The Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph (PBR) theorem is commonly taken to establish that a pure quantum state represents a physical property of the system to which it is assigned, rather than merely encoding knowledge. In this work, I distinguish between state-first and dynamics-first physical theories, and argue that this reading presupposes the former. These two types of theories support different approaches to causal explanation, and one of PBR's stated assumptions depends on the state-first approach. Using a recent interpretation of quantum theory as a concrete example, I show how a dynamics-first theory can explain the PBR correlations while maintaining a broadly epistemic reading of quantum states. I conclude that the PBR theorem supports a dilemma: either the quantum state is part of reality, or reality is not fundamentally built out of states.
The Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph (PBR) theorem is commonly taken to establish that a pure quantum state represents a physical property of the system to which it is assigned, rather than merely encoding knowledge. In this work, I distinguish between state-first and dynamics-first physical theories, and argue that this reading presupposes the former. These two types of theories support different approaches to causal explanation, and one of PBR's stated assumptions depends on the state-first approach. Using a recent interpretation of quantum theory as a concrete example, I show how a dynamics-first theory can explain the PBR correlations while maintaining a broadly epistemic reading of quantum states. I conclude that the PBR theorem supports a dilemma: either the quantum state is part of reality, or reality is not fundamentally built out of states.
The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) no-go theorem provides an argument for the reality of the quantum state by ruling out $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic ontological theories, in which the quantum state is of a statistical nature. It applies under an assumption of preparation independence, the validity of which has been subject to debate. We propose two plausible and less restrictive alternatives: a weaker notion allowing for classical correlations, and an even weaker, physically motivated notion of independence, which merely prohibits the possibility of superluminal causal influences in the preparation process. The latter is a minimal requirement for enabling a reasonable treatment of subsystems in any theory. It is demonstrated by means of an explicit $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic ontological model that the argument of PBR becomes invalid under the alternative notions of independence. As an intermediate step, we recover a result which is valid in the presence of classical correlations. Finally, we obtain a theorem which holds under the minimal requirement, approximating the result of PBR. For this, we consider experiments involving randomly sampled preparations and derive bounds on the degree of $\ensuremath{\psi}$ epistemicity that is consistent with the quantum-mechanical predictions. The approximation is exact in the limit as the sample space of preparations becomes infinite.
In this paper, a proof similar to the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem is given to prove that time in quantum theory is not epistemic but has ontological reality. For this, we first discuss how time can be encoded as an intrinsic property of a quantum system. We prepare a quantum state containing time as an intrinsic property and show by a PBR-type proof that time cannot be an epistemic notion. In fact, the PBR theorem implies an ontic notion of time. Indeed, if the quantum state is a physical property, then quantum state reduction is a physical process involving information destruction. In this case, quantum probabilities are intrinsic probabilities without epistemic origin, and they generate a genuinely new sequence of events. This novelty introduced by quantum probabilities can be interpreted as time.
In this paper we consider time as a property of a preparation or a quantum system and investigate whether it is an epistemic property according to Harrigan and Spekkens’ criterion [Found Phys 40, 125–157 (2010)]. To be precise, using a tabletop setup where the predictions of quantum mechanics and general relativity can be combined, we prepare a quantum state such that it is a quantum superposition of the different durations ticked by a quantum mechanical clock moving in spacetime. Such a preparation provides a quantum system that includes time as an intrinsic property. Indeed, changing the weights in the superposition changes the time as an expectation value as well as the possible different clock readings and histories. With a proof similar to the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem [Nature Phys 8, 475–478 (2012)], it is shown that time in quantum theory is not an epistemic notion, but has ontological reality. In fact, the PBR theorem implies an ontic notion of time. Indeed, by proving that the quantum state is a physical property, the PBR theorem requires quantum state reduction to be a physical process. In this case, quantum probabilities are intrinsic probabilities without epistemic origin, and they generate a genuinely new sequence of events. This novelty introduced by quantum probabilities can be interpreted as time. However, although the PBR theorem implies this result, it does not prove it. First, an additional assumption is required to ensure the intrinsic character of quantum probabilities. Second, the PBR theorem is not constructed to prove that time is ontic, but to prove that ψ is ontic. All these issues are discussed in detail in the paper.
The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem establishes ψ-onticity for individual quantum systems, but its standard formulation relies on the Preparation Independence Postulate (PIP). This has led to a prevalent view that rejecting PIP leaves open the possibility of ψ-epistemic models for individual systems. In this work, we show that this understanding is incomplete: once the PBR theorem establishes ψ-onticity for composite systems prepared in product states, the ψ-onticity of the individual subsystems follows directly from the tensor-product structure of quantum mechanics, without invoking PIP or any further auxiliary assumptions. This result removes a key auxiliary assumption from the PBR theorem, closes a persistent loophole for preserving ψ-epistemic models, and strengthens the conceptual foundations of ψ-ontology.
Towards the end of 2011, Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph derived a theorem that aimed to show that the quantum state must be ontic (a state of reality) in a broad class of realist approaches to quantum theory. This result attracted a lot of attention and controversy. The aim of this review article is to review the background to the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem, to provide a clear presentation of the theorem itself, and to review related work that has appeared since the publication of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph paper. In particular, this review: Explains what it means for the quantum state to be ontic or epistemic (a state of knowledge); Reviews arguments for and against an ontic interpretation of the quantum state as they existed prior to the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem; Explains why proving the reality of the quantum state is a very strong constraint on realist theories in that it would imply many of the known no-go theorems, such as Bell's Theorem and the need for an exponentially large ontic state space; Provides a comprehensive presentation of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem itself, along with subsequent improvements and criticisms of its assumptions; Reviews two other arguments for the reality of the quantum state: the first due to Hardy and the second due to Colbeck and Renner, and explains why their assumptions are less compelling than those of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem; Reviews subsequent work aimed at ruling out stronger notions of what it means for the quantum state to be epistemic and points out open questions in this area. The overall aim is not only to provide the background needed for the novice in this area to understand the current status, but also to discuss often overlooked subtleties that should be of interest to the experts. Quanta 2014; 3: 67–155.
I argue for a realist interpretation of the quantum state. I begin by reviewing and critically evaluating two arguments for an antirealist interpretation of the quantum state, the first derived from the so-called ‘measurement problem’, and the second from the concept of local causality. I argue that existing antirealist interpretations do not solve the measurement problem. Furthermore, I argue that it is possible to construct a local, realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, using methods borrowed from quantum field theory and based on John S. Bell’s concept of ‘local beables’.\nIf the quantum state is interpreted subjectively, then the probabilities it associates with experimental outcomes are themselves subjective. I address the prospects for developing a subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanical probabilities based on the Quantum de Finetti Representation Theorem. Epistemic interpretations of the quantum state can be divided into those that are epistemic with respect to underlying ontic states, and those that are epistemic with respect to measurement outcomes. The Pusey Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) theorem places serious constraints on the former family of interpretations. I identify an important explanatory gap in the latter sort of interpretation. In particular, if the quantum state is a subjective representation of beliefs about future experimental outcomes, then it is not clear why those experimenters who use quantum mechanics should be better able to negotiate the world than those who do not.\nI then turn to the task of articulating a positive argument for the thesis of quantum state realism. I begin by articulating a minimal set of conditions that any realist interpretation must meet. One assumption built into the PBR result is that systems prepared in a given quantum state have a well-defined set of physical properties, which may be completely or incompletely described by the quantum state. Antirealist interpretations that reject this assumption are therefore compatible with the PBR result. A compelling case for quantum state realism must therefore be made on more general grounds. I consider two concrete examples of phenomena described by quantum mechanics that strongly suggest that the quantum state is genuinely representational in character.