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International Conference on Hybrid Information Technology (ICHIT)

Security Analysis of Hsieh-Sun's Deniable Authentication Protocol

Eun‐Jun Yoon, Kee-Young Yoo

Published Nov 9, 2006• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In 2004, Hsieh and Sun showed that Fan et al.'s deniable protocol does not posse the denial property; that is, a cheating receiver can prove the source of the received message to a third party. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Fan et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper points out an error in Hsieh-Sun's cryptanalysis on Fan et al.'s deniable authentication protocol and demonstrate that Hsieh-Sun's improved deniable authentication protocol still does not posse the deniable property and is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack.

DOI
10.1109/ichit.2006.214

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Security Analysis of Hsieh-Sun's Deniable Authentication Protocol

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具保護(匿名)傳送者的可否認驗證協定

馬瑞澤

A deniable authentication protocol should satisfy the property that only the intended receiver authenticates the sender’s identity of received messages. This property is called authentication property. On the other hand, the intended receiver cannot prove the sender’s identity to the third party. The second property is called deniability property. To satisfy deniability property, in most deniable authentication protocols, the receiver is able to forge/modify the received message from the sender. Since the received data is forgeable by the receiver, the sender easily denies that he/she sent the data. Although the sent message is deniable for the sender, the sender still has no evidence to prove that he/she sent the message to prevent the receiver’s circumvention. In this propose, a new property, sender protection, is proposed for the deniable authentication protocol. In a deniable authentication protocol with sender protection, although the sent message is still forgeable by the receiver, the sender can provide an evidence to prove that whether or not the message is really sent from him/her. To protect senders more completely, it is better that the sender is anonymous in a deniable authentication protocol. Therefore, another goal of our research is to design a deniable authentication protocols with anonymous and protected sender.

•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations

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Mario Di Raimondo, Rosario Gennaro

Deniable Authentication protocols allow a Sender to authenticate a message for a Receiver, in a way that the Receiver cannot convince a third party that such authentication (or any authentication) ever took place.We present two new approaches to the problem of deniable authentication. The novelty of our schemes is that they do not require the use of CCA-secure encryption (all previous known solutions did), thus showing a different generic approach to the problem of deniable authentication. This new approach is practically relevant as it leads to more efficient protocols and security reductions.In the process we point out a subtle definitional issue for deniability. In particular we propose the notion of forward deniability, which requires that the authentications remain deniable even if the Sender wants to later prove that she authenticated a message. We show that forward deniability is not implied by the original notion of deniability, by showing some deniable protocols which are not forward deniable. Our new proposals are forward deniable.

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In 2004, Hsieh and Sun showed that Fan et al.'s deniable protocol does not posse the denial property; that is, a cheating receiver can prove the source of the received message to a third party. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Fan et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper points out an error in Hsieh-Sun's cryptanalysis on Fan et al.'s deniable authentication protocol and demonstrate that Hsieh-Sun's improved deniable authentication protocol still does not posse the deniable property and is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack.
In 2004, Hsieh and Sun showed that Fan et al.'s deniable protocol does not posse the denial property; that is, a cheating receiver can prove the source of the received message to a third party. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Fan et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper points out an error in Hsieh-Sun's cryptanalysis on Fan et al.'s deniable authentication protocol and demonstrate that Hsieh-Sun's improved deniable authentication protocol still does not posse the deniable property and is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack.
A deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to transfer an authenticated message to a receiver, and the receiver cannot prove to a third party about the source of the message. In 2006, Zhu et al. analyzed deniable authentication protocols proposed by Deng et al. in 2001, which were based on a protocol proposed by Aumann et al. in 1998. In this paper, we show that the modified protocols by Zhu et al. suffer from a Byzantine attack when two sessions run concurrently. We also suggest methods to solve the problem.
A deniable authentication protocol allows a sender to transfer an authenticated message to a receiver in such a way that the receiver cannot prove to a third party about the source of the message. In 2001, Deng et al. proposed two deniable authentication protocols under the communication model defined by Aumann and Rabin in 1998. In this paper, we show that these two protocols have a common issue, which incurs vulnerability to the person-in-the-middle (PIM) attack. We also propose a modification for solving the problem.
In 2006, Shao et al. showed that Wang et al.'s deniable authentication protocol based on ElGamal cryptography is insecure to a person-in-the-middle attack; that is, in the whole process, the receiver cannot be aware of the existence of this adversary as well as the modification of the messages. Furthermore, they also presented a modification of Wang et al.'s protocol to overcome the security flaw. However, the current paper demonstrates that Shao et al.'s improved deniable authentication protocol is susceptible to a malicious receiver's impersonation attack. To mitigate this security breach, we propose an improved deniable authentication protocol based on ElGamal cryptography.
A deniable authentication protocol should satisfy the property that only the intended receiver authenticates the sender’s identity of received messages. This property is called authentication property. On the other hand, the intended receiver cannot prove the sender’s identity to the third party. The second property is called deniability property. To satisfy deniability property, in most deniable authentication protocols, the receiver is able to forge/modify the received message from the sender. Since the received data is forgeable by the receiver, the sender easily denies that he/she sent the data. Although the sent message is deniable for the sender, the sender still has no evidence to prove that he/she sent the message to prevent the receiver’s circumvention. In this propose, a new property, sender protection, is proposed for the deniable authentication protocol. In a deniable authentication protocol with sender protection, although the sent message is still forgeable by the receiver, the sender can provide an evidence to prove that whether or not the message is really sent from him/her. To protect senders more completely, it is better that the sender is anonymous in a deniable authentication protocol. Therefore, another goal of our research is to design a deniable authentication protocols with anonymous and protected sender.
Deniable Authentication protocols allow a Sender to authenticate a message for a Receiver, in a way that the Receiver cannot convince a third party that such authentication (or any authentication) ever took place.We present two new approaches to the problem of deniable authentication. The novelty of our schemes is that they do not require the use of CCA-secure encryption (all previous known solutions did), thus showing a different generic approach to the problem of deniable authentication. This new approach is practically relevant as it leads to more efficient protocols and security reductions.In the process we point out a subtle definitional issue for deniability. In particular we propose the notion of forward deniability, which requires that the authentications remain deniable even if the Sender wants to later prove that she authenticated a message. We show that forward deniability is not implied by the original notion of deniability, by showing some deniable protocols which are not forward deniable. Our new proposals are forward deniable.