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arXiv:2006.00191 · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

Secrecy Capacity of a Gaussian Wiretap Channel With ADCs is Always Positive

Seung-Hyun Nam, Si-Hyeon Lee

Published Nov 17, 2021• 3 citations
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Abstract

We consider a complex Gaussian wiretap channel with finite-resolution analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. For this channel, we show that a positive secrecy rate is always achievable as long as the channel gains at the legitimate receiver and at the eavesdropper are different, regardless of the quantization levels of the ADCs. For the achievability, we first consider the case of the one-bit ADCs at the legitimate receiver and apply a binary input distribution where the two input points have the same phase when the channel gain at the legitimate receiver is less than that at the eavesdropper, and otherwise the opposite phase. Then the result is generalized for the case of arbitrary finite-resolution ADCs at the legitimate receiver by translating the input distribution appropriately. We also provide numerical lower bounds on the achievable secrecy rates, and analyze the tendency of the secrecy rates according to the channel difference, the power constraint, and the quantization levels for some cases. For the special case of the real Gaussian wiretap channel with one-bit ADCs at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, we show that our choice of phase does not lose any optimality for the Wyner code.

DOI
10.1109/tit.2021.3128971

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We consider a complex Gaussian wiretap channel with finite-resolution analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. For this channel, we show that a positive secrecy rate is always achievable as long as the channel gains at the legitimate receiver and at the eavesdropper are different, regardless of the quantization levels of the ADCs. For the achievability, we first consider the case of the one-bit ADCs at the legitimate receiver and apply a binary input distribution where the two input points have the same phase when the channel gain at the legitimate receiver is less than that at the eavesdropper, and otherwise the opposite phase. Then the result is generalized for the case of arbitrary finite-resolution ADCs at the legitimate receiver by translating the input distribution appropriately. We also provide numerical lower bounds on the achievable secrecy rates, and analyze the tendency of the secrecy rates according to the channel difference, the power constraint, and the quantization levels for some cases. For the special case of the real Gaussian wiretap channel with one-bit ADCs at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, we show that our choice of phase does not lose any optimality for the Wyner code.
We consider the Gaussian wiretap channel with onebit analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. In this channel, we show that a positive secrecy rate is always achievable whenever the noise power n12at the legitimate receiver is not the same as the noise power n22at the eavesdropper. A binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) and an asymmetric BPSK are shown to achieve a positive secrecy rate for the cases of n12and n1> n2, respectively. We partially justify the choice of these signalings by showing that the optimal input distribution that achieves Rs* := supPX:E[X2]≤PI(X; Y1) - I(X; Y2), where X is the channel input with power constraint of P, and Y1and Y2are the channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, should satisfy some symmetric and asymmetric properties for the cases of n12and n1> n2, respectively. Moreover, for n12and sufficiently large P, it is shown that a BPSK using power smaller than P achieves Rs*.
In this paper, we investigate the effect of output quantization on the secrecy capacity of the binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel. As a result, a closed-form expression with infinite summation terms of the secrecy capacity of the binary-input Gaussian wiretap channel is derived for the case when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have unquantized outputs. In particular, computable tight upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity are obtained. Theoretically, we prove that when the legitimate receiver has unquantized outputs while the eavesdropper has binary quantized outputs, the secrecy capacity is larger than that when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have unquantized outputs or both have binary quantized outputs. Further, numerical results show that in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) (of the main channel) region, the secrecy capacity of the binary input Gaussian wiretap channel when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have unquantized outputs is larger than the capacity when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have binary quantized outputs; as the SNR increases, the secrecy capacity when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have binary quantized outputs tends to overtake.
We investigate the fundamental communication limits when messages are sent via a Gaussian two-way channel, which must at the same time be kept secret from an external eavesdropper. In this two-way wiretap channel that models two legitimate transceivers and an eavesdropping receiver, there are two techniques to provide confidentiality for the messages: one entails the legitimate nodes to jam the eavesdropper, i.e., cooperative jamming, while the other entails generating keys from the feedback signals received by the two legitimate nodes and using them to encrypt the messages. Previous work has shown that both methods can be used concurrently to improve the secrecy rates of a channel with a degradedness condition. In this work, we consider the general case, and derive a new outer bound for the secrecy capacity region of this channel. A case is identified where the loss in secrecy rate, due to ignoring the backward (feedback) link at each legitimate transmitter from the other, is bounded by a constant which only depends on the channel gains. This is the case when the power of the two legitimate nodes increases proportionally. In all other cases, we show that ignoring feedback signals causes unbounded loss in the secrecy rate. The loss is measured as the gap between the achievable rate when the feedback signals are taken into account, and the upper bound when the feedback is not used, and hence is not affected by the choice of the achievable scheme. This result therefore establishes that, for the Gaussian two-way channel with an external eavesdropper, the encoders need to be designed with memory. This is in contrast to the result for this channel in the absence of an eavesdropper.
We study the Gaussian multiple access channel in presence of an adversary, who is simultaneously able to eavesdrop and jam, i.e., an active wiretapper. We assume that the adversary has a power constraint, which she can utilize to have any arbitrary jamming strategy. The multiple access channel between the legitimate transmitters and the receiver thus becomes arbitrarily varying. We derive inner and outer bounds on the secrecy rate region of our model. In the case of a degraded channel, we characterize the optimal secrecy sum-rate, and within 0.5 bits per channel use the optimal individual rate constraints. As a special case, we obtain the secrecy capacity of the point-to-point Gaussian wiretap channel when the eavesdropper is able to arbitrarily jam.
A Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel model is considered, where there exists a transmitter, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper each equipped with multiple antennas. The optimality of beamforming for secrecy capacity subject to sum power constraint is studied, and two sufficient conditions for beamforming to be globally optimal are given. The first sufficient condition states that when the difference between the Gram matrices of legitimate and eavesdropper channel matrices has exactly one positive eigenvalue, then beamforming is globally optimal. An alternative sufficient condition, which involves convex optimization, is also provided. For the case in which beamforming is globally optimal, the secrecy capacity is obtained. Otherwise, an upper bound of the difference between the secrecy capacity and beamforming secrecy rate is provided.
A Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel model is considered, where there exists a transmitter, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper each equipped with multiple antennas. The problem of finding the optimal input covariance matrix that achieves secrecy capacity subject to a power constraint is studied. In particular, it is shown that when the difference between the Grams of legitimate and eavesdropper channel matrices has all negative eigenvalues except one positive eigenvalue, beamforming is optimal. For that case, the secrecy capacity is obtained.