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International Symposium on Information Theory and its Applications

Binary transmissions over Gaussian wiretap channel under soft/hard decision decoding

Chao Qi, Yanling Chen, A. J. Han Vinck, Xiaohu Tang

Published Dec 11, 2014• 1 citation
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Abstract

We study the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel with binary input under either soft or hard decision decoding. A closed-form expression of the secrecy capacity is derived by assuming that the eavesdropper uses the same decoding method as the legitimate receiver. An upper bound of the loss of secrecy capacity is provided whilst a smart eavesdropper choosing the best decoding method and a legitimate receiver employing an insufficient decoding method. Simulations show that in the low SNR (of the main channel) region, the secrecy capacity of the binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel under soft decision decoding is larger than the one under hard decision decoding; as the SNR increases, the secrecy capacity under hard decision decoding tends to overtake.

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arXiv:2006.00191•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Nov 17, 2021•3 citations
We study the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel with binary input under either soft or hard decision decoding. A closed-form expression of the secrecy capacity is derived by assuming that the eavesdropper uses the same decoding method as the legitimate receiver. An upper bound of the loss of secrecy capacity is provided whilst a smart eavesdropper choosing the best decoding method and a legitimate receiver employing an insufficient decoding method. Simulations show that in the low SNR (of the main channel) region, the secrecy capacity of the binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel under soft decision decoding is larger than the one under hard decision decoding; as the SNR increases, the secrecy capacity under hard decision decoding tends to overtake.
In this paper, we investigate the effect of output quantization on the secrecy capacity of the binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel. As a result, a closed-form expression with infinite summation terms of the secrecy capacity of the binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel is derived for the case when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have unquantized outputs. In particular, computable tight upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity are obtained. Theoretically, we prove that when the legitimate receiver has unquantized outputs while the eavesdropper has binary quantized outputs, the secrecy capacity is larger than that when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have unquantized outputs or both have binary quantized outputs. Further, numerical results show that in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) (of the main channel) region, the secrecy capacity of the binary input Gaussian wiretap channel when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have unquantized outputs is larger than the capacity when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have binary quantized outputs; as the SNR increases, the secrecy capacity when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have binary quantized outputs tends to overtake.
We investigate the fundamental communication limits when messages are sent via a Gaussian two-way channel, which must at the same time be kept secret from an external eavesdropper. In this two-way wiretap channel that models two legitimate transceivers and an eavesdropping receiver, there are two techniques to provide confidentiality for the messages: one entails the legitimate nodes to jam the eavesdropper, i.e., cooperative jamming, while the other entails generating keys from the feedback signals received by the two legitimate nodes and using them to encrypt the messages. Previous work has shown that both methods can be used concurrently to improve the secrecy rates of a channel with a degradedness condition. In this work, we consider the general case, and derive a new outer bound for the secrecy capacity region of this channel. A case is identified where the loss in secrecy rate, due to ignoring the backward (feedback) link at each legitimate transmitter from the other, is bounded by a constant which only depends on the channel gains. This is the case when the power of the two legitimate nodes increases proportionally. In all other cases, we show that ignoring feedback signals causes unbounded loss in the secrecy rate. The loss is measured as the gap between the achievable rate when the feedback signals are taken into account, and the upper bound when the feedback is not used, and hence is not affected by the choice of the achievable scheme. This result therefore establishes that, for the Gaussian two-way channel with an external eavesdropper, the encoders need to be designed with memory. This is in contrast to the result for this channel in the absence of an eavesdropper.
We study the secrecy capacity of Gaussian wiretap channel aided by an external jammer/helper. Both the transmitter and the intended receiver are equipped with a single antenna, while the eavesdropper and the jammer are equipped withMMMandNNNantennas, respectively. Generally, an analytical form of the secrecy capacity in this scenario is difficult to obtain. Instead, we consider a null-space jamming scheme which totally nulls out the jamming signal at the legitimate receiver, and derive lower and upper bounds on its maximal achievable secrecy rateRN{R_N}RN​. The relationship between the average secrecy capacityCˉN{\bar C_N}CˉN​of Gaussian wiretap channel and the average secrecy rateRˉN{\bar R_N}RˉN​achieved by the null-space jamming scheme is investigated, and we prove thatRˉN≤CˉN≤RˉN+1{\bar R_N} \leq {\bar C_N} \leq {\bar R_{N + 1}}RˉN​≤CˉN​≤RˉN+1​. Based on this inequality and the derived lower and upper bounds onRN{R_N}RN​, the upper and lower bounds on the average secrecy capacity of Gaussian wiretap channel aided by an external jammer can be obtained, where our result shows that whenN>MN > MN>M, the average secrecy capacity increases linearly with the total transmit power; while whenN≤M−1N \leq M - 1N≤M−1, there exists a performance ceiling on it.
We study the secrecy capacity of fast fading channels under imperfect main channel (between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver) estimation at the transmitter. Lower and upper bounds on the ergodic secrecy capacity are derived for a class of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) fading channels. The achievable rate follows from a standard wiretap code in which a simple on-off power control is employed along with a Gaussian input. The upper bound is obtained using an appropriate correlation scheme of the main and eavesdropper channels and is the best known upper bound so far. The upper and lower bounds coincide with recently derived ones in case of perfect main CSI. Furthermore, the upper bound is tight in case of no main CSI, where the secrecy capacity is equal to zero. Asymptotic analysis at high and low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is also given. At high SNR, we show that the capacity is bounded by providing upper and lower bounds that depend on the channel estimation error. At low SNR, however, we prove that the secrecy capacity is asymptotically equal to the capacity of the main channel as if there were no secrecy constraint. Numerical results are provided for i.i.d. Rayleigh fading channels.
We consider a complex Gaussian wiretap channel with finite-resolution analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. For this channel, we show that a positive secrecy rate is always achievable as long as the channel gains at the legitimate receiver and at the eavesdropper are different, regardless of the quantization levels of the ADCs. For the achievability, we first consider the case of the one-bit ADCs at the legitimate receiver and apply a binary input distribution where the two input points have the same phase when the channel gain at the legitimate receiver is less than that at the eavesdropper, and otherwise the opposite phase. Then the result is generalized for the case of arbitrary finite-resolution ADCs at the legitimate receiver by translating the input distribution appropriately. We also provide numerical lower bounds on the achievable secrecy rates, and analyze the tendency of the secrecy rates according to the channel difference, the power constraint, and the quantization levels for some cases. For the special case of the real Gaussian wiretap channel with one-bit ADCs at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, we show that our choice of phase does not lose any optimality for the Wyner code.