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Chinese Physics Letters

Forcible-Measurement Attack on Quantum Secure Direct Communication Protocol with Cluster State

Gao Fei, Fen-Zhuo Guo, Wen Qiao-yan, Fu-Chen Zhu

Published Jul 29, 2008• 18 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The security of the quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol with cluster state is analysed. It is shown that the secret would be partially leaked out when an eavesdropper performs forcible measurements on the transmitted particles. With the help of the result in minimum error discrimination, an upper bound (i.e. 40%) of this leakage is obtained. Moreover, the particular measurements which makes the leakage reach this bound are given.

DOI
10.1088/0256-307x/25/8/009

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The security of the quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol with cluster state is analysed. It is shown that the secret would be partially leaked out when an eavesdropper performs forcible measurements on the transmitted particles. With the help of the result in minimum error discrimination, an upper bound (i.e. 40%) of this leakage is obtained. Moreover, the particular measurements which makes the leakage reach this bound are given.
The quantum secure direct communication protocol recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) is revisited. A security leak is pointed out. Taking advantage of this leak, an eavesdropper may adopt the intercept–measure–resend strategy to attack the quantum channel such that in the C-S QSDC protocol the secret message can be completely eavesdropped. To fix the leak, the original version of the C-S QSDC protocol is revised. As a consequence, the security is improved and assured at least in the case of an ideal quantum channel.
The controlled quantum secure direct communication (CQSDC) with authentication protocol based on four particle cluster states via quantum one-time pad and local unitary operations is cryptanalyzed. It is found that there are some serious security issues in this protocol. An eavesdropper (Eve) can eavesdrop on some information of the identity strings of the receiver and the controller without being detected by the selective-CNOT-operation (SCNO) attack. By the same attack, Eve can also steal some information of the secret message that the sender transmits. In addition, the receiver can take the same kind of attack to eavesdrop on some information of the secret message out of the control of the controller. This means that the requirements of CQSDC are not satisfied. At last, we improve the original CQSDC protocol to a secure one.
In a recent paper[J. Korean. Phys. Soc. 49 (2006) 459], two GHZ-state-based quantum secure direct communication protocols were presented. Here we point out that an eavesdropper can utilize a special property of GHZ states, i.e. “correlation-elicitable" to obtain half information of the transmitted secrets without being detected in both protocols. The particular attack strategy is demonstrated in detail. Furthermore, a possible improvement is proposed, which makes the protocols secure against this kind of attack.