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Computer Communications

Improvement of the Peyravian–Jeffries’s user authentication protocol and password change protocol

Marko Hölbl, Tatjana Welzer, Boštjan Brumen

Published Jan 2, 2008• 13 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.comcom.2007.12.029

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