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International Journal of Quantum Information

CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE QUANTUM STATE SHARING PROTOCOL USING FOUR SETS OF W-CLASS STATES

Xiu‐Bo Chen, Shuai Yang, Gang Xu, Yuan Su, Yixian Yang

Published Feb 1, 2013• 14 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Recently, a protocol is proposed for the quantum state sharing (QSTS) of an arbitrary three-photon state using four sets of W-class states. Unfortunately, its security analysis is inadequate. In this paper, we find the security loophole of this QSTS protocol. It is mainly caused by the fake quantum channel, whose security is not guaranteed by the legal participants. We present a simple but feasible strategy, by which an eavesdropper can successfully steal the exact secret. Furthermore, a secure QSTS protocol is put forward. The security of our improved protocol is analyzed in details.

DOI
10.1142/s021974991350010x

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Recently, a protocol is proposed for the quantum state sharing (QSTS) of an arbitrary three-photon state using four sets of W-class states. Unfortunately, its security analysis is inadequate. In this paper, we find the security loophole of this QSTS protocol. It is mainly caused by the fake quantum channel, whose security is not guaranteed by the legal participants. We present a simple but feasible strategy, by which an eavesdropper can successfully steal the exact secret. Furthermore, a secure QSTS protocol is put forward. The security of our improved protocol is analyzed in details.
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Recently, Gao et al.'s [ Commun. Theor. Phys. 52 (2009) 421 ] multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol with two-photon three-dimensional Bell states was enhanced by Hwang et al. [ Commun. Theor. Phys. 56 (2011) 79 ]. The improved protocol removes some unnecessary unitary operations, devices, and transmissions by the technique of decoy single photons and careful modification. However, in this paper, we investigate the security of the improved protocol and find it is insecure. The eavesdropper can steal all Alice's secret information. Furthermore, a feasible modification to remedy the security loophole is put forward. Our improved protocol provides a basic method to modify a kind of MQSS protocols which cannot resist the collusion attack.
Security of a quantum secret sharing of quantum state protocol proposed by Guo et al. [Chin. Phys. Lett. 25 (2008) 16] is reexamined. It is shown that an eavesdropper can obtain some of the transmitted secret information by monitoring the classical channel or the entire secret by intercepting the quantum states, and moreover, the eavesdropper can even maliciously replace the secret message with an arbitrary message without being detected. Finally, the deep reasons why an eavesdropper can attack this protocol are discussed and the modified protocol is presented to amend the security loopholes.
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is a typical multipartite quantum cryptographic primitive. Although QSS is theoretically secure, imperfect experimental devices would threaten its security. The glare blinding attack is a strong attack against practical single-photon detectors. In the paper, we propose a simple and effective glare blinding attack strategy in the practical three-partite QSS system. The glare blinding attack combined with the fake-state attack enables the eavesdropper to steal parts of transmitted keys without being detected. We provide the numerical simulation of QSS's performance in the above attack condition. The simulation results show that QSS's maximal photon transmission distance is largely reduced to about 10 km. Our work indicates the importance of inspecting QSS's security loopholes in the detector. The glare blinding attack should become a general testing item in the security evaluation standard of QSS.
In this paper, the perfect secret sharing in quantum cryptography is investigated. On one hand, the security of a recent protocol [Adhikari et al. Quantum Inform. \& Comput. 12 (2012) 0253-0261] is re-examined. We find that it violates the requirement of information theoretic security in the secret sharing and suffers from the information leakage. The cryptanalysis including several specific attack strategies are given, which shows that a dishonest participant can steal half or all of the secrets without being detected. On the other hand, we design a new quantum secret sharing protocol. The security of protocol is rigorously proved. It meets the fundamental requirement of information theoretic security. Furthermore, the security analysis including both the outside attacks and participant attacks is given in details. It is shown that our proposed protocol can achieve perfect secret sharing.