A joint paper by Albert Einstein and \nPaul Ehrenfest, published just weeks \nafter the results of the Stern-Gerlach \nexperiment became known, shows \nwith remarkable clarity and prescience \nthe unsurmountable difficulties \nthat the experiment posed for \nany classical interpretation. With a \nfocus on the measurement process, \nrather than on the underlying theoretical \nalternatives for this experimentum \ncrucis, the authors almost \nanticipate what would later be recognized \nas a central conceptual difficulty \nof quantum mechanics, i.e., the \nquantum measurement problem.
A joint paper by Albert Einstein and \nPaul Ehrenfest, published just weeks \nafter the results of the Stern-Gerlach \nexperiment became known, shows \nwith remarkable clarity and prescience \nthe unsurmountable difficulties \nthat the experiment posed for \nany classical interpretation. With a \nfocus on the measurement process, \nrather than on the underlying theoretical \nalternatives for this experimentum \ncrucis, the authors almost \nanticipate what would later be recognized \nas a central conceptual difficulty \nof quantum mechanics, i.e., the \nquantum measurement problem.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
Q UANTUM MECHANICS, TOGETHER WITH RELATIVITY, are the basis of most of what we know of the very large, the very small, and the very fast.And in all of these areas our knowledge is extensive.It would be hard to say how good these theories are; arithmetic, one might say, is good mathematics.For all that, there is a problem, a strange and amorphous difficulty: it is the problem of measurement.This problem has become much more interesting, and much more pressing, as a result of some recent developments.Hitherto the difficulty has been so peculiar, and so formless, that physicists have on the whole thought it a matter of philosophy.But that is not quite right (or that is what I shall argue).It is certainly philosophical, but it is also a matter of methodology, a question of what physics is to do; and now the matter has come to seem quite pressing.In this sense the measurement problem has become a problem for physics.But what is the problem of measurement?As a first stab, we can say this: on the basis of quantum mechanics, there is a difficulty in accounting for the
The central problem in the quantum theory of measurement, how to describe the process of state reduction in terms of the quantum mechanical formalism, is solved on the basis of the relativity of quantal states, which implies that once the apparatus is detected in a well-defined state, the object state must reduce to a corresponding one. This is a process termed by Schrodinger disentanglement. Here, it is essential to observe that Renninger's negative result does constitute an actual measurement process. From this point of view, Heisenberg's interpretation of his microscope experiment and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen arguments are reinvestigated. Satisfactory discussions are given to various experimental situations, such as the Stern-Gerlach-type experiment, successive measurements, macroscopic measurements, and Schrodinger's cat. Finally it is proposed to regard a state vector in quantum mechanics as an irreducible physical construct, in Margenau's sense, that is not further analyzable both mathematically and conceptually.
Stern-Gerlach experiment is a paradigm of measurement theory in quantum mechanics. Notwithstanding several analysis given in literature, no clear understanding of the apparent collapse has been given so far. Indeed, one can imagine a Stern-Gerlach device where all environmental effects are removed and ask the question on how the measurement goes on. In this letter we will prove that a the Stern-Gerlach device behaves as a true measurement apparatus, as expected by the Copenaghen interpretation, by the Ehrenfest theorem. In this way we recover, by other means, a limit on the Stern-Gerlach device, given by Bohm, based on scrambling of phases due to a large oscillation frequency.
The basic thesis of this book is that there is no quantum measurement problem. I do not mean by this that the apparent paradoxes of quantum mechanics arise because we fail to recognize ‘that quantum theory does not describe physical reality’ (Fuchs and Peres 2000a). Quantum theory describes reality just fine, like any other scientific theory worth taking seriously: describing (and explaining) reality is what the scientific enterprise is about. Nor do I mean that we have found solutions to the problem, ways to modify or supplement quantum mechanics so that the paradoxes are removed. I don’t actually think that we have found any very satisfactory solutions in this sense (at least not in the relativistic domain) but that isn’t my theme: even if we did have these modifications, they would be ways of changing from quantum physics, which supposedly does have a measurement problem, to some other theory, which supposedly doesn’t.
Ever since the beginning of quantum mechanics, the measurement problem has been a subject of sometimes discontinued but nevertheless recurrent concern. As students, most physicists have raised questions about it, but the spectacular and renewed successes of quantum theory were a strong incentive for them to work out applications without further worrying about foundations. In each generation, however, some dissatisfaction reemerges, which leads to slow progress, and we may expect that the measurement problem will some day be cleared up rather than forgotten. The situation recalls statistical mechanics, the foundations of which still give rise to scientific discussions, in spite of more than one century’s achievements. Actually, the paradoxes of irreversibility and of Maxwell’s demon share some common features with quantum measurements, to wit, they involve probabilities in a crucial fashion and their explanation requires elucidating the role of the observer.