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Lecture notes in computer science

Non-Interactive Blind Signatures: Post-Quantum and Stronger Security

Foteini Baldimtsi, Jiaqi Cheng, Rishab Goyal, Aayush Yadav

Published Dec 10, 2024• 5 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-981-96-0888-1_3

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Blind signatures (BS) allow a signer to produce a valid signature on a message without learning the message itself.They have niche applications in privacy-preserving protocols such as digital cash and electronic voting.Non-interactive blind signatures (NIBS) remove the need for interaction between the signer and the user.In the post-quantum era, lattice-based NIBS schemes are studied as candidates for long-term security.In Asiacrypt 2024, Baldimtsi et al. proposed the first lattice-based NIBS construction, whose security relies on the random one-more inhomogeneous short integer solution (rOM-ISIS) assumption.This rOM-ISIS is considered to be a non-standard assumption.Later, Zhang et al. introduced another lattice-based construction in ProvSec 2024, and proved its security under the standard module short integer solution (MSIS) assumption.We analyse the security of the latter scheme.In the random oracle model, we show that it fails to achieve both nonce blindness and receiver blindness.We present explicit attacks where an adversary breaks both properties with probability 1.Our attack is based on a crucial observation that uncovers a flaw in the design.Specifically, this flaw allows an attacker to link a message-signature pair with its presignature-nonce pair.In addition, we also identify a flaw in the unforgeability proof.Finally, we suggest a modification to address the issue, which is similar to Baldimtsi et al. construction, and its security relies again on the non-standard rOM-ISIS assumption.This work again raises the question of the feasibility of achieving NIBS from standard assumptions.
Actually, the NIST post-quantum cryptosystem standardization competition reached its third round with seven finalist candidates. And NIST invites the cryptographic community to analyzing the selected candidates. In this context, we contribute by creating a new blind digital signature protocol over our release of NTRU post-quantum cryptosystem. Our protocol can be a variant of FALCON digital signature scheme, which is among of those finalist candidates. Because of our NTRU release is additively homomorphic, we successfully blind and unblind the digital signature by adding a random message. We obtained good results; the speed performance of our protocol outperforms FALCON by a factor up to 27, with a stronger security level, and perfect correctness.