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Chinese Physics Letters

Cryptanalysis of Quantum Secure Direct Communication and Authentication Scheme via Bell States

Fei Gao, Su‐Juan Qin, Fen-Zhuo Guo, Qiaoyan Wen

Published Feb 1, 2011• 38 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The security of the quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) and authentication protocol based on Bell states is analyzed. It is shown that an eavesdropper can invalidate the authentication function, and implement a successful man-in-the-middle attack, where he/she can obtain or even modify the transmitted secret without introducing any error. The particular attack strategy is demonstrated and an improved protocol is presented.

DOI
10.1088/0256-307x/28/2/020303

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The security of the quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) and authentication protocol based on Bell states is analyzed. It is shown that an eavesdropper can invalidate the authentication function, and implement a successful man-in-the-middle attack, where he/she can obtain or even modify the transmitted secret without introducing any error. The particular attack strategy is demonstrated and an improved protocol is presented.
Abstract Recently, Yan et al . proposed a quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol with authentication using single photons and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs ( Yan L. et al ., Comput. Mater. Contin. , 63 (2020) 1297). In this work, we show that the above QSDC protocol is secure neither against intercept-and-resend attack, nor against impersonation attack. With any of these two types of attacks, an eavesdropper can recover the full secret message. We also propose a suitable modification of this protocol, which not only defeats the above attacks, but also resists all other common attacks. Thus, our modified protocol provides an improvement over the existing one in terms of security.
In a recent paper[J. Korean. Phys. Soc. 49 (2006) 459], two GHZ-state-based quantum secure direct communication protocols were presented. Here we point out that an eavesdropper can utilize a special property of GHZ states, i.e. “correlation-elicitable" to obtain half information of the transmitted secrets without being detected in both protocols. The particular attack strategy is demonstrated in detail. Furthermore, a possible improvement is proposed, which makes the protocols secure against this kind of attack.
Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) can transmit secret messages directly from one user to another without first establishing a shared secret key, which is different from quantum key distribution. In this paper, we propose a novel quantum secure direct communication protocol based on signal photons and Bell states. Before the execution of the proposed protocol, two participants Alice and Bob exchange their corresponding identity IDA and IDB through quantum key distribution and keep them secret, respectively. Then the message sender, Alice, encodes each secret message bit into two single photons (| 01〉or|10〉) or a Bell state , and composes an ordered secret message sequence. To insure the security of communication, Alice also prepares the decoy photons and inserts them into secret message sequence on the basis of the values of IDA and IDB. By the secret identity IDA and IDB, both sides of the communication can check eavesdropping and identify each other. The proposed protocol not only completes secure direct communication, but also realizes the mutual authentication. The security analysis of the proposed protocol is presented in the paper. The analysis results show that this protocol is secure against some common attacks, and no secret message leaks even if the messages are broken. Compared with the two-way QSDC protocols, the presented protocol is a one-way quantum communication protocol which has the immunity to Trojan horse attack. Furthermore, our proposed protocol can be realized without quantum memory.
We analyze the security of a quantum secure direct communication protocol equipped with authentication. We first propose a specifc attack on the protocol by which, an adversary can break the secret already shared between Alice and Bob, when he (adversary) runs the protocol few times. The attack shows that there is a gap in authentication procedure of the protocol, and by doing so the adversary can obtain the key without remaining any trace. We then give the modification of the protocol and analyze the security of it, and show how the modified protocol can close the gap.
The controlled quantum secure direct communication (CQSDC) with authentication protocol based on four particle cluster states via quantum one-time pad and local unitary operations is cryptanalyzed. It is found that there are some serious security issues in this protocol. An eavesdropper (Eve) can eavesdrop on some information of the identity strings of the receiver and the controller without being detected by the selective-CNOT-operation (SCNO) attack. By the same attack, Eve can also steal some information of the secret message that the sender transmits. In addition, the receiver can take the same kind of attack to eavesdrop on some information of the secret message out of the control of the controller. This means that the requirements of CQSDC are not satisfied. At last, we improve the original CQSDC protocol to a secure one.