Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Chinese Physics Letters

Cai–Li Communication Protocol in Noisy Quantum Channel

Hua Lu, Yan Xu-Dong, Xianzhou Zhang

Published Dec 1, 2004• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Since the original Cai–Li protocol [Chin. Phys. Lett. 21 (2004) 601] can be used only in an ideal quantum communication, we present the modified Cai–Li protocol that can be used in the a noisy quantum channel by using Calderbank–Shor–Steane (CSS) codes to correct errors. We also give a tight bound on the connection between information Eve eavesdropped with a measurement attack in line B → A and detection probability, which shows that the Cai–Li protocol can be used as a quasisecure direct quantum communication.

DOI
10.1088/0256-307x/21/12/006

Related papers

Eavesdropping on Quantum Secure Direct Communication with W State in Noisy Channel

Yuan Hao, Liu Yin-Min, Zhang Wen +1 more

Security of the quantum secure direct communication protocol (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel noise. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the C-S QSDC protocol is not secure if the quantum bit error rate (QBER) caused by quantum channel noise is higher than 4.17%. Our eavesdropping scheme induces about 4.17% QBER for those check qubits. However, such QBER can be hidden in the counterpart induced by the noisy quantum channel if the eavesdropper Eve replaces the original noisy channel by an ideal one. Furthermore, if the QBER induced by quantum channel noise is lower than 4.17%, then in the eavesdropping scheme Eve still can eavesdrop part of the secret messages by safely attacking a fraction of the transmitted qubits. Finally, an improvement on the C-S QSDC protocol is put forward.

Communications in Theoretical Physics•Jan 1, 2008•13 citations

Quantum Secure Direct Communication Using Quantum Calderbank-Shor-Steane Error Correcting Codes

Xin LÜ

The notion of quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) has been introduced recently in quantum cryptography as a replacement for quantum key distribution, in which two communication entities exchange secure classical messages without establishing any shared keys previously. In this paper, a quantum secure direct communication scheme using quantum Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) error correction codes is proposed. In the scheme, a secure message is first transformed into a binary error vector and then encrypted (decrypted) via quantum coding (decoding) procedures. An adversary Eve, who has controlled the communication channel, can't recover the secrete messages because she doesn't know the deciphering keys. Security of this scheme is based on the assumption

Journal of Software•Jan 1, 2006•17 citations

Eavesdropping on the Bostroem-Filbinger Communication Protocol in Noisy Quantum Channel

Qing-yu Cai

We show an eavesdropping scheme on Bostr\UNICODE{0xf6}m-Felbinger communication protocol (called ping-pong protocol) [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] in an ideal quantum channel. A measurement attack can be perfectly used to eavesdrop Alice's information instead of a most general quantum operation attack. In a noisy quantum channel, the direct communication is forbidden. We present a quantum key distribution protocol based on the ping-pong protocol, which can be used in a low noisy quantum channel. And we give a weak upper bound on the bit-error ratio that the detection probability $d$ should be lower than 0.11, which is a requirement criterion when we utilize the ping-pong protocol in a real communication.

arXiv:quant-ph/0404085•Apr 14, 2004•0 citations

Joint encryption and error correction for secure quantum communication

Nitin Jha, Abhishek Parakh, Mahadevan Subramaniam

Secure quantum networks are a bedrock requirement for developing a future quantum internet. However, quantum channels are susceptible to channel noise that introduce errors in the transmitted data. The traditional approach to providing error correction typically encapsulates the message in an error correction code after encryption. Such separate processes incur overhead that must be avoided when possible. We, consequently, provide a single integrated process that allows for encryption as well as error correction. This is a first attempt to do so for secure quantum communication and combines the Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) code with the three-stage secure quantum communication protocol. Lastly, it allows for arbitrary qubits to be transmitted from sender to receiver making the proposed protocol general purpose.

arXiv:2505.18133•Scientific Reports•Oct 19, 2024•3 citations

CSS codes for Quantum Metrology with Discrete-time Error Correction

Ugnė Liaubaitė, Debora Ramacciotti, Robert Raußendorf

The goal of quantum metrology is to estimate an unknown parameter with better-than-classical precision and, ideally, to attain Heisenberg scaling. In realistic settings, however, noise can substantially reduce this advantage and, in many cases, restore standard-quantum-limit-like performance. Preserving the quantum enhancement therefore requires noise-robust strategies, which can be implemented using quantum error correction. In this work, we develop and analyze a quantum-metrology protocol based on Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes. The main result is that, for noise perpendicular to the sensing Hamiltonian, discrete-time error correction preserves Heisenberg-like temporal scaling over a finite interrogation-time window whose duration depends on the correction frequency. It is further shown that recovery applied only after the sensing evolution provides no metrological advantage over the corresponding uncorrected noisy protocol in the setup considered here. An analytical framework is developed for arbitrary CSS codes and applied to the Steane and Shor codes, for which the discrete-time corrected dynamics, the Heisenberg-like-to-SQL-like crossover, and the optimal interrogation time are determined and numerically analysed.

quant-pharXiv:2609.40022•Oct 1, 2026•0 citations

Secure Direct Communication Using Quantum Calderbank-Shor-Steane Codes.

Xin Lü, Zhi Ma, Dengguo Feng

The notion of quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) has been introduced recently in quantum cryptography as a replacement for quantum key distribution, in which two communication entities exchange secure classical messages without establishing any shared keys previously. In this paper, a quantum secure direct communication scheme using quantum Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CCS) error correction codes is proposed. In the scheme, a secure message is first transformed into a binary error vector and then encrypted(decrypted) via quantum coding(decoding) procedures. An adversary Eve, who has controlled the communication channel, can’t recover the secrete messages because she doesn’t know the deciphering keys. Security of this scheme is based on the assumption that decoding general linear codes is intractable even on quantum computers.

•Jan 1, 2004•0 citations
Since the original Cai–Li protocol [Chin. Phys. Lett. 21 (2004) 601] can be used only in an ideal quantum communication, we present the modified Cai–Li protocol that can be used in the a noisy quantum channel by using Calderbank–Shor–Steane (CSS) codes to correct errors. We also give a tight bound on the connection between information Eve eavesdropped with a measurement attack in line B → A and detection probability, which shows that the Cai–Li protocol can be used as a quasisecure direct quantum communication.
Security of the quantum secure direct communication protocol (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel noise. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the C-S QSDC protocol is not secure if the quantum bit error rate (QBER) caused by quantum channel noise is higher than 4.17%. Our eavesdropping scheme induces about 4.17% QBER for those check qubits. However, such QBER can be hidden in the counterpart induced by the noisy quantum channel if the eavesdropper Eve replaces the original noisy channel by an ideal one. Furthermore, if the QBER induced by quantum channel noise is lower than 4.17%, then in the eavesdropping scheme Eve still can eavesdrop part of the secret messages by safely attacking a fraction of the transmitted qubits. Finally, an improvement on the C-S QSDC protocol is put forward.
The notion of quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) has been introduced recently in quantum cryptography as a replacement for quantum key distribution, in which two communication entities exchange secure classical messages without establishing any shared keys previously. In this paper, a quantum secure direct communication scheme using quantum Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) error correction codes is proposed. In the scheme, a secure message is first transformed into a binary error vector and then encrypted (decrypted) via quantum coding (decoding) procedures. An adversary Eve, who has controlled the communication channel, can't recover the secrete messages because she doesn't know the deciphering keys. Security of this scheme is based on the assumption
We show an eavesdropping scheme on Bostr\UNICODE{0xf6}m-Felbinger communication protocol (called ping-pong protocol) [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] in an ideal quantum channel. A measurement attack can be perfectly used to eavesdrop Alice's information instead of a most general quantum operation attack. In a noisy quantum channel, the direct communication is forbidden. We present a quantum key distribution protocol based on the ping-pong protocol, which can be used in a low noisy quantum channel. And we give a weak upper bound on the bit-error ratio that the detection probability ddd should be lower than 0.11, which is a requirement criterion when we utilize the ping-pong protocol in a real communication.
Secure quantum networks are a bedrock requirement for developing a future quantum internet. However, quantum channels are susceptible to channel noise that introduce errors in the transmitted data. The traditional approach to providing error correction typically encapsulates the message in an error correction code after encryption. Such separate processes incur overhead that must be avoided when possible. We, consequently, provide a single integrated process that allows for encryption as well as error correction. This is a first attempt to do so for secure quantum communication and combines the Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) code with the three-stage secure quantum communication protocol. Lastly, it allows for arbitrary qubits to be transmitted from sender to receiver making the proposed protocol general purpose.
The goal of quantum metrology is to estimate an unknown parameter with better-than-classical precision and, ideally, to attain Heisenberg scaling. In realistic settings, however, noise can substantially reduce this advantage and, in many cases, restore standard-quantum-limit-like performance. Preserving the quantum enhancement therefore requires noise-robust strategies, which can be implemented using quantum error correction. In this work, we develop and analyze a quantum-metrology protocol based on Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes. The main result is that, for noise perpendicular to the sensing Hamiltonian, discrete-time error correction preserves Heisenberg-like temporal scaling over a finite interrogation-time window whose duration depends on the correction frequency. It is further shown that recovery applied only after the sensing evolution provides no metrological advantage over the corresponding uncorrected noisy protocol in the setup considered here. An analytical framework is developed for arbitrary CSS codes and applied to the Steane and Shor codes, for which the discrete-time corrected dynamics, the Heisenberg-like-to-SQL-like crossover, and the optimal interrogation time are determined and numerically analysed.
The notion of quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) has been introduced recently in quantum cryptography as a replacement for quantum key distribution, in which two communication entities exchange secure classical messages without establishing any shared keys previously. In this paper, a quantum secure direct communication scheme using quantum Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CCS) error correction codes is proposed. In the scheme, a secure message is first transformed into a binary error vector and then encrypted(decrypted) via quantum coding(decoding) procedures. An adversary Eve, who has controlled the communication channel, can’t recover the secrete messages because she doesn’t know the deciphering keys. Security of this scheme is based on the assumption that decoding general linear codes is intractable even on quantum computers.