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arXiv:2604.12577

Ternary Quantum Eraser Cryptography

Ahmed Halawani, Yahya Meshalwi Khabrani, Abdulaziz Al-Mogheeth, Zheng-Hong Li, M. Al-Amri

quant-phSubmitted Apr 14, 2026• Announced Apr 15, 2026• 0 citations• Revised Apr 23, 2026 (v2)
v1 · Apr 14, 2026v2 · Apr 23, 2026
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Abstract

Quantum key distribution protocols based on the quantum eraser phenomenon offer an operational advantage: automatic identification of matching and mismatching encoding choices through interference, eliminating basis reconciliation. However, binary quantum eraser implementations permit an eavesdropper to recover Alice's encoded bit with $85\%$ probability. To overcome this constraint, we introduce a ternary quantum eraser protocol employing three polarization states with $120^\circ$ angular separation, transmitted in three-photon groups with randomized temporal ordering. This extension achieves enhanced security through two complementary mechanisms. First, the reduced distinguishability of symmetrically-arranged quantum states limits single-photon discrimination. Second, the combinatorial complexity of unknown photon ordering constrains multi-photon eavesdropping strategies. Security analysis against individual eavesdropping attacks within the four-dimensional path-polarization Hilbert space establishes that an eavesdropper's maximum success probability is bounded at $54\%$, substantially below the binary discrimination bound. The protocol maintains a binary-equivalent efficiency of 0.30 bits per photon, comparable to established binary QKD protocols at the sifted-rate level, while preserving the operational simplicity inherent to quantum eraser cryptography.

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Quantum key distribution protocols based on the quantum eraser phenomenon offer an operational advantage: automatic identification of matching and mismatching encoding choices through interference, eliminating basis reconciliation. However, binary quantum eraser implementations permit an eavesdropper to recover Alice's encoded bit with 85%85\%85% probability. To overcome this constraint, we introduce a ternary quantum eraser protocol employing three polarization states with 120∘120^\circ120∘ angular separation, transmitted in three-photon groups with randomized temporal ordering. This extension achieves enhanced security through two complementary mechanisms. First, the reduced distinguishability of symmetrically-arranged quantum states limits single-photon discrimination. Second, the combinatorial complexity of unknown photon ordering constrains multi-photon eavesdropping strategies. Security analysis against individual eavesdropping attacks within the four-dimensional path-polarization Hilbert space establishes that an eavesdropper's maximum success probability is bounded at 54%54\%54%, substantially below the binary discrimination bound. The protocol maintains a binary-equivalent efficiency of 0.30 bits per photon, comparable to established binary QKD protocols at the sifted-rate level, while preserving the operational simplicity inherent to quantum eraser cryptography.
Abstract Quantum eraser-based cryptographic schemes provide an alternative to conventional quantum key distribution (QKD) by encoding compatibility between preparation and measurement directly in interference, thereby eliminating the need for classical basis reconciliation. However, implementations restricted to binary encoding suffer from an intrinsic limitation: the relatively high distinguishability of two non-orthogonal states enables an eavesdropper to extract information with high success probability. Here, we show that this limitation can be mitigated by extending the quantum eraser framework to higher dimensional encoding. We introduce a ternary protocol based on three symmetrically arranged polarization states, combined with multi-photon grouping and randomized temporal ordering. Within a controlled security model based on individual attacks, we show that the maximum success probability of an undetected, faithful-resend attack drops from ≈ 85% to ≈ 54% relative to the binary case, while the binary-equivalent sifted-key rate is slightly higher (0.30 versus 0.25 bits per photon). Unlike conventional high-dimensional QKD, where the benefit of added dimensions is information-theoretic, the advantage here is physical, arising from the interplay between encoding dimensionality and interference-based indistinguishability. In this setting, higher-dimensional encoding reduces the accessibility of which-path information, leading to a suppression of information leakage at the physical level. These results identify encoding dimensionality as a resource for controlling information accessibility in interference-based cryptographic schemes and clarify the operational limits of quantum eraser-based approaches. Although the present analysis is restricted to a simplified attack model, it provides a physically transparent framework for exploring how interference and indistinguishability can be jointly engineered to influence security in quantum communication.
Employing the fundamental laws of quantum physics, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises the unconditionally secure distribution of cryptographic keys. However, in practical realisations, a QKD protocol is only secure, when the quantum bit error rate introduced by an eavesdropper unavoidably exceeds the system error rate. This condition guarantees that an eavesdropper cannot disguise his presence by simply replacing the original transmission line with a less faulty one. Unfortunately, this condition also limits the possible distance between the communicating parties, Alice and Bob, to a few hundred kilometers. To overcome this problem, we design a QKD protocol which allows Alice and Bob to distinguish system errors from eavesdropping errors. If they are able to identify the origin of their errors, they can detect eavesdropping even when the system error rate exceeds the eavesdropping error rate. To achieve this, the proposed protocol employs an alternative encoding of information in two-dimensional photon states. Errors manifest themselves as quantum bit and as index transmission errors with a distinct correlation between them in case of intercept-resend eavesdropping. As a result, Alice and Bob can tolerate lower eavesdropping and higher system error rates without compromising their privacy.
We introduce a ternary quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol and asymptotic security proof based on three coherent states and homodyne detection. Previous work had considered the binary case of two coherent states and here we nontrivially extend this to three. Our motivation is to leverage the practical benefits of both discrete and continuous (Gaussian) encoding schemes creating a best-of-both-worlds approach; namely, the postprocessing of discrete encodings and the hardware benefits of continuous ones. We present a thorough and detailed security proof in the limit of infinite signal states which allows us to lower bound the secret key rate. We calculate this is in the context of collective eavesdropping attacks and reverse reconciliation postprocessing. Finally, we compare the ternary coherent state protocol to other well-known QKD schemes (and fundamental repeaterless limits) in terms of secret key rates and loss.
In this paper, we introduce a novel two-way quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol in which the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) employ one qubit of a maximally entangled Bell state as the quantum channel for key exchange. The protocol incorporates a new security mechanism based on a scrambling operator. Unlike conventional two-way QKD protocols, all sifting operations and eavesdropper detection procedures are postponed until the completion of the quantum communication stage and are performed exclusively by Bob. Since the control mode is never publicly announced, attacks that rely on mode-dependent adaptations or attempt to remain hidden within the control mode are inherently prevented. Furthermore, the traveling qubit does not directly encode key information, substantially limiting the information that can be extracted from attacks targeting the quantum channel alone. An additional distinctive feature of the protocol is that rounds that would ordinarily be discarded can instead be utilized to detect the presence of an eavesdropper. We analyze a broad class of ancilla-based attacks, in which an eavesdropper couples an ancillary system to the transmitted qubit in an attempt to gain information about the key, and show that such attacks are detectable in their most general form.
The first quantum cryptography protocol, proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84), has been widely studied in recent years. This protocol uses four states (more precisely, two complementary bases) for the encoding of the classical bit. Recently, it has been noticed that by using the same four states, but a different encoding of information, one can define a protocol which is more robust in practical implementations, specifically when attenuated laser pulses are used instead of single-photon sources [V. Scarani et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004), referred to as the SARG04 protocol]. We present a detailed study of SARG04 in two different regimes. In the first part, we consider an implementation with a single-photon source: we derive bounds on the error rate QQQ for security against all possible attacks by the eavesdropper. The lower and the upper bound obtained for SARG04 ($Q\ensuremath{\lesssim}10.95%$ and $Q\ensuremath{\gtrsim}14.9%$, respectively) are close to those obtained for BB84 ($Q\ensuremath{\lesssim}12.4%$ and $Q\ensuremath{\gtrsim}14.6%$, respectively). In the second part, we consider a realistic source consisting of an attenuated laser and improve on previous analysis by allowing Alice to optimize the mean number of photons as a function of the distance. The SARG04 protocol is found to perform better than BB84, both in secret-key rate and in maximal achievable distance, for a wide class of Eve's attacks.
It seems that quantum key distribution (QKD) may be completely insecure when the message sender Alice always encodes her key bits in a fixed basis. In this paper, we present a QKD protocol with classical Alice, i.e. Alice always encodes her key bit in the {|0〉,|1〉} basis (we call it classical {0,1} basis) and the eavesdropper Eve knows this fact. We prove that our protocol is completely robust against any eavesdropping attack and present the amount of tolerable noise against Eve's individual attack. Next, we present a QKD protocol to demonstrate that secure key bits can be distributed even if neither Alice nor Bob has quantum capacities, and extend this idea to a QKD network protocol with numerous parties who have only classical capacities. Finally, we discuss that quantum is necessary in QKD for security reasons, but both Alice and Bob may be classical.