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arXiv:2609.34411

Coherence Rather Than Error Rate Governs Privacy in Multi-Tenant Quantum Computing

Farhad Farokhi

quant-phcs.CRSubmitted Sep 28, 2026• Announced Sep 29, 2026• 0 citations• Revised Oct 1, 2026 (v2)
v1 · Sep 28, 2026v2 · Oct 1, 2026
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Abstract

Multi-tenant computing enables providers of commercial cloud quantum processors to rent disjoint sectors of a device to independent users. Average gate error, which cloud quantum computing providers report, does not determine how much one tenant learns about another. We propose an information-theoretic notion of information leakage across co-tenancy boundaries stemming from quantum state distinguishability. We measure this leakage on commercially-available 156-qubit (IBM Kingston) and 20-qubit (IQM Garnet) devices. Boundaries with identical benchmarked error can offer significantly different amount of information leakage because standard reported measures of error are blind to coherent-versus-stochastic nature of the error while the proposed notion of information leakage is not. A uniform Pauli randomisation implemented over the victim's whole register is used as a defence mechanism to reduce the information leakage to zero. The defence theoretically does not incur a fidelity cost, but the experiments show a non-trivial degradation caused by accumulation of errors. We provide a specific call-for-action to the providers of quantum cloud computing to report information leakage in addition to standard error rates in their device datasheet to enable users to compute privacy and security risks prior to engagement with the device.

AI Summary

The paper asks whether published gate-error statistics can certify privacy between tenants sharing a quantum processor. It models crosstalk through secret-conditioned channels on an adversary’s register and quantifies leakage using maximal quantum leakage, expressed as a state-discrimination advantage. Defining conditional spread as $\Gamma=\max_{x,x'}\tfrac12\|\mathcal E_B^x-\mathcal E_B^{x'}\|_\diamond$, it proves $\mathcal L\leq\log_2[1+(M-1)\Gamma]$ for $M$ secrets. Equal-infidelity examples have either zero leakage or coherent leakage scaling as $\Gamma\approx\sqrt{6r}$, demonstrating that average infidelity alone does not determine privacy. Experiments prepare a victim’s classical bit and measure conditional phases on an adjacent probe during idle evolution under residual $ZZ$ coupling. On IBM Kingston, a selected pair reaches $\Gamma\approx0.35$, corresponding to $0.43$ bits of single-shot leakage. A 21-boundary survey gives median $\Gamma=0.35$ and an estimated 75-shot budget for 99% discrimination confidence. Across all 176 coupled pairs, 134 have reported two-qubit errors between $10^{-3}$ and $3\times10^{-3}$ but measured spreads ranging from 0.007 to 0.68. Seven IQM Garnet boundaries provide an additional device check. A secret, full-register Pauli randomisation eliminates leakage exactly when the secret affects only the input state, by the quantum-one-time-pad argument. Boundary-only randomisation fails when computation moves interior data outward. Hardware tests show suppression with fidelity overhead and residual leakage. Stated limitations include finite-shot uncertainty, possible transmon third-level effects, secret-dependent dynamics outside the defence guarantee, and unresolved many-tenant composition. Experiments disable twirling and dynamical decoupling; other hardware modalities remain untested.

Little sign of AI-generated textAI use disclosedOverclaimsStrong assumptionsPossible error
the author used Claude Sonnet 5 (Anthropic), a large language model, for revising the prose and writing the Python and Qiskit code used for hardware experiments.

Central claim may not hold: Equal-infidelity stochastic Pauli channels can leak secret information, while secret-independent coherent channels cannot, so the paper establishes insufficiency of average infidelity rather than coherence as the governing privacy variable. Full-register Pauli randomisation guarantees zero leakage under Result 2's secret-independent-evolution assumption, not throughout the broader threat model advertised in the abstract. The hardware survey compares idle leakage with published gate errors and therefore does not isolate coherence or experimentally establish equal infidelity of the channels producing that leakage. The experimental spread estimator generally underestimates transverse state distinguishability when the conditional contrasts differ, despite the appendix claiming to account for that asymmetry. The repetition section presents a model-specific memoryless discrimination exponent and shot budget as general, although pure-state examples achieve a larger exponent without quantum memory.

Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.

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Multi-tenant computing enables providers of commercial cloud quantum processors to rent disjoint sectors of a device to independent users. Average gate error, which cloud quantum computing providers report, does not determine how much one tenant learns about another. We propose an information-theoretic notion of information leakage across co-tenancy boundaries stemming from quantum state distinguishability. We measure this leakage on commercially-available 156-qubit (IBM Kingston) and 20-qubit (IQM Garnet) devices. Boundaries with identical benchmarked error can offer significantly different amount of information leakage because standard reported measures of error are blind to coherent-versus-stochastic nature of the error while the proposed notion of information leakage is not. A uniform Pauli randomisation implemented over the victim's whole register is used as a defence mechanism to reduce the information leakage to zero. The defence theoretically does not incur a fidelity cost, but the experiments show a non-trivial degradation caused by accumulation of errors. We provide a specific call-for-action to the providers of quantum cloud computing to report information leakage in addition to standard error rates in their device datasheet to enable users to compute privacy and security risks prior to engagement with the device.
The paper asks whether published gate-error statistics can certify privacy between tenants sharing a quantum processor. It models crosstalk through secret-conditioned channels on an adversary’s register and quantifies leakage using maximal quantum leakage, expressed as a state-discrimination advantage. Defining conditional spread as Γ=max⁡x,x′12∥EBx−EBx′∥⋄\Gamma=\max_{x,x'}\tfrac12\|\mathcal E_B^x-\mathcal E_B^{x'}\|_\diamondΓ=maxx,x′​21​∥EBx​−EBx′​∥⋄​, it proves L≤log⁡2[1+(M−1)Γ]\mathcal L\leq\log_2[1+(M-1)\Gamma]L≤log2​[1+(M−1)Γ] for MMM secrets. Equal-infidelity examples have either zero leakage or coherent leakage scaling as Γ≈6r\Gamma\approx\sqrt{6r}Γ≈6r​, demonstrating that average infidelity alone does not determine privacy.
Experiments prepare a victim’s classical bit and measure conditional phases on an adjacent probe during idle evolution under residual ZZZZZZ coupling. On IBM Kingston, a selected pair reaches Γ≈0.35\Gamma\approx0.35Γ≈0.35, corresponding to 0.430.430.43 bits of single-shot leakage. A 21-boundary survey gives median Γ=0.35\Gamma=0.35Γ=0.35 and an estimated 75-shot budget for 99% discrimination confidence. Across all 176 coupled pairs, 134 have reported two-qubit errors between 10−310^{-3}10−3 and 3×10−33\times10^{-3}3×10−3 but measured spreads ranging from 0.007 to 0.68. Seven IQM Garnet boundaries provide an additional device check.
A secret, full-register Pauli randomisation eliminates leakage exactly when the secret affects only the input state, by the quantum-one-time-pad argument. Boundary-only randomisation fails when computation moves interior data outward. Hardware tests show suppression with fidelity overhead and residual leakage. Stated limitations include finite-shot uncertainty, possible transmon third-level effects, secret-dependent dynamics outside the defence guarantee, and unresolved many-tenant composition. Experiments disable twirling and dynamical decoupling; other hardware modalities remain untested.
Cloud-based quantum service providers allow multiple users to run programs on shared hardware concurrently to maximize resource utilization and minimize operational costs. This multi-tenant computing (MTC) model relies on the error parameters of the hardware for fair qubit allocation and scheduling, as error-prone qubits can degrade computational accuracy asymmetrically for users sharing the hardware. To maintain low error rates, quantum providers perform periodic hardware calibration, often relying on third-party calibration services. If an adversary within this calibration service misreports error rates, the allocator can be misled into making suboptimal decisions even when the physical hardware remains unchanged. We demonstrate such an attack model in which an adversary strategically misreports qubit error rates to reduce hardware throughput, and probability of successful trial (PST) for two previously proposed allocation frameworks, i.e. Greedy and Community-Based Dynamic Allocation Partitioning (COMDAP). Experimental results show that adversarial misreporting increases execution latency by 24% and reduces PST by 7.8%. We also propose to identify inconsistencies in reported error rates by analyzing statistical deviations in error rates across calibration cycles.
As quantum computers become available through multi-tenant cloud platforms, ensuring privacy against adversaries sharing the same quantum processing unit becomes critical. We introduce and explore \emph{covert quantum computing}, a new concept that ensures an adversary with access to all other quantum computational units (QCUs) of a quantum computer cannot detect computation on the subset that they cannot access. Analogous to covert communication, we employ information theory. However, since here the adversary controls the systems used for detection, we require a richer framework for covertness analysis that accounts for the use of quantum memories and adaptive operations. Thus, we adopt the \emph{quantum-strategy} framework used in quantum game theory and memory channel discrimination. Current quantum computers use planar graph circuit layouts and typically assume nearest-neighbor crosstalk. We derive discrete isoperimetric inequalities to show that, for an nnn-qubit circuit under this model, only O(n)\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{n})O(n​) border qubits provide detection information to the adversary. We then explore this scaling law on IQM's 54-qubit \emph{Emerald} processor and IBM's 156-qubit \emph{ibm\_fez} machine employing the Heron 2 architecture. We implement Ramsey experiments on qubits not used in computation, and detect nearest-neighbor crosstalk, as expected. However, we also observe long-range coupling effects beyond the border qubits, revealing a side channel that the adversary can exploit. We hypothesize that this long-range crosstalk is induced by leakage from the drive and control lines. Beyond weakening covertness, it exposes co-tenants to both adversarial and unintended crosstalk and degrades circuits that span spatially distributed qubits, motivating further work on spatial isolation and crosstalk characterization.
Noisy quantum computers suffer from readout or measurement error. It is a classical bit-flip error due to which state "1" is read out as "0" and vice-versa. The probability of readout error shows a state dependence i.e., flipping probability of state "1" may differ from flipping probability of state "0". Moreover, the probability shows correlation across qubits. These state-dependent and correlated error probability introduces a signature of victim outputs on adversary output when two programs are run simultaneously on the same quantum computer. This can be exploited to sense victim output which may contain sensitive information. In this paper, we systematically show that such readout error-dependent signatures exist and that an adversary can use such signature to infer a user output. We experimentally demonstrate the attack (inference) on 3 public IBM quantum computers. Using Jensen-Shannon Distance (JSD) a measure for statistical inference, we show that our approach identifies victim output with an accuracy of 96% on real hardware. We also present randomized output flipping as a lightweight yet effective countermeasure to thwart such information leakage attacks. Our analysis shows the countermeasure incurs a minor penalty of 0.05% in terms of fidelity.
Present-day quantum computing is cloud-based, where a user submits a circuit to a service provider's proprietary backend hardware. While providers may wish to hide implementation details, scheduling choices, or even which physical device was used, noisy finite-shot outputs can carry backend-specific fingerprints: information imprinted in the classical output distribution that can reveal the backend identity. So far, such fingerprints have mostly been studied from a benchmarking perspective, with limited attention to privacy considerations for users and providers. This work develops the first formal framework for backend identifiability and its privacy implications. We introduce a backend-identifiability game and use it to formalise routing anonymity as a security notion for quantum cloud services. We show that backend identifiability is a hypothesis-testing problem and prove that, under passive i.i.d. access to a single backend, routing anonymity decays exponentially at the Chernoff rate. We also establish a utility-anonymity trade-off, imposing fundamental limits on how much backend-specific information can be removed from classical outputs without degrading their usefulness. In addition, we observe that, for noisy quantum hardware, identifying fingerprints are inherently an intermediate-depth phenomenon, and establish a depth principle using Pauli-transfer-matrix tools. We complement the theory with experiments on Amazon Braket on AWS, using ion-trap and superconducting quantum processors. We observe 87-90% classification between superconducting backends and 96-100% classification across physical platforms, and find that identifiability can survive natural forms of post-processing. Overall, these results establish routing anonymity as a distinct security requirement for quantum cloud computing, and provide a framework for quantifying and controlling the utility-anonymity trade-off.
Errors are common issues in quantum computing platforms, among which leakage is one of the most-challenging to address. This is because leakage, i.e., the loss of information stored in the computational subspace to undesired subspaces in a larger Hilbert space, is more difficult to detect and correct than errors that preserve the computational subspace. As a result, leakage presents a significant obstacle to the development of fault-tolerant quantum computation. In this paper, we propose an efficient and accurate benchmarking framework called leakage randomized benchmarking (LRB), for measuring leakage rates on multi-qubit quantum systems. Our approach is more insensitive to state preparation and measurement (SPAM) noise than existing leakage benchmarking protocols, requires fewer assumptions about the gate set itself, and can be used to benchmark multi-qubit leakages, which has not been achieved previously. We also extended the LRB protocol to an interleaved variant called interleaved LRB (iLRB), which can benchmark the average leakage rate of generic n-site quantum gates with reasonable noise assumptions. We demonstrate the iLRB protocol on benchmarking generic two-qubit gates realized using flux tuning and analyzed the behavior of iLRB under corresponding leakage models. Our numerical experiments showed good agreement with the theoretical estimations, indicating the feasibility of both the LRB and iLRB protocols.
The ability for users to access quantum computers through the cloud has increased rapidly in recent years. Despite still being Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) machines, modern quantum computers are now being actively employed for research and by numerous startups. Quantum algorithms typically produce probabilistic results, necessitating repeated execution to produce the desired outcomes. In order for the execution to begin from the specified ground state each time and for the results of the prior execution not to interfere with the results of the subsequent execution, the reset mechanism must be performed between each iteration to effectively reset the qubits. However, due to noise and errors in quantum computers and specifically these reset mechanisms, a noisy reset operation may lead to systematic errors in the overall computation, as well as potential security and privacy vulnerabilities of information leakage. To counter this issue, we thoroughly examine the state leakage problem in quantum computing, and then propose a solution by employing the classical and quantum one-time pads before the reset mechanism to prevent the state leakage, which works by randomly applying simple gates for each execution of the circuit. In addition, this work explores conditions under which the classical one-time pad, which uses fewer resources, is sufficient to protect state leakage. Finally, we study the role of various errors in state leakage, by evaluating the degrees of leakage under different error levels of gate, measurement, and sampling errors. Our findings offer new perspectives on the design of reset mechanisms and secure quantum computing systems.