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Foundations of Physics Letters

An ?observer decomposition? for Everett's theory

Yoav Ben-Dov

Published Aug 1, 1990• 10 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf00769710

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It is generally accepted that Everett's theory of quantum mechanics cannot be experimentally tested as such experiment would involve operations on the observer which are beyond our current technology. We propose an alternative to test Everett's theory which does not involve any operation on the observer. If we assume that the observer is of finite dimension, it is shown that Everett's theory leads to distinctive properties for the system being observed, and that such difference can be experimentally tested.
Everett's relative-state construction in quantum theory has never been satisfactorily expressed in the Heisenberg picture. What one might have expected to be a straightforward process was impeded by conceptual and technical problems that we solve here. The result is a construction which, unlike Everett's one in the Schrödinger picture, makes manifest the locality of Everettian multiplicity, its inherently approximative nature and its origin in certain kinds of entanglement and locally inaccessible information. (By Everettian , we are referring not only to Everett's own work, but also to versions of quantum theory that elaborate and refine his. The notion of relative states first appeared in Everett (Everett 1973 In The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (eds BS DeWitt, N Graham)). We are proposing a formalism for relative states that is more detailed and more illuminating than Everett's.) Our construction also allows us to give a more precise definition of an Everett ‘universe’, under which it is fully quantum, not quasi-classical, and we compare the Everettian decomposition of a quantum state with the foliation of a space–time.
Everett ( 1957a , b , 1973 ) relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics has often been taken to involve a metaphysical commitment to the existence of many splitting worlds each containing physical copies of observers and the objects they observe. While there was earlier talk of splitting worlds in connection with Everett, this is largely due to DeWitt’s (Phys Today 23:30–35, 1970 ) popular presentation of the theory. While the thought of splitting worlds or parallel universes has captured the popular imagination, Everett himself favored the language of elements, branches, or relative states in describing his theory. The result is that there is no mention of splitting worlds or parallel universes in any of Everett’s published work. Everett, however, did write of splitting observers and was willing to adopt the language of many worlds in conversation with people who were themselves using such language. While there is evidence that Everett was not entirely comfortable with talk of many worlds, it does not seem to have mattered much to him what language one used to describe pure wave mechanics. This was in part a result of Everett’s empirical understanding of the cognitive status of his theory.