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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Comments on ‘Nonlocal Influences and Possible Worlds’

Henry Pierce Stapp

Published Mar 1, 1990• 7 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Clifton, Butterfield, and Redhead [1989] have constructed two separate arguments that bear some resemblances to a proof of mine pertaining to the nonlocal character of quantum theory. Their arguments have flaws, which they point out. I explicate my proof by explaining in detail both how it differs logically from the two arguments they have constructed, and how it avoids the pitfalls of both.

DOI
10.1093/bjps/41.1.59

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Clifton, Butterfield, and Redhead [1989] have constructed two separate arguments that bear some resemblances to a proof of mine pertaining to the nonlocal character of quantum theory. Their arguments have flaws, which they point out. I explicate my proof by explaining in detail both how it differs logically from the two arguments they have constructed, and how it avoids the pitfalls of both.
A recent proof, formulated in the symbolic language of modal logic, shows that a well-defined formulation of the possibility mentioned in the title is answered affirmatively. In the paper being commented upon several proposals were made about how to translate this symbolic proof into prose, and it was concluded, on the basis of those proposed translations, that either the proof was invalid or that an unwarranted reality assumption was made. However, those interpretations deviate in small but important ways from the precise logical path followed in the proof. It is explained here how by staying on this path one avoids the difficulties that those deviations engendered.