This author has been engaged over the past several years in the effort to develop certain basic intuitions into a fully mathematical theory. These evolving intuitions first began with the idea that the economist's notion of utility might more truly be represented mathematically by a normed measure on the commodity space rather than by a point function, the value of the measure on a particular set of goods having the sense of a relative propensity of the individual to select a good in that set. With this idea there came in turn, quite naturally, the insight that utility and probability are one and the same thing. And accordingly it emerged that the theory we were seeking would not be restricted to the economic behavior of human beings, nor even to the behavior in general of human beings: it would pertain, in utmost generality, to all behavior of all systems. Thus, it must affirm that all behavior is the evolution of stochastic processes, and that all systems are stochastic processes. Consistent with this the structural elements of stochastic processes are seen as the fundamental, objective, real entities, the ultimate building-blocks of reality. These are eventualities and acts and-according to the traditional mathematical representation of stochastic processes, also-probabilities. This structural aspect of the theory under development puts into sharp evidence its wide divergence from the classical scientific conception of reality. Our intensive search failed to discover a dynamical law for the proposed new theory within the mathematical context of the traditional, σ-field-real-valued-measure representation of stochastic processes. We therefore have gone on to a higher level of possible mathematical representation. This particular representation would have collections of eventualities represented by lattices of certain configurations in a unitary space. Closed linear manifolds are among these configurations, and indeed the formalism of quantum mechanics falls into the context of this representation. But the general lattice element in the kinds of lattices being investigated is more complicated than a linear manifold, being heuristically comparable with an acute-angle cone of vectors. These configurations are formulated by means of a ƒlanking relation between linear manifolds. One such lattice has been developed. Others are currently being sought through variations on the notion of flanking. The fact that probabilities present themselves in the unitary space representation-as is familiar from quantum mechanics-as parameters of the relationship between linear manifolds suggests that probability is not a fundamental structural concept. It is consequently indicated that eventualities and acts alone are the basic elements of real structure. Accordingly, the dynamical law must be formulable in terms of these elements only. There is a natural suggestion of what the law might look like. Even at the present early stage of development of the new theory being sought it is possible to cite many pieces of empirical evidence vouching for its exclusive validity. Such evidence is particularly noteworthy in the domain of human behavior.
This author has been engaged over the past several years in the effort to develop certain basic intuitions into a fully mathematical theory. These evolving intuitions first began with the idea that the economist's notion of utility might more truly be represented mathematically by a normed measure on the commodity space rather than by a point function, the value of the measure on a particular set of goods having the sense of a relative propensity of the individual to select a good in that set. With this idea there came in turn, quite naturally, the insight that utility and probability are one and the same thing. And accordingly it emerged that the theory we were seeking would not be restricted to the economic behavior of human beings, nor even to the behavior in general of human beings: it would pertain, in utmost generality, to all behavior of all systems. Thus, it must affirm that all behavior is the evolution of stochastic processes, and that all systems are stochastic processes. Consistent with this the structural elements of stochastic processes are seen as the fundamental, objective, real entities, the ultimate building-blocks of reality. These are eventualities and acts and-according to the traditional mathematical representation of stochastic processes, also-probabilities. This structural aspect of the theory under development puts into sharp evidence its wide divergence from the classical scientific conception of reality. Our intensive search failed to discover a dynamical law for the proposed new theory within the mathematical context of the traditional, σ-field-real-valued-measure representation of stochastic processes. We therefore have gone on to a higher level of possible mathematical representation. This particular representation would have collections of eventualities represented by lattices of certain configurations in a unitary space. Closed linear manifolds are among these configurations, and indeed the formalism of quantum mechanics falls into the context of this representation. But the general lattice element in the kinds of lattices being investigated is more complicated than a linear manifold, being heuristically comparable with an acute-angle cone of vectors. These configurations are formulated by means of a ƒlanking relation between linear manifolds. One such lattice has been developed. Others are currently being sought through variations on the notion of flanking. The fact that probabilities present themselves in the unitary space representation-as is familiar from quantum mechanics-as parameters of the relationship between linear manifolds suggests that probability is not a fundamental structural concept. It is consequently indicated that eventualities and acts alone are the basic elements of real structure. Accordingly, the dynamical law must be formulable in terms of these elements only. There is a natural suggestion of what the law might look like. Even at the present early stage of development of the new theory being sought it is possible to cite many pieces of empirical evidence vouching for its exclusive validity. Such evidence is particularly noteworthy in the domain of human behavior.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Every vertex of the magic cube of physics discussed so far introduced a major element in the development of physics and the whole of science. Mechanics introduced the basic concept of equations of motion, or time-evolution of a physical system given certain initial condition and the associated idea of determinism, even with its generalization in the form of chaos, the dependence of the outcomes of the temporal evolution on the initial conditions. These concepts taken for many particles, or elements of a physical system, led to the probabilistic description of many particle systems, in the realm of statistical physics and thermodynamics, whereby the averages over time of various observable quantities were related to the ensemble averages, that involve classical, so-called Kolmogorov, probability measures, at least for certain “equilibrium” situations. The second law of thermodynamics introduced the concept of entropy and its probabilistic increase, the first truly emergent, probabilistic law in physics (temperature and pressure, being other emergent quantities, apart from entropy, the measure of disorder of a statistical system). In the context of Newtonian gravity, one gets, at least in retrospect the geometric description of gravity in non-relativistic, Galilean spacetime. Galilean relativity, based on the asymmetric mixing of space and time, with the absolute, universal time, true for all observers, gets generalized in special theory of relativity to observer dependent space and observer dependent time, viewed as “slices” of a new concept of spacetime, with the new concept of causal structure, that distinguish timelike, null and spacelike events. This in turn is made into a full dynamical geometric structure of spacetime with a relativistic description of gravity stemming from curvature of spacetime, and a dynamical causal structure, tied to gravity. In our next story, the story of quantum theory, we will encounter fundamental, intrinsic probabilities, that can interfere, unlike the classical probabilities of statistical thermodynamics, and which are consistent with equations of motion of individual elements, and not, as in statistical thermodynamics, with temporal averages over the time evolution of many elements. This is the big new lesson of quantum theory, that transcends the lessons of classical spacetime physics.
The quantities in physics that can be measured are conventionally denoted observables : entities that can be observed (directly or indirectly) and to which a value in appropriate units can be assigned. Examples include position, momentum, and energy. Unlike in classical physics, the concept of an observable in quantum theory possesses a significance beyond that of the measurable: to each observable there corresponds a unique operator in an abstract, linear vector space. These operators (and others) govern all aspects of quantum systems. Quantum operators act on abstract vectors in the linear space. Especially important are the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of these operators, in particular because some of the eigenvectors are the quantum states mentioned in the preceding chapters. Furthermore, for any operator that is the mathematical image of an observable, its eigenvalues constitute the entire set of values that measurement of the observable can yield . Finally, from the quantum states one can obtain the probabilities for the occurrence of events in the microscopic world, for example, the most likely value that measurement of an observable will yield. The concepts of operators and eigenvalue problems, as well as those of quantal probabilities, of Hermiticity, and of complete sets, were encountered and exemplified in the preceding chapter using the language of differential equations. While much of quantum mechanics could be presented in terms of this language alone, certain fundamental concepts (spin, for instance) cannot be, and it eventually becomes necessary to consider quantum mechanics as a theoretical framework embedded in that abstract linear vector space known as a Hilbert space.
This thesis is concerned with the description, characterization, and structural analysis of general physical processes. While all of these questions are well understood in classical physics, the situation presents itself much murkier in the realm of quantum mechanics, where fundamental classical properties fail to hold. Here, we close this conceptual gap and provide the theoretical foundation for the description of processes in classical physics, quantum mechanics, and beyond. These findings, in turn, enable the experimental investigation of key properties of dynamical processes, like, for example, the existence of memory effects and their respective temporal structure.
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state S with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state S is a subset of a state space S={Z}, such that S always contains many elements Z. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of S cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements Z, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of S is described in terms of sequential time n∈N, which is updated according to n→n+1 each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time n can be separated from relational time t, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each n, in which t represents the knowledge at sequential time n about the temporal relations between present and past events.
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g., ''feeling,'' ''knowing,'' and ''effort'') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classical physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, due to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analyzing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classical-physics-based predecessor is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics, and is able to represent more adequately than classical concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.