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arXiv:2602.02191

The trouble with recording devices

Eric Tesse

quant-phSubmitted Feb 2, 2026• Announced Feb 3, 2026• 0 citations• Revised Feb 8, 2026 (v2)
v1 · Feb 2, 2026v2 · Feb 8, 2026
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Abstract

Quantum theory encounters a difficulty when attempting to describe recording devices. If the recording is of events in which quantum uncertainty plays a role, such as an experiment on a quantum system, quantum theory is unable to correctly predict the probabilities of both future and past states of the recording. The nature of this difficulty will be laid out at the outset. A resolution then will be presented, in which the Born rule will be lightly amended so as to correctly predict all probabilities. The resolution will have the further benefit of clarifying how quantum theory applies to an array of situations in which the theory can be ambiguous, such as the descriptions of continuous measurements, and of closed systems containing all observers.

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Some time ago, John Bell and I wrote a tongue-in-cheek article on the interpretation of quantum mechanics;11. J. S. Bell, M. Nauenberg, in Preludes in Theoretical Physics, A. de Shalit, H. Feshbach, L. van Hove, eds., North Holland, Amsterdam (1966), p. 270;reprinted in J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge U. 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Quantum theory encounters a difficulty when attempting to describe recording devices. If the recording is of events in which quantum uncertainty plays a role, such as an experiment on a quantum system, quantum theory is unable to correctly predict the probabilities of both future and past states of the recording. The nature of this difficulty will be laid out at the outset. A resolution then will be presented, in which the Born rule will be lightly amended so as to correctly predict all probabilities. The resolution will have the further benefit of clarifying how quantum theory applies to an array of situations in which the theory can be ambiguous, such as the descriptions of continuous measurements, and of closed systems containing all observers.
Some time ago, John Bell and I wrote a tongue-in-cheek article on the interpretation of quantum mechanics;11. J. S. Bell, M. Nauenberg, in Preludes in Theoretical Physics, A. de Shalit, H. Feshbach, L. van Hove, eds., North Holland, Amsterdam (1966), p. 270;reprinted in J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge U. Press, New York (1987), p. 24. in it we remarked that only a minority of physicists had any interest in the topic and that the typical physicist thought he would understand it “if ever he can spare twenty minutes to think about it.” According to David Mermin, however, that situation has changed dramatically, and “new interpretations [of quantum mechanics] appear every year.”Actually, most textbooks on the subject continue to be based on the well-established Born interpretation of quantum mechanics, which postulates that the absolute square of the Schrödinger wavefunction, projected onto a particular quantum state, gives the probability for the occurrence of that state after an appropriate measurement has been made. Mermin indicated that the problem with the Born interpretation involves a confusion, “prevalent among physicists,” regarding the nature of probability. He presented his preference for a “personalist Bayesian view,” which leads separate “agents,” like Eugene Wigner and his friend, to make different probability assignments based on their beliefs. But as Richard Feynman remarked, “Nature does not know what you are looking at, and she behaves the way she is going to behave whether you bother to take down the data or not.”22. R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 3, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA (1989), p. 3–7.Indeed, as applied to experiments, probability simply corresponds to the relative frequency for the occurrence of a given final state after identical states are prepared initially and measurements are made by appropriate detectors—devices that, through an irreversible macroscopic process, provide a permanent record of the outcome. Hence, the results of an experiment are independent of any observers, whose only role is to set up appropriate measurement devices, calculate the probabilities from quantum theory, and then write papers based on the recorded results.As Max Born also emphasized, in classical mechanics the situation is analogous, when one takes into account that in practice initial conditions in an experiment are known only imprecisely.33. M. Born, Dan. Mat. Fys. Medd. 30 (2), 1 (1955). Hence the observed evolution of the system is also determined by a probability function that satisfies the Liouville equation. But in that case, after a measurement is performed, no one talks about the “collapse” of this classical function, whereas in quantum mechanics it is common to use that controversial expression for the Schrödinger wavefunction.Mermin discussed a “shifty split” between the classical and the quantum domain, a split that supposedly “haunts quantum mechanics.” He claimed that “regardless of what is split from what, all versions of the shifty split are vague and ambiguous.” However, that is not always the case, as a simple example shows. Consider an initial quantum wavepacket for a particle under an attractive central force that varies inversely with the square of the radial distance—the classic problem of planetary motion from the viewpoint of quantum mechanics, for example, or an excited electron in a Rydberg atom. For a finite time, the wavepacket will follow a classical Keplerian elliptic orbit, but like the Liouville distribution for the analogous classical problem, from the outset it will disperse due to the spread in initial position and momentum.For the classical distribution to be in close correspondence with the quantum wavepacket, its initial spread is assumed to satisfy the uncertainty relation. Eventually, however, the head of the wavepacket, like in the classical distribution, will catch up with its tail. Afterwards, further spreading of the wavepacket leads to interference effects between the two components, and the classical–quantum correspondence ceases to be valid. The time when such interference effects first appear is of order nτ/3, where n is the mean principal quantum number of the wavepacket and τ is the Kepler period.44. M. Nauenberg, Phys. Rev. A 40, 1133 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.40.1133 Experimentally, that transition has been observed to agree with theory in Rydberg atoms55. M. Nauenberg, C. Stroud, J. Yeazell, Sci. Am., June 1994, p. 44. https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0694-44 for n = 100, τ = 152 picoseconds, and nothing shifty about this classical–quantum correspondence is found. For planetary orbits, however, n is of order 1070, and therefore the answer to Albert Einstein’s often repeated remark “Is the moon there when nobody looks?” (see David Mermin, Physics Today, April 1985, page 38) is yes.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. S. Bell, M. Nauenberg, in Preludes in Theoretical Physics, A. de Shalit, H. Feshbach, L. van Hove, eds., North Holland, Amsterdam (1966), p. 270; Google Scholarreprinted in J. S. Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge U. Press, New York (1987), p. 24. Google Scholar2. R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 3, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA (1989), p. 3–7. Google Scholar3. M. Born, Dan. Mat. Fys. Medd. 30 (2), 1 (1955). Google Scholar4. M. Nauenberg, Phys. Rev. A 40, 1133 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.40.1133, Google ScholarCrossref, CAS5. M. Nauenberg, C. Stroud, J. Yeazell, Sci. Am., June 1994, p. 44. https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0694-44, Google ScholarCrossref© 2012 American Institute of Physics.
In June 1925 Heisenberg arrived at Helgoland/Heligoland island to escape a fit of hay fever. He returned with a sketch of a strange theory of the micro-world, which we now call quantum mechanics. This essay attempts to present a look at this theory, which tries to return to the original insight of Heisenberg on what should be the essence of a theory of atomic realm: it must be a theory of the observable events, in which fundamentally unobservable quantities have no place. No ontological status is given to elements of the mathematical formulation of the theory. The theory is about our description of events in laboratories, probabilities of which are given by the Born rule. Following Bohr, these events involve macroscopic measuring apparatuses, and the accessible final events are classically describable. Information about the events is cloneable, as it is of a classical nature. The modern quantum theory of classicality is the decoherence theory. It treats "the pointer variable" of measuring apparatus as an open system interacting with an environment consisting of all other "zillions" of degrees of freedom of the device, and anything coupled to it. Because such environment is uncontrollable we have no possibility to reverse measurements. The quantum mechanical measurement theory based on decoherence theory is reproducing the predictions of Born rule. Notwithstanding, possibility of reversing measurements and of application of Born rule in situations other than these which lead to macroscopically observable events are features of a modification of quantum mechanics which is called by its adherents "unitary quantum mechanics". As its predictions, which go beyond quantum mechanics, are not testable - we claim that unitary quantum mechanics in an interpretation of quantum mechanics. As such it is metaphysics.
Ever since the beginning of quantum mechanics, the measurement problem has been a subject of sometimes discontinued but nevertheless recurrent concern. As students, most physicists have raised questions about it, but the spectacular and renewed successes of quantum theory were a strong incentive for them to work out applications without further worrying about foundations. In each generation, however, some dissatisfaction reemerges, which leads to slow progress, and we may expect that the measurement problem will some day be cleared up rather than forgotten. The situation recalls statistical mechanics, the foundations of which still give rise to scientific discussions, in spite of more than one century’s achievements. Actually, the paradoxes of irreversibility and of Maxwell’s demon share some common features with quantum measurements, to wit, they involve probabilities in a crucial fashion and their explanation requires elucidating the role of the observer.
We present a complete, mathematically rigorous, and observer-free resolution of the quantum measurement problem. Building entirely on the axiomatic framework established in the preceding work, which derives the Born rule exclusively from unitary dynamics, uniqueness of classical records, unitary invariance, and ergodic stability, we show that the entire measurement process is governed by a single deterministic law: unitary evolution. The apparent wavefunction collapse is not a physical process but an effective description of the emergence of a unique dynamically stable classical record under decoherence and unique ergodicity. No auxiliary postulates, collapse mechanisms, or observer-dependent inputs are required. We explain the origin of definite measurement outcomes, the emergence of objective probability, the elimination of quantum-classical duality, and provide a fully consistent resolution of the Wigner’s friend paradox. The framework reproduces all experimental predictions of quantum mechanics without contradictions and establishes a unified, self-contained foundation for quantum measurement theory. This work constitutes the first complete, minimal, and mathematically closed solution to the quantum measurement problem.