Abstract A central problem in the interpretation of non‐relativistic quantum mechanics is to relate the conceptual structure of the theory to the classical idea of the state of a physical system. This paper approaches the problem by presenting an analysis of the notion of an elementary physical proposition. The notion is shown to be realized in standard formulations of the theory and to illuminate the significance of proofs of the impossibility of hidden variable extensions. In the interpretation of quantum mechanics that emerges from this analysis, the philosophically distinctive features of the theory derive from the fact that it seeks to represent a reality of which complete knowledge is essentially unattainable.
The term proposition usually denotes in quantum mechanics (QM) an element of (standard) quantum logic (QL). Within the orthodox interpretation of QM the propositions of QL cannot be associated with sentences of a language stating properties of individual samples of a physical system, since properties are nonobjective in QM. This makes the interpretation of propositions problematical. The difficulty can be removed by adopting the objective interpretation of QM proposed by one of the authors (semantic realism, or SR, interpretation). In this case, a unified perspective can be adopted for QM and classical mechanics (CM), and a simple first order predicate calculus L(x) with Tarskian semantics can be constructed such that one can associate a physical proposition (i.e., a set of physical states) with every sentence of L(x). The set
Pf of all physical propositions is partially ordered and contains a subset
PTf of testable physical propositions whose order structure depends on the criteria of testability established by the physical theory. In particular,
PTf turns out to be a Boolean lattice in CM, while it can be identified with QL in QM. Hence the propositions of QL can be associated with sentences of L(x), or also with the sentences of a suitable quantum language
LTQ(x), and the structure of QL characterizes the notion of testability in QM. One can then show that the notion of quantum truth does not conflict with the classical notion of truth within this perspective. Furthermore, the interpretation of QL propounded here proves to be equivalent to a previous pragmatic interpretation worked out by one of the authors, and can be embodied within a more general perspective which considers states as first order predicates of a broader language with a Kripkean semantics.
The semantics underlying the propositional structure of Hilbert space quantum mechanics involves an inherent ambiguity concerning the impossibility of assigning definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. Although the preceding Kochen-Specker result forbids a global, absolute assignment of truth values to quantum mechanical propositions, it does not exclude ones that are contextual. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton “uniqueness theorem” is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a suitable “preferred” observable. It is suggested that the most natural choice of the latter, especially for confronting the problem of truth valuation in quantum mechanics, results in the determinateness of the observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The resulting account of truth is compatible with a realist conception of truth. Such an account essentially denies that there can be a universal context of reference or an Archimedean standpoint from which to evaluate logically the totality of facts of nature.