In order to claim that one has experimentally tested whether a noncontextual ontological model could underlie certain measurement statistics in quantum theory, it is necessary to have a notion of noncontextuality that applies to unsharp measurements, i.e., those that can only be represented by positive operator-valued measures rather than projection-valued measures. This is because any realistic measurement necessarily has some nonvanishing amount of noise and therefore never achieves the ideal of sharpness. Assuming a generalized notion of noncontextuality that applies to arbitrary experimental procedures, it is shown that the outcome of a measurement depends deterministically on the ontic state of the system being measured if and only if it is associated with a projector. Hence for every unsharp measurement, its outcome necessarily has an indeterministic dependence on the ontic state. We defend this proposal against alternatives. In particular, we demonstrate why considerations parallel to Fine's theorem do not challenge this conclusion.
In order to claim that one has experimentally tested whether a noncontextual ontological model could underlie certain measurement statistics in quantum theory, it is necessary to have a notion of noncontextuality that applies to unsharp measurements, i.e., those that can only be represented by positive operator-valued measures rather than projection-valued measures. This is because any realistic measurement necessarily has some nonvanishing amount of noise and therefore never achieves the ideal of sharpness. Assuming a generalized notion of noncontextuality that applies to arbitrary experimental procedures, it is shown that the outcome of a measurement depends deterministically on the ontic state of the system being measured if and only if it is associated with a projector. Hence for every unsharp measurement, its outcome necessarily has an indeterministic dependence on the ontic state. We defend this proposal against alternatives. In particular, we demonstrate why considerations parallel to Fine's theorem do not challenge this conclusion.
When it isn't possible to tell two distinct experimental procedures apart purely from their input/output statistics, then it seems a plausible hypothesis that the two procedures must be physically identical. We call such a hypothesis "noncontextuality", an instance of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Read in the contrapositive, this hypothesis entails that any physical distinctions between two experimental procedures must necessarily lead to a difference in their operational statistics. The results I present in this thesis concern the failure of this hypothesis -- a failure dubbed "contextuality" -- when one tries to embed an operational theory (such as quantum theory) in the ontological models framework. The Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates the failure of noncontextuality for deterministic ontological models of quantum theory, i.e., those ontological models where the ontic/physical state of the system fixes the outcome of any projective measurement on the system in a deterministic manner. This thesis goes beyond the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem by asking what operational facts must be verified in experiments to conclude that Nature does not admit noncontextual ontological models, not even indeterministic ones. This leads to noncontextuality inequalities that are robust to noise in the preparations and measurements. In the particular case of quantum theory, these inequalities are meaningful even when unsharp measurements (or POVMs) are allowed, a feature not shared by the traditional approach to KS-noncontextuality where unsharp measurements are excluded by fiat: allowing them renders even trivial POVMs (proportional to identity) maximally KS-contextual. The sense in which trivial POVMs are indeed "trivial" (or "noncontextual") is clear in our approach: they are simply too noisy to lead to violation of our noncontextuality inequalities.
Ontological theories of quantum mechanics provide a realistic description of single systems by means of well-defined quantities conditioning the measurement outcomes. In order to be complete, they should also fulfill the minimal condition of macroscopic realism. Under the assumption of outcome determinism and for Hilbert space dimension greater than 2, they were all proved to be contextual for projective measurements. In recent years a generalized concept of noncontextuality was introduced that applies also to the case of outcome indeterminism and unsharp measurements. It was pointed out that the Beltrametti-Bugajski model is an example of measurement noncontextual indeterminist theory. Here we provide a simple proof that this model is the only one with such a feature for projective measurements and Hilbert space dimension greater than 2. In other words, there is no extension of quantum theory providing more accurate predictions of outcomes and simultaneously preserving the minimal labeling of events through projective operators. As a corollary, noncontextuality for projective measurements implies noncontextuality for unsharp measurements. By noting that the condition of macroscopic realism requires an extension of quantum theory, unless a breaking of unitarity is invoked, we arrive at the conclusion that the only way to solve the measurement problem in the framework of an ontological theory is by relaxing the hypothesis of measurement noncontextuality in its generalized sense.
The Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem establishes the impossibility of a noncontextual hidden variable model of quantum theory, or equivalently, that quantum theory is contextual. In this paper, an operational definition of contextuality is introduced which generalizes the standard notion in three ways: (i) it applies to arbitrary operational theories rather than just quantum theory, (ii) it applies to arbitrary experimental procedures rather than just sharp measurements, and (iii) it applies to a broad class of ontological models of quantum theory rather than just deterministic hidden variable models. We derive three no-go theorems for ontological models, each based on an assumption of noncontextuality for a different sort of experimental procedure; one for preparation procedures, another for unsharp measurement procedures (that is, measurement procedures associated with positive-operator valued measures), and a third for transformation procedures. All three proofs apply to two-dimensional Hilbert spaces, and are therefore stronger than traditional proofs of contextuality.
The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.
A characterization of noncontextual models which fall within the ambit of Fine's theorem is provided. In particular, the equivalence between the existence of three notions is made explicit: a joint probability distribution over the outcomes of all the measurements considered, a measurement-noncontextual and outcome-deterministic (or KS-noncontextual, where KS stands for Kochen-Specker) model for these measurements, and a measurement-noncontextual and factorizable model for them. A KS inequality, therefore, is implied by each of these three notions. Following this characterization of noncontextual models that fall within the ambit of Fine's theorem, nonfactorizable noncontextual models which lie outside the domain of Fine's theorem are considered. While outcome determinism for projective (sharp) measurements in quantum theory can be shown to follow from the assumption of preparation noncontextuality, such a justification is not available for nonprojective (unsharp) measurements which ought to admit outcome-indeterministic response functions. The Liang-Spekkens-Wiseman (LSW) inequality is cited as an example of a noncontextuality inequality that should hold in any noncontextual model of quantum theory without assuming factorizability. Three other noncontextuality inequalities, which turn out to be equivalent to the LSW inequality under relabelings of measurement outcomes, are derived for Specker's scenario. The polytope of correlations admissible in this scenario, given the no-disturbance condition, is characterized.
The Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates that it is not possible to reproduce the predictions of quantum theory in terms of a hidden variable model where the hidden variables assign a value to every projector deterministically and noncontextually. A noncontextual value assignment to a projector is one that does not depend on which other projectors-the context-are measured together with it. Using a generalization of the notion of noncontextuality that applies to both measurements and preparations, we propose a scheme for deriving inequalities that test whether a given set of experimental statistics is consistent with a noncontextual model. Unlike previous inequalities inspired by the Kochen-Specker theorem, we do not assume that the value assignments are deterministic and therefore in the face of a violation of our inequality, the possibility of salvaging noncontextuality by abandoning determinism is no longer an option. Our approach is operational in the sense that it does not presume quantum theory: a violation of our inequality implies the impossibility of a noncontextual model for any operational theory that can account for the experimental observations, including any successor to quantum theory.