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Springer eBooks

Concurrently-Secure Blind Signatures Without Random Oracles or Setup Assumptions

Carmit Hazay, Jonathan I. Katz, Chiu‐Yuen Koo, Yehuda Lindell

Published May 16, 2007• 64 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-540-70936-7_18

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Abstract. All known round optimal (i.e., two-move) blind signature schemes either need a common reference string, rely on random oracles, or assume the hardness of some interactive assumption. At Eurocrypt 2010, Fischlin and Schröder showed that a broad class of three-move blind signature scheme cannot be instantiated in the standard model based on any non-interactive assumption. This puts forward the question if round optimal blind signature schemes exist in the standard model. Here, we give a positive answer presenting the first round optimal blind signature scheme that is secure in the standard model without any setup assumptions. Our solution does not need interactive assumptions. 1
This paper proposes a generic construction of hierarchical identity-based identification (HIBI) protocols secure against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks in the standard model. The proposed construction converts a digital signature scheme existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks, where the scheme has a protocol for showing possession of a signing key, not a signature. Our construction is based on the so-called certificate-based construction of hierarchical identity-based cryptosystems, and utilizes a variant of the well-known OR-proof technique to ensure the security against impersonation under active and concurrent attacks. We also present several concrete examples of our construction employing the Waters signature (EUROCRYPT 2005), and other signatures. As results, its concurrent security of each instantiation is proved under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, the RSA assumption, or their variants in the standard model. Chin, Heng, and Goi proposed an HIBI protocol passively and concurrently secure under the CDH and one-more CDH assumption, respectively (FGIT-SecTech 2009). However, its security is proved in the random oracle model.