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American Journal of Physics

Response to “Comment on ‘Nonlocal character of quantum theory,’ ” by Abner Shimony and Howard Stein [Am. J. Phys. 69 (8), 848–853 (2001)]

Henry Pierce Stapp

Published Aug 1, 2001• 14 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The question raised by Shimony and Stein is examined and used to explain in more detail a key point of my proof that any theory that conforms to certain general ideas of orthodox relativistic quantum field theory must permit transfers of information over space-like intervals. It is also explained why this result is not a problem for relativistic quantum theory, but, on the contrary, opens the door to a satisfactory realistic relativistic quantum theory based on the ideas of Tomonaga, Schwinger, and von Neumann.

DOI
10.1119/1.1374252

Related papers

Reply to "On Stapp's`Nonlocal Character of Quantum Theory' "

Henry Pierce Stapp

The question raised by Shimony and Stein is examined and used to explain in more detail a key point of my proof that any theory that conforms to certain general ideas of orthodox relativistic quantum field theory must permit transfers of information over spacelike intervals. It is also explained why this result is not a problem for relativistic quantum theory, but, on the contrary, opens the door to a satisfactory realistic relativistic quantum theory based on the ideas of Tomonaga, Schwinger, and von Neumann.

arXiv:quant-ph/0010086•Oct 25, 2000•0 citations

Counterfactual Logic and the Hardy Paradox: Remarks on Shimony and Stein's Criticism of Stapp's Proof

Tomasz Bigaj

This is an extended critique of comments made by Abner Shimony and Howard Stein on Henry Stapp’s proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics. Although I claim that ultimately Stapp’s proof does not establish its purported conclusion, yet Shimony and Stein’s criticism contains a number of weak points, which need to be clarified.

•May 1, 2004•2 citations

Comments on ‘Nonlocal Influences and Possible Worlds’

Henry Pierce Stapp

Clifton, Butterfield, and Redhead [1989] have constructed two separate arguments that bear some resemblances to a proof of mine pertaining to the nonlocal character of quantum theory. Their arguments have flaws, which they point out. I explicate my proof by explaining in detail both how it differs logically from the two arguments they have constructed, and how it avoids the pitfalls of both.

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Mar 1, 1990•7 citations

Quantum Locality?

Stapp, Henry

Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a ‘consistent quantum theory’ (CQT) that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues, on the basis of his examination of certain arguments that claim to demonstrate the existence of such nonlocal influences, that such influences do not exist. However, his examination was restricted mainly to hidden-variable-based arguments that include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by attributing to the system properties alien to that system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive framework. This necessary existence, within the ‘consistent’ framework, of long range essentially instantaneous influences refutes the claim made by Griffiths that his ‘consistent’ framework is superior to the orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann because it does not entail instantaneous influences. An added section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites a litany of ambiguities that seem to restrict, devastatingly, the scope of his CQT formalism, apparently to buttress his claim that my use of that formalism to validate the nonlocality theorem is flawed. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question. It is show here in detail why the precise statement of this theorem justifies the specified application of CQT. It is also shown, in response to his challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has proposed is not valid.

•Nov 10, 2011•0 citations

Quantum Locality?

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Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a ‘consistent quantum theory’ (CQT) that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues, on the basis of his examination of certain arguments that claim to demonstrate the existence of such nonlocal influences, that such influences do not exist. However, his examination was restricted mainly to hidden-variable-based arguments that include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by attributing to the system properties alien to that system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive framework. This necessary existence, within the ‘consistent’ framework, of long range essentially instantaneous influences refutes the claim made by Griffiths that his ‘consistent’ framework is superior to the orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann because it does not entail instantaneous influences. An added section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites a litany of ambiguities that seem to restrict, devastatingly, the scope of his CQT formalism, apparently to buttress his claim that my use of that formalism to validate the nonlocality theorem is flawed. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question. It is show here in detail why the precise statement of this theorem justifies the specified application of CQT. It is also shown, in response to his challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has proposed is not valid.

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Comment on “Nonlocal character of quantum theory,” by Henry P. Stapp [Am. J. Phys. 65 (4), 300–304 (1997)]

Abner Shimony, Howard Stein

A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.

American Journal of Physics•Aug 1, 2001•18 citations
The question raised by Shimony and Stein is examined and used to explain in more detail a key point of my proof that any theory that conforms to certain general ideas of orthodox relativistic quantum field theory must permit transfers of information over space-like intervals. It is also explained why this result is not a problem for relativistic quantum theory, but, on the contrary, opens the door to a satisfactory realistic relativistic quantum theory based on the ideas of Tomonaga, Schwinger, and von Neumann.
The question raised by Shimony and Stein is examined and used to explain in more detail a key point of my proof that any theory that conforms to certain general ideas of orthodox relativistic quantum field theory must permit transfers of information over spacelike intervals. It is also explained why this result is not a problem for relativistic quantum theory, but, on the contrary, opens the door to a satisfactory realistic relativistic quantum theory based on the ideas of Tomonaga, Schwinger, and von Neumann.
Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a ‘consistent quantum theory’ (CQT) that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues, on the basis of his examination of certain arguments that claim to demonstrate the existence of such nonlocal influences, that such influences do not exist. However, his examination was restricted mainly to hidden-variable-based arguments that include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by attributing to the system properties alien to that system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive framework. This necessary existence, within the ‘consistent’ framework, of long range essentially instantaneous influences refutes the claim made by Griffiths that his ‘consistent’ framework is superior to the orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann because it does not entail instantaneous influences. An added section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites a litany of ambiguities that seem to restrict, devastatingly, the scope of his CQT formalism, apparently to buttress his claim that my use of that formalism to validate the nonlocality theorem is flawed. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question. It is show here in detail why the precise statement of this theorem justifies the specified application of CQT. It is also shown, in response to his challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has proposed is not valid.
Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a ‘consistent quantum theory’ (CQT) that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues, on the basis of his examination of certain arguments that claim to demonstrate the existence of such nonlocal influences, that such influences do not exist. However, his examination was restricted mainly to hidden-variable-based arguments that include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by attributing to the system properties alien to that system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive framework. This necessary existence, within the ‘consistent’ framework, of long range essentially instantaneous influences refutes the claim made by Griffiths that his ‘consistent’ framework is superior to the orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann because it does not entail instantaneous influences. An added section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites a litany of ambiguities that seem to restrict, devastatingly, the scope of his CQT formalism, apparently to buttress his claim that my use of that formalism to validate the nonlocality theorem is flawed. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question. It is show here in detail why the precise statement of this theorem justifies the specified application of CQT. It is also shown, in response to his challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has proposed is not valid.
A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.