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Lecture notes in computer science

Quantum-Like Representation of Irrational Inference

Masanari Asano, Irina Basieva, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov, Masanori Ohya, Yoshiharu Tanaka

Published Jan 1, 2012• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-35659-9_13

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Empirical findings from cognitive psychology indicate that, in scenarios under high levels of uncertainty, many people tend to make irrational decisions. To address this problem, models based on quantum probability theory, such as the quantum-like Bayesian networks, have been proposed. However, this model makes use of a Bayes normalisation factor during probabilistic inference to convert the likelihoods that result from quantum interference effects into probability values. The interpretation of this operation is not clear and leads to extremely skewed intensity waves that make the task of prediction of these irrational decisions challenging. This article proposes the law of balance, a novel mathematical formalism for probabilistic inferences in quantum-like Bayesian networks, based on the notion of balanced intensity waves. The general idea is to balance the intensity waves resulting from quantum interference in such a way that, during Bayes normalisation, they cancel each other. With this representation, we also propose the law of maximum uncertainty, which is a method to predict these paradoxes by selecting the amplitudes of the wave with the highest entropy. Empirical results show that the law of balance together with the law of maximum uncertainty were able to accurately predict different experiments from cognitive psychology showing paradoxical or irrational decisions, namely in the Prisoner's Dilemma game and the Two-Stage Gambling Game.
Classic probability theory (CPT) is generally considered the rational way to make inferences, but there have been some empirical findings showing a divergence between reasoning and the principles of classical probability theory (CPT), inviting the conclusion that humans are irrational. Perhaps the most famous of these findings is the conjunction fallacy (CF). Recently, the CF has been shown consistent with the principles of an alternative probabilistic framework, quantum probability theory (QPT). Does this imply that QPT is irrational or does QPT provide an alternative interpretation of rationality? Our presentation consists of 3 parts. First, we examine the putative rational status of QPT using the same argument as used to establish the rationality of CPT, the Dutch Book (DB) argument, according to which reasoners should not commit to bets guaranteeing a loss. We prove the rational status of QPT by formulating it as a particular case of an extended form of CPT, with separate probability spaces produced by changing context. Second, we empirically examine the key requirement for whether a CF can be rational or not; the results show that participants indeed behave rationally, at least relative to the representations they employ. Finally, we consider whether the conditions for the CF to be rational are applicable in the outside (nonmental) world. Our discussion provides a general and alternative perspective for rational probabilistic inference, based on the idea that contextuality requires either reasoning in separate CPT probability spaces or reasoning with QPT principles. (PsycINFO Database Record