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International Journal of Theoretical Physics

Maximal structures of determinate propositions in quantum mechanics

Jeffrey Bub

Published Aug 1, 1995• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf00676236

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Given a complete orthocomplemented lattice L and a set S of nonnegative real functions on L, sufficient conditions are established that S should fulfill in order that L be atomic. The conditions are investigated under which L may be represented by the lattice of all closed subspaces of a separable Hilbert space. (As is well known, the atomicity of L plays an important role here.) Some unsolved problems are pointed out. In axiomatic quantum mechanics, the lattice L may represent the set of propositions whereas the set of functions S represents the set of physical states. The conditions imposed on the pair (L,S) then have a simple and plausible physical interpretation; an important condition imposed on (L,S) is the existence of the ``maximal'' (i.e., maximally determined) states which appear in the theory as limit constructions.