Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical

A new geometrical approach to Nash equilibria organization in Eisert's quantum games

David M. Schneider

Published Feb 8, 2012• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We extend the periodic point-based method for Eisert's quantum games (Schneider 2011 J. Phys. A: Math. Theor. 44 095301) to games not previously analyzed. From the comparison of different cases, we observe that games sharing the same classical features (as for instance the symmetrized Battle of the Sexes and the Chicken game) can have different characteristics after the quantization, and conversely, games with different classical behaviors (the Chicken game and the Prisoner's dilemma), are completely equivalent within Eisert's protocol. This fact is reflected in the structure of the map that the periodic point-procedure associates to the quantum game (from which the Nash equilibria are deduced). In order to understand how these unexpected outcomes are generated, we give a geometrical description of our observations in terms of bifurcation theory for maps.

DOI
10.1088/1751-8113/45/8/085303

Related papers

A periodic point-based method for the analysis of Nash equilibria in 2 × 2 symmetric quantum games

David M. Schneider

We present a novel method of looking at Nash equilibria in 2 × 2 quantum games. Our method is based on a mathematical connection between the problem of identifying Nash equilibria in game theory, and the topological problem of the periodic points in nonlinear maps. To adapt our method to the original protocol designed by Eisert et al (1999 Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 3077–80) to study quantum games, we are forced to extend the space of strategies from the initial proposal. We apply our method to the extended strategy space version of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and find that a new set of Nash equilibria emerge in a natural way. Nash equilibria in this set are optimal as Eisert's solution of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and include this solution as a limit case.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical•Feb 9, 2011•6 citations

Nash Equilibria in Four-Strategy Quantum Extensions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Piotr Frąckiewicz, Anna Gorczyca–Goraj, Krzysztof Grzegorz Grzanka +2 more

The concept of Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum extensions of the general form of the Prisoner's Dilemma game is investigated. The process of quantization involves incorporating two additional unitary strategies, which effectively expand the classical game. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. The resulting Nash equilibria are found to be more closely aligned with Pareto-optimal solutions than those of the conventional Nash equilibrium outcome of the classical game. Our results demonstrate the complexity and diversity of strategic behavior in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In particular, we provide a detailed characterization of strategy profiles and their corresponding Nash equilibria, thereby extending the understanding of quantum strategies' impact on traditional game-theoretical problems.

Entropy•Jul 15, 2025•2 citations

Quantum game theory based on the Schmidt decomposition

Tsubasa Ichikawa, Izumi Tsutsui, Taksu Cheon

We present a novel formulation of quantum game theory based on the Schmidt decomposition, which has the merit that the entanglement of quantum strategies is manifestly quantified. We apply this formulation to 2-player, 2-strategy symmetric games and obtain a complete set of quantum Nash equilibria. Apart from those available with the maximal entanglement, these quantum Nash equilibria are extensions of the Nash equilibria in classical game theory. The phase structure of the equilibria is determined for all values of entanglement, and thereby the possibility of resolving the dilemmas by entanglement in the game of Chicken, the Battle of the Sexes, the Prisoners' Dilemma, and the Stag Hunt, is examined. We find that entanglement transforms these dilemmas with each other but cannot resolve them, except in the Stag Hunt game where the dilemma can be alleviated to a certain degree.

arXiv:quant-ph/0702167•Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical•Mar 17, 2008•39 citations

Efficiency of Classical and Quantum Games Equilibria

M. Szopa

Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of classical and quantum games are investigated in the context of their Pareto efficiency. The examples of the prisoner's dilemma, battle of the sexes and the game of chicken are studied. Correlated equilibria usually improve Nash equilibria of games but require a trusted correlation device susceptible to manipulation. The quantum extension of these games in the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein formalism and the Frąckiewicz-Pykacz parameterization is analyzed. It is shown that the Nash equilibria of these games in quantum mixed Pauli strategies are closer to Pareto optimal results than their classical counter-parts. The relationship of mixed Pauli strategies equilibria and correlated equilibria is also studied.

Entropy•Apr 22, 2021•21 citations

Nash equilibria in four-strategy quantum game extensions of the Prisoner's Dilemma

Piotr Frąckiewicz, Anna Gorczyca–Goraj, Krzysztof Grzegorz Grzanka +2 more

This paper investigates Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma. The quantization process involves extending the classical game by introducing two additional unitary strategies. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. For each class, we identify and analyse all possible Nash equilibria. Our results reveal the complexity and diversity of strategic behaviour in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In the case of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, the resulting Nash equilibria of quantum extensions are found to be closer to Pareto optimal solutions than those of the classical equilibrium.

arXiv:2411.01711•Nov 3, 2024•0 citations

Nash Equilibrium in the Quantum Battle of Sexes Game

Jiangfeng Du, Xiaodong Xu, Li, Hui +2 more

We investigate Nash Equilibrium in the quantum Battle of Sexes Game. We find the game has infinite Nash Equilibria and all of them leads to the asymmetry result. We also show that there is no unique but infinite Nash Equilibrium in it if we use the quantizing scheme proposed by Eisert et al and the two players are allowed to adopt any unitary operator as his/her strategies.

arXiv:quant-ph/0010050•Oct 12, 2000•13 citations
We extend the periodic point-based method for Eisert's quantum games (Schneider 2011 J. Phys. A: Math. Theor. 44 095301) to games not previously analyzed. From the comparison of different cases, we observe that games sharing the same classical features (as for instance the symmetrized Battle of the Sexes and the Chicken game) can have different characteristics after the quantization, and conversely, games with different classical behaviors (the Chicken game and the Prisoner's dilemma), are completely equivalent within Eisert's protocol. This fact is reflected in the structure of the map that the periodic point-procedure associates to the quantum game (from which the Nash equilibria are deduced). In order to understand how these unexpected outcomes are generated, we give a geometrical description of our observations in terms of bifurcation theory for maps.
We present a novel method of looking at Nash equilibria in 2 × 2 quantum games. Our method is based on a mathematical connection between the problem of identifying Nash equilibria in game theory, and the topological problem of the periodic points in nonlinear maps. To adapt our method to the original protocol designed by Eisert et al (1999 Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 3077–80) to study quantum games, we are forced to extend the space of strategies from the initial proposal. We apply our method to the extended strategy space version of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and find that a new set of Nash equilibria emerge in a natural way. Nash equilibria in this set are optimal as Eisert's solution of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and include this solution as a limit case.
The concept of Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum extensions of the general form of the Prisoner's Dilemma game is investigated. The process of quantization involves incorporating two additional unitary strategies, which effectively expand the classical game. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. The resulting Nash equilibria are found to be more closely aligned with Pareto-optimal solutions than those of the conventional Nash equilibrium outcome of the classical game. Our results demonstrate the complexity and diversity of strategic behavior in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In particular, we provide a detailed characterization of strategy profiles and their corresponding Nash equilibria, thereby extending the understanding of quantum strategies' impact on traditional game-theoretical problems.
We present a novel formulation of quantum game theory based on the Schmidt decomposition, which has the merit that the entanglement of quantum strategies is manifestly quantified. We apply this formulation to 2-player, 2-strategy symmetric games and obtain a complete set of quantum Nash equilibria. Apart from those available with the maximal entanglement, these quantum Nash equilibria are extensions of the Nash equilibria in classical game theory. The phase structure of the equilibria is determined for all values of entanglement, and thereby the possibility of resolving the dilemmas by entanglement in the game of Chicken, the Battle of the Sexes, the Prisoners' Dilemma, and the Stag Hunt, is examined. We find that entanglement transforms these dilemmas with each other but cannot resolve them, except in the Stag Hunt game where the dilemma can be alleviated to a certain degree.
Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of classical and quantum games are investigated in the context of their Pareto efficiency. The examples of the prisoner's dilemma, battle of the sexes and the game of chicken are studied. Correlated equilibria usually improve Nash equilibria of games but require a trusted correlation device susceptible to manipulation. The quantum extension of these games in the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein formalism and the Frąckiewicz-Pykacz parameterization is analyzed. It is shown that the Nash equilibria of these games in quantum mixed Pauli strategies are closer to Pareto optimal results than their classical counter-parts. The relationship of mixed Pauli strategies equilibria and correlated equilibria is also studied.
This paper investigates Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma. The quantization process involves extending the classical game by introducing two additional unitary strategies. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. For each class, we identify and analyse all possible Nash equilibria. Our results reveal the complexity and diversity of strategic behaviour in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In the case of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, the resulting Nash equilibria of quantum extensions are found to be closer to Pareto optimal solutions than those of the classical equilibrium.