Ontological theories of quantum mechanics provide a realistic description of single systems by means of well-defined quantities conditioning the measurement outcomes. In order to be complete, they should also fulfill the minimal condition of macroscopic realism. Under the assumption of outcome determinism and for Hilbert space dimension greater than 2, they were all proved to be contextual for projective measurements. In recent years a generalized concept of noncontextuality was introduced that applies also to the case of outcome indeterminism and unsharp measurements. It was pointed out that the Beltrametti-Bugajski model is an example of measurement noncontextual indeterminist theory. Here we provide a simple proof that this model is the only one with such a feature for projective measurements and Hilbert space dimension greater than 2. In other words, there is no extension of quantum theory providing more accurate predictions of outcomes and simultaneously preserving the minimal labeling of events through projective operators. As a corollary, noncontextuality for projective measurements implies noncontextuality for unsharp measurements. By noting that the condition of macroscopic realism requires an extension of quantum theory, unless a breaking of unitarity is invoked, we arrive at the conclusion that the only way to solve the measurement problem in the framework of an ontological theory is by relaxing the hypothesis of measurement noncontextuality in its generalized sense.
Ontological theories of quantum mechanics provide a realistic description of single systems by means of well-defined quantities conditioning the measurement outcomes. In order to be complete, they should also fulfill the minimal condition of macroscopic realism. Under the assumption of outcome determinism and for Hilbert space dimension greater than 2, they were all proved to be contextual for projective measurements. In recent years a generalized concept of noncontextuality was introduced that applies also to the case of outcome indeterminism and unsharp measurements. It was pointed out that the Beltrametti-Bugajski model is an example of measurement noncontextual indeterminist theory. Here we provide a simple proof that this model is the only one with such a feature for projective measurements and Hilbert space dimension greater than 2. In other words, there is no extension of quantum theory providing more accurate predictions of outcomes and simultaneously preserving the minimal labeling of events through projective operators. As a corollary, noncontextuality for projective measurements implies noncontextuality for unsharp measurements. By noting that the condition of macroscopic realism requires an extension of quantum theory, unless a breaking of unitarity is invoked, we arrive at the conclusion that the only way to solve the measurement problem in the framework of an ontological theory is by relaxing the hypothesis of measurement noncontextuality in its generalized sense.
In order to claim that one has experimentally tested whether a noncontextual ontological model could underlie certain measurement statistics in quantum theory, it is necessary to have a notion of noncontextuality that applies to unsharp measurements, i.e., those that can only be represented by positive operator-valued measures rather than projection-valued measures. This is because any realistic measurement necessarily has some nonvanishing amount of noise and therefore never achieves the ideal of sharpness. Assuming a generalized notion of noncontextuality that applies to arbitrary experimental procedures, it is shown that the outcome of a measurement depends deterministically on the ontic state of the system being measured if and only if it is associated with a projector. Hence for every unsharp measurement, its outcome necessarily has an indeterministic dependence on the ontic state. We defend this proposal against alternatives. In particular, we demonstrate why considerations parallel to Fine's theorem do not challenge this conclusion.
The Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem establishes the impossibility of a noncontextual hidden variable model of quantum theory, or equivalently, that quantum theory is contextual. In this paper, an operational definition of contextuality is introduced which generalizes the standard notion in three ways: (i) it applies to arbitrary operational theories rather than just quantum theory, (ii) it applies to arbitrary experimental procedures rather than just sharp measurements, and (iii) it applies to a broad class of ontological models of quantum theory rather than just deterministic hidden variable models. We derive three no-go theorems for ontological models, each based on an assumption of noncontextuality for a different sort of experimental procedure; one for preparation procedures, another for unsharp measurement procedures (that is, measurement procedures associated with positive-operator valued measures), and a third for transformation procedures. All three proofs apply to two-dimensional Hilbert spaces, and are therefore stronger than traditional proofs of contextuality.
Quantum processes cannot be reduced, in a nontrivial way, to classical processes without specifying the context in the description of a measurement procedure. This requirement is implied by the Kochen--Specker theorem in the outcome-deterministic case and, more generally, by the Gleason theorem. The latter establishes that there is only one noncontextual classical model compatible with quantum theory, the one that trivially identifies the quantum state with the classical state. However, this model requires a breaking of the unitary evolution to account for macroscopic realism. Thus, a causal classical model compatible with the unitary evolution of the quantum state is necessarily contextual to some extent. Inspired by well-known results in quantum communication complexity, we consider a particular class of hidden variable theories by assuming that the amount of information about the measurement context is finite. Aiming at establishing some general features of these theories, we first present a generalized version of the Gleason theorem and provide a simple proof of it. Assuming that Gleason's hypotheses hold only locally for small changes of the measurement procedure, we obtain almost the same conclusion of the original theorem about the functional form of the probability measure. An additional constant and a relaxed property of the density operator are the only two differences from the original result. By this generalization of the Gleason theorem and the assumption of finite information for the context, we prove that the probabilities over three or more outcomes of a projective measurement must be linear functions of the projectors associated with the outcomes, given the information on the context.
The presence of contextuality in quantum theory was first highlighted by Bell, Kochen and Specker, who discovered that for quantum systems of three or more dimensions, measurements could not be viewed as deterministically revealing pre-existing properties of the system. More precisely, no model can assign deterministic outcomes to the projectors of a quantum measurement in a way that depends only on the projector and not the context (the full set of projectors) in which it appeared, despite the fact that the Born rule probabilities associated with projectors are independent of the context. A more general, operational definition of contextuality introduced by Spekkens, which we will term 'probabilistic contextuality', drops the assumption of determinism and allows for operations other than measurements to be considered contextual. Even two-dimensional quantum mechanics can be shown to be contextual under this generalised notion. Probabilistic noncontextuality represents the postulate that elements of an operational theory that cannot be distinguished from each other based on the statistics of arbitrarily many repeated experiments (they give rise to the same operational probabilities) are ontologically identical. In this paper, we introduce a framework that enables us to distinguish between different noncontextuality assumptions in terms of the relationships between the ontological representations of objects in the theory given a certain relation between their operational representations. This framework can be used to motivate and define a 'possibilistic' analogue, encapsulating the idea that elements of an operational theory that cannot be unambiguously distinguished operationally can also not be unambiguously distinguished ontologically. We then prove that possibilistic noncontextuality is equivalent to an alternative notion of noncontextuality proposed by Hardy. Finally, we demonstrate that these weaker noncontextuality assumptions are sufficient to prove alternative versions of known 'no-go' theorems that constrain ψ -epistemic models for quantum mechanics.
When it isn't possible to tell two distinct experimental procedures apart purely from their input/output statistics, then it seems a plausible hypothesis that the two procedures must be physically identical. We call such a hypothesis "noncontextuality", an instance of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Read in the contrapositive, this hypothesis entails that any physical distinctions between two experimental procedures must necessarily lead to a difference in their operational statistics. The results I present in this thesis concern the failure of this hypothesis -- a failure dubbed "contextuality" -- when one tries to embed an operational theory (such as quantum theory) in the ontological models framework. The Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates the failure of noncontextuality for deterministic ontological models of quantum theory, i.e., those ontological models where the ontic/physical state of the system fixes the outcome of any projective measurement on the system in a deterministic manner. This thesis goes beyond the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem by asking what operational facts must be verified in experiments to conclude that Nature does not admit noncontextual ontological models, not even indeterministic ones. This leads to noncontextuality inequalities that are robust to noise in the preparations and measurements. In the particular case of quantum theory, these inequalities are meaningful even when unsharp measurements (or POVMs) are allowed, a feature not shared by the traditional approach to KS-noncontextuality where unsharp measurements are excluded by fiat: allowing them renders even trivial POVMs (proportional to identity) maximally KS-contextual. The sense in which trivial POVMs are indeed "trivial" (or "noncontextual") is clear in our approach: they are simply too noisy to lead to violation of our noncontextuality inequalities.
This paper argues that physical quantities should be reconstructed not as non-contextual intrinsic attributes with measurement-independent determinate values, but as equivalence classes of measurement procedures. Bell–CHSH violations first motivate the problem: they show that Bell-type local causality/factorizability, measurement independence, and the relevant form of outcome determinism or value-definiteness cannot be jointly maintained, without by themselves refuting realism as such. Kochen–Specker contextuality supplies the stronger premise for the sharp-observable case: no global, non-contextual, dispersion-free value assignment to projection-valued observables can preserve the functional relations among compatible observables in Hilbert spaces of dimension at least three. The positive proposal uses algebraic quantum theory to identify physical quantities with classes of measuring procedures that yield the same outcome statistics over a full or tomographically complete state domain. This reconstruction preserves the classical deterministic limit while rejecting the stronger claim that measured quantities are context-independent values possessed independently of measurement. The analysis is restricted to sharp observables and projection-valued measurements; POVMs and unsharp measurements are noted as extensions. The resulting view is realist about an observer-independent world but non-intrinsic about empirical quantities, and it situates Wheeler's "It from Bit" as an interpretive corollary rather than as a foundational premise.