Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a ‘consistent quantum theory’ (CQT) that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues, on the basis of his examination of certain arguments that claim to demonstrate the existence of such nonlocal influences, that such influences do not exist. However, his examination was restricted mainly to hidden-variable-based arguments that include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by attributing to the system properties alien to that system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive framework. This necessary existence, within the ‘consistent’ framework, of long range essentially instantaneous influences refutes the claim made by Griffiths that his ‘consistent’ framework is superior to the orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann because it does not entail instantaneous influences. An added section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites a litany of ambiguities that seem to restrict, devastatingly, the scope of his CQT formalism, apparently to buttress his claim that my use of that formalism to validate the nonlocality theorem is flawed. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question. It is show here in detail why the precise statement of this theorem justifies the specified application of CQT. It is also shown, in response to his challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has proposed is not valid.
Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a ‘consistent quantum theory’ (CQT) that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues, on the basis of his examination of certain arguments that claim to demonstrate the existence of such nonlocal influences, that such influences do not exist. However, his examination was restricted mainly to hidden-variable-based arguments that include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by attributing to the system properties alien to that system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive framework. This necessary existence, within the ‘consistent’ framework, of long range essentially instantaneous influences refutes the claim made by Griffiths that his ‘consistent’ framework is superior to the orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann because it does not entail instantaneous influences. An added section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites a litany of ambiguities that seem to restrict, devastatingly, the scope of his CQT formalism, apparently to buttress his claim that my use of that formalism to validate the nonlocality theorem is flawed. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question. It is show here in detail why the precise statement of this theorem justifies the specified application of CQT. It is also shown, in response to his challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has proposed is not valid.
Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a ‘consistent quantum theory’ (CQT) that he has developed, the issue of whether, as is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light transfers of information over long distances. He argues, on the basis of his examination of certain arguments that claim to demonstrate the existence of such nonlocal influences, that such influences do not exist. However, his examination was restricted mainly to hidden-variable-based arguments that include in their premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One cannot logically prove properties of a system by attributing to the system properties alien to that system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited proof is valid within that restrictive framework. This necessary existence, within the ‘consistent’ framework, of long range essentially instantaneous influences refutes the claim made by Griffiths that his ‘consistent’ framework is superior to the orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann because it does not entail instantaneous influences. An added section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites a litany of ambiguities that seem to restrict, devastatingly, the scope of his CQT formalism, apparently to buttress his claim that my use of that formalism to validate the nonlocality theorem is flawed. But the vagaries that he cites do not upset the proof in question. It is show here in detail why the precise statement of this theorem justifies the specified application of CQT. It is also shown, in response to his challenge, why a putative proof of locality that he has proposed is not valid.
It may well be that a relativistic version of the theory, while Lorentz invariant and local at the observational level, may be necessarily non-local and with a preferred frame (or aether) at the fundamental level. – John Bell [1] Introduction Bell's theorem establishes a contradiction between locality (and a few other assumptions) and certain predictions of quantum mechanics [2]. There have been two main issues surrounding the deep implications of this celebrated theorem. The first issue is basic, and it concerns whether the theorem really establishes that nonlocality is a necessary feature of any empirically viable theory and hence a feature of nature itself. One aspect of the issue concerns exactly what the underlying assumptions of Bell's theorem are. For example, some argue that these assumptions include the assumption of counterfactual definiteness [3–5], while others disagree [6–8]. The other aspect of the issue concerns which assumption should be dropped due to the resulting contradiction. Some believe that standard quantum mechanics may avoid nonlocality by denying counterfactual definiteness [3–5]. The second issue is much deeper, and it concerns how to make sense of the strange nonlocality when assuming that Bell's theorem establishes that our world is nonlocal. In particular, it has yet to be determined whether such quantum nonlocality is compatible with the theory of relativity, e.g., whether the nonlocality requires the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame [7, 9, 10]. It seems that “there is a preferred frame of reference, and in this preferred frame of reference things do go faster than light … Behind the apparent Lorentz invariance of the phenomena, there is a deeper level which is not Lorentz invariant” [11]. But it also seems possible that the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame is an illusion, since it cannot be detected according to standard quantum mechanics. A more subtle issue is whether quantum nonlocality permits superluminal signaling. It is widely thought that the answers to these questions will lead to a deeper understanding of Bell's theorem and quantum nonlocality. In this paper, we will present a new analysis of quantum nonlocality and its apparent incompatibility with relativity.
It is shown that when properly analyzed using principles consistent with the
use of a Hilbert space to describe microscopic properties, quantum mechanics is
a local theory: one system cannot influence another system with which it does
not interact. Claims to the contrary based on quantum violations of Bell
inequalities are shown to be incorrect. A specific example traces a violation
of the CHSH Bell inequality in the case of a spin-3/2 particle to the
noncommutation of certain quantum operators in a situation where (non)locality
is not an issue. A consistent histories analysis of what quantum measurements
measure, in terms of quantum properties, is used to identify the basic problem
with derivations of Bell inequalities: the use of classical concepts (hidden
variables) rather than a probabilistic structure appropriate to the quantum
domain. A difficulty with the original Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument
for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics is the use of a counterfactual
argument which is not valid if one assumes that Hilbert-space quantum mechanics
is complete; locality is not an issue. The quantum correlations that violate
Bell inequalities can be understood using local quantum common causes.
Wavefunction collapse and Schr\odinger steering are calculational procedures,
not physical processes. A general Principle of Einstein Locality rules out
nonlocal influences between noninteracting quantum systems. Some suggestions
are made for changes in terminology that could clarify discussions of quantum
foundations and be less confusing to students.
Bell's theorem is 50 years old. Still there is a controversy about its implications. Much of it has its roots in confusion regarding the premises from which the theorem can be derived. Some claim that a derivation of Bell's inequalities requires just locality assumption, and nothing more. Violations of the inequalities are then interpreted as ``nonlocality'' or ``quantum nonlocality''. We show that such claims are unfounded and that every derivation of Bell's inequalities requires a premise -- in addition to locality and freedom of choice -- which is either assumed tacitly, or unconsciously, or is embedded in a single compound condition (like Bell's ``local causality''). The premise is equivalent to the assumption of existence of additional variables which do not appear in the quantum formalism (in form of determinism, or joint probability for outcomes of all conceivable measurements, or ``additional causes`'', or ``hidden variables'', ``complete description of the state'' or counterfactual definiteness, etc.). A certain irony is that perhaps the main message of violation of Bell's inequalities is that our notion of locality should be based on an operationally well-defined no-signalling condition, rather than on local causality.
The view exists that the Bell inequality is a mere inconsistent application of classical concepts to a well-established quantum world. In the article, ``Nonlocality claims are inconsistent with Hilbert-space quantum mechanics'' [Phys. Rev. A, 101, 022117, (2020)], Robert B. Griffiths advocates for quantum theory's locality. Although R. B. Griffiths presents valuable insights in favor of quantum mechanics' local character, he argues the Bell inequality is an inconsistent application of classical physics to quantum mechanics. We explain why a correct assessment of the Bell inequality does not in fact conflict with Griffiths's views of quantum locality and, on the contrary, it already contemplates them. Hence, Bell inequality inconsistency is not necessary for Griffiths's quantum locality to hold.