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Foundations of Physics

On Bell’s Everett (?) Theory

Shan Gao

Published Aug 1, 2022• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10701-022-00609-2

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I define a notion of local causality LOC closely modelled on the Bell principle, construed as the condition that single case probabilities cannot be modified by actions at spacelike separation. The new principle, like that of Bell, forces Bell inequalities, but with two loopholes: one is retrocausation, known to Bell, but the other is nonuniqueness of remote outcomes, a loophole only for LOC, not for the Bell principle. I also set out a theory of physical probability, applicable to the Everett interpretation, in agreement with the Born rule, and therefore violating Bell inequalities. I show it is consistent with LOC. Surprisingly, both loopholes are exploited. I conclude not only that probability in the Everett interpretation involves no action at a distance, but that the observed violations of Bell inequalities is powerful evidence for many worlds.