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Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical

A periodic point-based method for the analysis of Nash equilibria in 2 × 2 symmetric quantum games

David M. Schneider

Published Feb 9, 2011• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We present a novel method of looking at Nash equilibria in 2 × 2 quantum games. Our method is based on a mathematical connection between the problem of identifying Nash equilibria in game theory, and the topological problem of the periodic points in nonlinear maps. To adapt our method to the original protocol designed by Eisert et al (1999 Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 3077–80) to study quantum games, we are forced to extend the space of strategies from the initial proposal. We apply our method to the extended strategy space version of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and find that a new set of Nash equilibria emerge in a natural way. Nash equilibria in this set are optimal as Eisert's solution of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and include this solution as a limit case.

DOI
10.1088/1751-8113/44/9/095301

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We present a novel method of looking at Nash equilibria in 2 × 2 quantum games. Our method is based on a mathematical connection between the problem of identifying Nash equilibria in game theory, and the topological problem of the periodic points in nonlinear maps. To adapt our method to the original protocol designed by Eisert et al (1999 Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 3077–80) to study quantum games, we are forced to extend the space of strategies from the initial proposal. We apply our method to the extended strategy space version of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and find that a new set of Nash equilibria emerge in a natural way. Nash equilibria in this set are optimal as Eisert's solution of the quantum Prisoner's dilemma and include this solution as a limit case.
We extend the periodic point-based method for Eisert's quantum games (Schneider 2011 J. Phys. A: Math. Theor. 44 095301) to games not previously analyzed. From the comparison of different cases, we observe that games sharing the same classical features (as for instance the symmetrized Battle of the Sexes and the Chicken game) can have different characteristics after the quantization, and conversely, games with different classical behaviors (the Chicken game and the Prisoner's dilemma), are completely equivalent within Eisert's protocol. This fact is reflected in the structure of the map that the periodic point-procedure associates to the quantum game (from which the Nash equilibria are deduced). In order to understand how these unexpected outcomes are generated, we give a geometrical description of our observations in terms of bifurcation theory for maps.
This paper investigates Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma. The quantization process involves extending the classical game by introducing two additional unitary strategies. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. For each class, we identify and analyse all possible Nash equilibria. Our results reveal the complexity and diversity of strategic behaviour in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In the case of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, the resulting Nash equilibria of quantum extensions are found to be closer to Pareto optimal solutions than those of the classical equilibrium.
The concept of Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum extensions of the general form of the Prisoner's Dilemma game is investigated. The process of quantization involves incorporating two additional unitary strategies, which effectively expand the classical game. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. The resulting Nash equilibria are found to be more closely aligned with Pareto-optimal solutions than those of the conventional Nash equilibrium outcome of the classical game. Our results demonstrate the complexity and diversity of strategic behavior in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In particular, we provide a detailed characterization of strategy profiles and their corresponding Nash equilibria, thereby extending the understanding of quantum strategies' impact on traditional game-theoretical problems.
We develop a rigorous mathematical framework for quantum game theory applied to static 2x2 games, extending classical concepts to the quantum setting where players may employ arbitrary unitary operations (pure strategies) or probability measures over the continuous group SU(2) (mixed strategies). The Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein protocol is introduced as the standard implementation of quantum 2x2 games. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria for continuous quantum mixed strategies via a fixed-point argument, generalising the classical Nash theorem to the quantum case.
We present a novel formulation of quantum game theory based on the Schmidt decomposition, which has the merit that the entanglement of quantum strategies is manifestly quantified. We apply this formulation to 2-player, 2-strategy symmetric games and obtain a complete set of quantum Nash equilibria. Apart from those available with the maximal entanglement, these quantum Nash equilibria are extensions of the Nash equilibria in classical game theory. The phase structure of the equilibria is determined for all values of entanglement, and thereby the possibility of resolving the dilemmas by entanglement in the game of Chicken, the Battle of the Sexes, the Prisoners' Dilemma, and the Stag Hunt, is examined. We find that entanglement transforms these dilemmas with each other but cannot resolve them, except in the Stag Hunt game where the dilemma can be alleviated to a certain degree.
For any two-by-two game G \mathbf {G} , we define a new two-player game G Q \mathbf {G}^Q . The definition is motivated by a vision of players in game G \mathbf {G} communicating via quantum technology according to the protocol introduced by J. Eisert and M. Wilkins. In the game G Q \mathbf {G}^Q , each player’s (mixed) strategy set consists of the set of all probability distributions on the 3-sphere S 3 \mathbf {S}^3 . Nash equilibria in the game can be difficult to compute. Our main theorems classify all possible mixed-strategy equilibria. First, we show that up to a suitable definition of equivalence, any strategy that arises in equilibrium is supported on at most four points; then we show that those four points must lie in one of a small number of allowable geometric configurations.