compute the shared session key successfully. For overcoming this weakness, we also propose a simple countermeasure.
Authenticated key agreement protocol is a fundamental building block for ensuring private communications between two or more parties over an insecure network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In the recent work, Wang et al. proposed an efficient two-party certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol from pairings used to protect the Web client/server communication. However, we found the scheme cannot withstand key compromise impersonation attack, and also, is vulnerable to one form of the man-in-the-middle attack -- key replicating attack, thus it doesn't possess some desirable security attributes,such as key compromise impersonation resilience and key integrity. We analyze the key replicating attack against the protocol in the BR93 security model in detail, and demonstrate that the protocol is not secure if the adversary was allowed to send a reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.