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Philosophy of Science

On the Process of Measurement in Quantum Mechanics

P. Jordan

Published Oct 1, 1949• 51 citations
Publisher

Abstract

It is the purpose of this note to comment on some important problems which have been already vividly discussed by several authors. Besides the well known former discussions of Schrödinger and J. v. Neumann I should like to mention here especially H. Margenau's article, “Critical Points in Modern Physical Theory,” (3) which strongly influenced my present discussion.

DOI
10.1086/287049

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Quantum theory has played a significant role in modern philosophy both as a source of metaphysical ideas and as an important example of a 'scientific revolution'. In spite of the sixty or so years that have elapsed since its invention, a long lasting controversy concerning the interpretation and meaning of quantum theory prevails. Almost all authors, however, seem to agree on one major point, namely, that there could be no interpretation of this theory which is both realistic and local.;The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that this premiss is false and that a realistic, local and deterministic interpretation of quantum theory (at least of part of it) does exist, provided that we extend the classical concept of probability.;In order to establish this a 'quasi classical' probability theory is developed based on some non Lebesgue measurable 'events', which is then applied to account for spin-statistics. Finally I note how this model reflects on the problems of physical realism, locality, the status of probability theory and the philosophical foundations of mathematics.

•Jan 1, 1983•1 citation
It is the purpose of this note to comment on some important problems which have been already vividly discussed by several authors. Besides the well known former discussions of Schrödinger and J. v. Neumann I should like to mention here especially H. Margenau's article, “Critical Points in Modern Physical Theory,” (3) which strongly influenced my present discussion.
The Margenau and Wigner ‘Comments’ (1962) on my ‘Comments on the Paper of David Sharp’ (Putnam, 1961; Sharp, 1961) is a strange document. First the authors say, in effect, ‘had anything been wrong (with the fundamentals of quantum mechanics) we should certainly have heard’. Then they issue various obiter dicta (e.g. the ‘cut between observer and object’ is unavoidable in quantum mechanics; the – highly subjectivistic – London-Bauer treatment of quantum mechanics is described, along with von Neumann's book, as ‘the most compact and explicit formulation of the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics’). My assumption 2 (that the whole universe is a system) is described as ‘not supportable’, because ‘the measurement is an interaction between the object and the observer’. The ‘object’ (the closed system) cannot include the observer. The issues involved in this discussion are fundamental ones. I believe that the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics today is as unhealthy as the conceptual structure of the calculus was at the time Berkeley's famous criticism was issued. For this reason – as much to emphasize the seriousness of the present situation in the foundations of quantum mechanics as to remove confusions that may be left in the mind of the general reader upon reading the Margenau and Wigner ‘Comments’ – I intend to restate the main points of my previous ‘Comments’, and to show in detail why the Margenau and Wigner remarks fail completely to meet them.
(1) the author has outlined several of the more important interpretations of measurement in quantum mechanics and discussed the problems arising from them. Particular attention was paid to the work of Bohr, Heisenberg and von Neumann and a tentative proposal was made for a possible interpretation which would mitigate some of the problems and dilemmas. This interpretation was essentially that proposed by Margenau (2) in terms of latent variables. He defines measurement to be any operation with physical apparatus which results in a number, including in this, of course, yes and no answers as well as conventional numerical answers. Further he makes the distinction between the preparation of a state and the measurement of the state (3). A preparation puts the quantum system into a particular state whereas the measurement frequently destroys the state in question. This paper presents several criteria to help in the evaluation of the alternatives presented in the first paper and carries further the suggested interpretation mentioned at the end of that paper.
Quantum theory has played a significant role in modern philosophy both as a source of metaphysical ideas and as an important example of a 'scientific revolution'. In spite of the sixty or so years that have elapsed since its invention, a long lasting controversy concerning the interpretation and meaning of quantum theory prevails. Almost all authors, however, seem to agree on one major point, namely, that there could be no interpretation of this theory which is both realistic and local.;The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that this premiss is false and that a realistic, local and deterministic interpretation of quantum theory (at least of part of it) does exist, provided that we extend the classical concept of probability.;In order to establish this a 'quasi classical' probability theory is developed based on some non Lebesgue measurable 'events', which is then applied to account for spin-statistics. Finally I note how this model reflects on the problems of physical realism, locality, the status of probability theory and the philosophical foundations of mathematics.