We study the impact that two miners equipped with quantum computers purpose-built for quantum Bitcoin mining will have on the 51% attack threshold of the Bitcoin network, given that the miners are playing a competitive game against each other to be the first to mine a block. We extend an existing game-theoretic framework for Bitcoin mining and compute the resultant payoff matrices. From these payoff matrices, we determine optimal quantum mining strategies for two non-colluding and aggressive quantum miners with multiple opportunities at finding a valid block in an otherwise classical Bitcoin network. We show that these optimal quantum mining strategies have a negligible effect on the 51% attack threshold. The novelty of our work is the inclusion of the Aggressive Quantum Mining Strategy and the realistic approach of allowing the quantum miners to restart their search if their measurements do not yield a valid block when determining the optimal quantum mining strategies. Our result is important for evaluating quantum-mining threats on cryptocurrencies based on Proof-of-Work, e.g. Bitcoin
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53 pages, 17 figures. Code available at https://github.com/zachmanson/quantumraces
We study the impact that two miners equipped with quantum computers purpose-built for quantum Bitcoin mining will have on the 51% attack threshold of the Bitcoin network, given that the miners are playing a competitive game against each other to be the first to mine a block. We extend an existing game-theoretic framework for Bitcoin mining and compute the resultant payoff matrices. From these payoff matrices, we determine optimal quantum mining strategies for two non-colluding and aggressive quantum miners with multiple opportunities at finding a valid block in an otherwise classical Bitcoin network. We show that these optimal quantum mining strategies have a negligible effect on the 51% attack threshold. The novelty of our work is the inclusion of the Aggressive Quantum Mining Strategy and the realistic approach of allowing the quantum miners to restart their search if their measurements do not yield a valid block when determining the optimal quantum mining strategies. Our result is important for evaluating quantum-mining threats on cryptocurrencies based on Proof-of-Work, e.g. Bitcoin
Bitcoin miners equipped with purpose-built quantum computers that execute Grover’s algorithm on classical candidate blocks, measuring the resulting quantum state to yield a potentially valid proof-of-work, pose a threat to Bitcoin’s security against 51% attacks. I aim to assess this threat by employing a game-theoretic framework inspired by the Lee-Ray-Santha quantum races model, extending it to better reflect how quantum miners would behave in practice. These extensions address some of the simplifications of prior works, where quantum miners performed only one quantum measurement (which does not maximise their resources), and were assumed to employ a peaceful strategy, wherein the quantum miners discard the resources already invested into searching upon receiving a broadcast of a newly-mined block (which is not enforceable). I consider a setting in which the quantum miners perform multiple quantum measurements between successive blocks, employ Sattath’s Aggressive Quantum Mining Strategy (AQMS), and must allocate limited quantum resources across these measurements. When employing Sattah’s AQMS, a quantum miner halts their execution of Grover’s algorithm and measures the resulting quantum state upon receiving a broadcast of a newly mined block, attempting to create a temporary fork and thereby decreasing the effective hash rate required for a 51% attack. In this novel setting, I derive the payoff matrices for the quantum miners and compute optimal quantum mining strategies that correspond to Nash equilibria. I simulate the deployment of these optimal quantum mining strategies within the Bitcoin network and estimate their effect on Bitcoin’s security against a 51% attack. I determine how two quantum miners should optimally allocate their quantum resources based on the network difficulty. Overall, I find that even when behaving optimally, two quantum miners cannot create enough temporary forks to render the Bitcoin network vulnerable to this quantum threat, given realistic constraints on their quantum resources. This thesis contributes to the growing body of research on the potential threats posed by scalable quantum computers, using the case of two quantum miners as a step toward understanding how quantum miners in general could affect Proof-of-Work-based cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin.
We initiate the study of quantum races, games where two or more quantum computers compete to solve a computational problem. While the problem of dueling algorithms has been studied for classical deterministic algorithms, the quantum case presents additional sources of uncertainty for the players. The foremost among these is that players do not know if they have solved the problem until they measure their quantum state. This question of `when to measure?' presents a very interesting strategic problem. We develop a game-theoretic model of a multiplayer quantum race, and find an approximate Nash equilibrium where all players play the same strategy. In the two-party case, we further show that this strategy is nearly optimal in terms of payoff among all symmetric Nash equilibria. A key role in our analysis of quantum races is played by a more tractable version of the game where there is no payout on a tie; for such races we completely characterize the Nash equilibria in the two-party case. One application of our results is to the stability of the Bitcoin protocol when mining is done by quantum computers. Bitcoin mining is a race to solve a computational search problem, with the winner gaining the right to create a new block. Our results inform the strategies that eventual quantum miners should use, and also indicate that the collision probability---the probability that two miners find a new block at the same time---would not be too high in the case of quantum miners. Such collisions are undesirable as they lead to forking of the Bitcoin blockchain.
Our aim is to determine conditions for quantum computing technology to give rise to security risks associated with quantum Bitcoin mining. Specifically, we determine the speed and energy efficiency a quantum computer needs to offer an advantage over classical mining. We analyze the setting in which the Bitcoin network is entirely classical except for a single quantum miner who has a small hash rate compared to that of the network. We develop a closed-form approximation for the probability that the quantum miner successfully mines a block, with this probability dependent on the number of Grover iterations the quantum miner applies before making a measurement. Next, we show that for a quantum miner that is “peaceful”, this success probability is maximized if the quantum miner applies Grover iterations for 16 minutes before measuring, which is surprising as the network mines blocks every 10 minutes on average. Using this optimal mining procedure, we show that the quantum miner outperforms a classical computer in efficiency (cost per block) if the condition Q < Crb is satisfied, where Q is the cost of a Grover iteration, C is the cost of a classical hash, r is the quantum miner's speed in Grover iterations per second, and b is a factor that attains its maximum if the quantum miner uses our optimal mining procedure. This condition lays the foundation for determining when quantum mining, and the known security risks associated with it, will arise.
Proof-of-Work (PoW) is a fundamental underlying technology behind most major blockchain cryptocurrencies. It has been previously pointed out that quantum devices provide a computational advantage in performing PoW in the context of Bitcoin. Here we make the case that this quantum advantage extends not only to all existing PoW mechanisms, but to any possible PoW as well. This has strong consequences regarding both quantum-based attacks on the integrity of the entirety of the blockchain, as well as more legitimate uses of quantum computation for the purpose of mining Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. For the first case, we estimate when these quantum attacks will become feasible, for various cryptocurrencies, and discuss the impact of such attacks. For the latter, we derive a precise formula to calculate the economic incentive for switching to quantum-based cryptocurrency miners. Using this formula, we analyze several test scenarios, and conclude that investing in quantum hardware for cryptocurrency mining has the potential to pay off immensely.
Bitcoin already faces a quantum threat through Shor attacks on elliptic-curve signatures. This paper isolates the other component that public discussion often conflates with it: mining. Grover's algorithm halves the exponent of brute-force search, promising a quadratic edge to any quantum miner of Bitcoin. Exactly how large that edge grows depends on fault-tolerant hardware. No prior study has costed that hardware end to end. We build an open-source estimator that sweeps the full attack surface: reversible oracles for double-SHA-256 mining and RIPEMD-based address preimages, surface-code factory sizing, fleet logistics under Nakamoto-consensus timing, and Kardashev-scale energy accounting. A parametric sweep over difficulty bits b, runtime caps, and target success probabilities reveals a sharp transition. At the most favourable partial-preimage setting (b = 32, 2^224 marked states), a superconducting surface-code fleet still requires about 10^8 physical qubits and about 10^4 MW. That load is comparable to a large national grid. Tightening to Bitcoin's January 2025 mainnet difficulty (b about 79) explodes the bill to about 10^23 qubits and about 10^25 W, approaching the Kardashev Type II threshold. These numbers settle a narrower question than "Is Bitcoin quantum-secure?" Once Grover mining is lifted from asymptotic query counts to fault-tolerant physical cost, practical quantum mining collapses under oracle, distillation, and fleet overhead. To push mining into non-trivial consensus effects, one must invoke astronomical quantum fleets operating at energy scales that lie far above present-day civilization.
Proof-of-Work (PoW) is a fundamental underlying technology behind most major blockchain cryptocurrencies. It has been previously pointed out that quantum devices provide a computational advantage in performing PoW in the context of Bitcoin. Here we make the case that this quantum advantage extends not only to all existing PoW mechanisms, but to any possible PoW as well. This has strong consequences regarding both quantum-based attacks on the integrity of the entirety of the blockchain, as well as more legitimate uses of quantum computation for the purpose of mining Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. For the first case, we estimate when these quantum attacks will become feasible, for various cryptocurrencies, and discuss the impact of such attacks. For the latter, we derive a precise formula to calculate the economic incentive for switching to quantum-based cryptocurrency miners. Using this formula, we analyze several test scenarios, and conclude that investing in quantum hardware for cryptocurrency mining has the potential to pay off immensely.