Superdeterminism has received recent attention as a possible path toward a locally causal explanation of the entanglement correlations that appear in experimental tests of Bell's theorem. While the term `superdeterminism' was coined by Bell to refer to restrictions on the free will of experimenters, it was not rigorously defined until recently. It has now been defined as a property of any physical theory that produces systematic violations of statistical independence. Here we focus on formalizing the requirements that being nonsuperdeterministic places on a physical theory, and setting a standard that must be met before we can conclude that a given theory is not superdeterministic. We begin by carefully examining how a physical theory determines what outcomes we observe when performing measurements in terms of ontic states and response functions, and how this differs between superdeterministic and nonsuperdeterministic theories, in terms of the behavior of the types of vetted random sampling procedures that we use in experiments. The core result is that individual samples and measurement outcomes must be representative of the observed distributions, which is explained in detail. This also has a bearing on how measurement settings are chosen by agents, whether freely or randomly, and we argue that this standard ultimately defines what freedom/independence actually mean. We then discuss contextuality, and show that in most cases, superdeterminism is contextual. Finally, we discuss how different physical theories, with different notions of ontic states and response functions, can give rise to the same empirical data, and how the same operational contextuality may appear in different forms.
Superdeterminism—where the Measurement Independence assumption in Bell’s Theorem is violated—is frequently assumed to imply implausibly conspiratorial correlations between properties λ of particles being measured and measurement settings x and y. But it does not have to be so: a superdeterministic but non-conspiratorial locally causal model is developed where each pair of entangled particles has unique λ. The model is based on a specific but arbitrarily fine discretisation of complex Hilbert space, where λ defines the information, over and above the freely chosen nominal settings x and y, which fixes the exact measurement settings X and Y of a run of a Bell experiment. Pearlean interventions, needed to assess whether x and y are Bell-type free variables, are shown to be inconsistent with rational-number constraints on the discretised Hilbert states. These constraints limit the post-hoc freedom to vary x keeping λ and y fixed but disappear with any coarse-graining of λ, X, and Y, rendering so-called drug-trial conspiracies irrelevant. Points in the discretised space can be realised as ensembles of symbolically labelled deterministic trajectories on an ‘all-at-once’ fractal attractor. It is shown how quantum mechanics might be ‘gloriously explained and derived’ as the singular continuum limit of the discretisation of Hilbert space. It is argued that the real message behind Bell’s Theorem has less to do with locality, realism, or freedom to choose, and more to do with the need to develop more explicitly holistic theories when attempting to synthesise quantum and gravitational physics.
Abstract Bell’s theorem demonstrates that any physical theory that is consistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics, and which satisfies some apparently innocuous assumptions, must violate the principle of local causality . It may therefore be possible to maintain local causality by rejecting one of these other assumptions instead. One possibility that has recently received significant attention involves rejecting the principle of statistical independence (SI). In this paper, we consider the frequency interpretation of SI, which states that
ρ(λ)≈ρ(λ∣Z) , where
ρ(λ) is the relative frequency of an element of an ensemble being in the state
λ , and Z is a label that separates the ensemble into apparently randomly selected sub-ensembles. SI is violated when the sub-ensemble frequency
ρ(λ∣Z) fails to be representative of the ensemble frequency
ρ(λ) . We argue that physical theories that systematically violate SI should all be understood as superdeterministic . This perspective on SI sheds light on a number of issues that are being debated in the superdeterminism literature, especially concerning its scope and philosophical consequences. Regarding scope, we argue that superdeterministic theories fall into three categories, deterministic theories with fine-tuned initial conditions, fluke theories, and nomic exclusion theories. We also argue that retrocausal and invariant set theories need not violate SI, which is contrary to how they are normally presented. Regarding philosophical implications, we argue that superdeterminism is incompatible with free will according to some prominent compatibilist accounts. We also argue that although superdeterminism is conspiratorial, it is not unscientific, but pre-scientific.
This is the first of two papers that attempt to comprehensively analyse superdeterministic hidden-variables models of Bell correlations. We first give an overview of superdeterminism and discuss various criticisms of it raised in the literature. We argue that the most common criticism, the violation of ‘free-will’, is incorrect. We take up Bell’s intuitive criticism that these models are ‘conspiratorial’. To develop this further, we introduce non-equilibrium extensions of superdeterministic models. We show that the measurement statistics of these extended models depend on the physical system used to determine the measurement settings. This suggests a fine-tuning in order to eliminate this dependence from experimental observation. We also study the signalling properties of these extended models. We show that although they generally violate the formal no-signalling constraints, this violation cannot be equated to an actual signal. We therefore suggest that the so-called no-signalling constraints be more appropriately named the marginal-independence constraints. We discuss the mechanism by which marginal-independence is violated in superdeterministic models. Lastly, we consider a hypothetical scenario where two experimenters use the apparent-signalling of a superdeterministic model to communicate with each other. This scenario suggests another conspiratorial feature peculiar to superdeterminism. These suggestions are quantitatively developed in the second paper.
In this dissertation, we explore two alternatives to quantum nonlocality in a single-universe framework: superdeterminism and retrocausality. These models circumvent Bell's theorem by violating the assumption that the hidden variables are uncorrelated with the measurement settings. In Chapter 1, we introduce superdeterminism and prepare the groundwork for our results in Chapter 2. We start from a review of the topic, focussing on the various qualitative criticisms raised against superdeterminism in the literature. We identify the criticism of 'superdeterministic conspiracy' by Bell as the most serious, and introduce nonequilibrium extensions of superdeterministic models in an attempt to formalise the criticism. We study the different properties of these models, and isolate two conspiratorial features. First, the measurement statistics depend on the physical system used to determine the measurement settings. Second, the formal no-signalling constraints are violated although there is no causal connection between the wings. We quantify in Chapter 2 the two conspiratorial features that we found in Chapter 1. We consider a Bell scenario where, in each run and at each wing, the experimenter chooses one of
N devices to determine the local measurement setting. We then show that a superdeterministic model of the scenario has to finely tuned such that measurement statistics do not depend on the physical system used to determine the measurement settings. This quantifies the first form of conspiracy identified in Chapter 1 as a fine tuning. We also show that a superdeterministic model of the scenario requires arbitrarily large correlations, quantified in terms of a formal entropy drop and in terms of mutual information, to be set up by the initial conditions. Such correlations are required to ensure that the devices that the hidden variables are correlated with are coincidentally the same as the devices in fact used for every run at each wing. This quantifies the second form of conspiracy identified in Chapter 2 as an arbitrary large correlation. Nonlocal and retrocausal models turn out to be non-conspiratorial according to both approaches, thereby singling out `conspiracy' as a unique, problematic feature of superdeterminism. In Chapter 3, we change tracks to focus on retrocausality. Our results regarding retrocausal models are, in contrast to superdeterminism, positive. We first show how to construct a local,
ψ-epistemic hidden-variable model of Bell correlations with wavefunctions in physical space by a retrocausal adaptation of the originally superdeterministic model given by Brans. We show that, in non-equilibrium, the model generally violates no-signalling constraints while remaining local with respect to both ontology and interaction between particles. Lastly, we argue that our model shares some structural similarities with the modal class of interpretations of quantum mechanics. In Chapter 4, focus on the question whether retrocausal models can utilise their relativistic properties to account for relativistic effects on entangled systems. We consider a hypothetical relativistic Bell experiment, where one of the wings experiences time-dilation effects. We show that the retrocausal Brans model, introduced in Chapter 3, can be easily generalised to analyse this experiment, and that it predicts less separation of eigenpackets in the wing experiencing the time-dilation. This causes the particle distribution patterns on the photographic plates to differ between the wings -- an experimentally testable prediction of the model. We discuss the difficulties faced by other hidden variable models in describing this experiment, and their natural resolution in our model due to its relativistic properties. Lastly, we argue that it is not clear at present, due to technical difficulties, if our prediction is reproduced by quantum field theory. We conclude that if it is, then the retrocausal Brans model predicts the same result with great simplicity in comparison. If not, the model can be experimentally tested.
Bell inequalities may only be derived, if hidden variables do not depend on the experimental settings. The stochastic independence of hidden and setting variables is called: freedom of choice, free will, measurement independence or no conspiracy. By imbedding the Bell causal structure in a larger causal network the authors correctly prove, that one can explain and quantify possible violation of measurement independence without evoking the super-determinism. They assume the independence of the variables that causally determine the settings and investigate how they might become correlated with hidden variables. Using their extended causal networks they derive a contextual probabilistic model on which their further correct results are based. The authors seem to ignore that contextual probabilistic model may be derived directly using only probabilistic concepts and incorporating correctly setting dependent variables describing measuring instruments. In these contextual probabilistic models experimenters freedom of choice is not compromised and the results of Bell Tests including an apparent violation of Einsteinian nonsignaling may be explained in a locally causal way. Talking about freedom of choice is misleading and is rooted in incorrect understanding of Bayes Theorem. We explain why freedom of choice should be called noncontextuality and why its violation in Bell Tests confirms only the contextual character of quantum observables. Therefore, contextuality and not experimenters freedom of choice are important resources in quantum information.
The violation of Bell inequalities seems to establish an important fact about the world: that it is non-local. However, this result relies on the assumption of the statistical independence of the measurement settings with respect to potential past events that might have determined them. Superdeterminism refers to the view that a local, and determinist, account of Bell inequalities violations is possible, by rejecting this assumption of statistical independence. We examine and clarify various problems with superdeterminism, looking in particular at its consequences on the nature of scientific laws and scientific reasoning. We argue that the view requires a neo-Humean account of at least some laws, and creates a significant problem for the use of statistical independence in other parts of physics and science more generally.