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Chinese Physics Letters

Cryptanalysis of Multiparty Quantum Secret Sharing of Quantum State Using Entangled States

Qin Su-Juan, Wen Qiao-yan, Fu-Chen Zhu

Published Oct 1, 2008• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Security of a quantum secret sharing of quantum state protocol proposed by Guo et al. [Chin. Phys. Lett. 25 (2008) 16] is reexamined. It is shown that an eavesdropper can obtain some of the transmitted secret information by monitoring the classical channel or the entire secret by intercepting the quantum states, and moreover, the eavesdropper can even maliciously replace the secret message with an arbitrary message without being detected. Finally, the deep reasons why an eavesdropper can attack this protocol are discussed and the modified protocol is presented to amend the security loopholes.

DOI
10.1088/0256-307x/25/10/009

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Security of a quantum secret sharing of quantum state protocol proposed by Guo et al. [Chin. Phys. Lett. 25 (2008) 16] is reexamined. It is shown that an eavesdropper can obtain some of the transmitted secret information by monitoring the classical channel or the entire secret by intercepting the quantum states, and moreover, the eavesdropper can even maliciously replace the secret message with an arbitrary message without being detected. Finally, the deep reasons why an eavesdropper can attack this protocol are discussed and the modified protocol is presented to amend the security loopholes.
This paper analyzes the security of a quantum secret sharing protocol between multiparty and multiparty, which was proposed by Yan and Gao. We show that this protocol is not secure because an external attacker can obtain the secret message shared by the two groups, making use of entanglement swapping. There are two reasons leading to this result. Firstly, the messages, which are transmitted on the quantum and classical channels, are not protected by message authentication. Secondly, the last participant in group 1 knows more information about the shared secret by the two groups. This result shows that there are some hidden security loopholes in this kind of quantum secret sharing protocols.
Extending the eavesdropping strategy devised by Zhang, Li, and Guo [Zhang, Li, and Guo, Phys. Rev. A 63, 036301 (2001)], we show that the multiparty quantum communication protocol based on entanglement swapping, which was proposed by Cabello (e-print quant-ph∕0009025), is not secure. We modify the protocol so that entanglement swapping can secure multiparty quantum communication, such as multiparty quantum key distribution and quantum secret sharing of classical information, and show that the modified protocol is secure against the Zhang-Li-Guo strategy for eavesdropping as well as the basic intercept-resend attack.
Recently, Yan and Gao [Phys. Rev. A 72, 012304 (2005)] presented a quantum secret sharing protocol which allows a secret message to be shared between two groups of parties (mmm parties in group 1 and nnn parties in group 2). Their protocol is claimed to be secure that, except with the cooperation of the entire group 1 or group 2, no subgroup of either group 1 or group 2 can extract the secret message. However, this study points out that the mthm\text{th}mth party (the last party to process the quantum state) of group 1 can maliciously replace the secret message with an arbitrary message without the detection of the other parties.
Recently, Gao et al.'s [ Commun. Theor. Phys. 52 (2009) 421 ] multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol with two-photon three-dimensional Bell states was enhanced by Hwang et al. [ Commun. Theor. Phys. 56 (2011) 79 ]. The improved protocol removes some unnecessary unitary operations, devices, and transmissions by the technique of decoy single photons and careful modification. However, in this paper, we investigate the security of the improved protocol and find it is insecure. The eavesdropper can steal all Alice's secret information. Furthermore, a feasible modification to remedy the security loophole is put forward. Our improved protocol provides a basic method to modify a kind of MQSS protocols which cannot resist the collusion attack.