Abstract The standard claim that the Schrödinger and Heisenberg pictures of quantum mechanics are equivalent rests on the fact that they yield identical empirical predictions. This equivalence therefore assumes the instrumentalist worldview in which theories serve only as tools for prediction. Under scientific realism, by contrast, theories aim to describe reality. Whereas the Schrödinger picture posits a time-evolving wave function, the Heisenberg picture posits so-called descriptors, time-evolving generators of the algebra of observables. These two structures are non-isomorphic: descriptors surject onto but do not reduce to the Schrödinger state. Hence, under realism, the pictures are inequivalent. The chapter argues that this inequivalence marks an opening toward a richer, separable ontology for quantum theory. On explanatory grounds, descriptors provide genuinely local accounts of superdense coding, teleportation, branching, and Bell inequality violations—phenomena that the Schrödinger framework does not explain fully locally.
Abstract The standard claim that the Schrödinger and Heisenberg pictures of quantum mechanics are equivalent rests on the fact that they yield identical empirical predictions. This equivalence therefore assumes the instrumentalist worldview in which theories serve only as tools for prediction. Under scientific realism, by contrast, theories aim to describe reality. Whereas the Schrödinger picture posits a time-evolving wave function, the Heisenberg picture posits so-called descriptors, time-evolving generators of the algebra of observables. These two structures are non-isomorphic: descriptors surject onto but do not reduce to the Schrödinger state. Hence, under realism, the pictures are inequivalent. The chapter argues that this inequivalence marks an opening toward a richer, separable ontology for quantum theory. On explanatory grounds, descriptors provide genuinely local accounts of superdense coding, teleportation, branching, and Bell inequality violations—phenomena that the Schrödinger framework does not explain fully locally.
This chapter briefly explains the two elementary points concerning quantum mechanics: the mean value rule and the Heisenberg picture. The Schrodinger and Heisenberg pictures are two different but equivalent sets of rules. In other words, when applied to a given physical situation they lead to the same observable predictions. In some respects the Heisenberg picture has definite technical advantages. It is particularly convenient, for instance, in quantum field theory. For describing pure cases the use of wave functions in place of kets is sometimes convenient. The mean value of an observable A and the probability that a measurement of A yields eigenvalue a k can be expressed by means of wave functions. The state vector of a system that does not undergo a measurement does not change with time, obviously this state vector is suddenly modified—also in the Heisenberg picture—when a measurement takes place.
In this chapter, the authors describe the Heisenberg picture of quantum mechanics by formally accomplishing a time-dependent transformation of state vectors and operators of the Schrodinger picture. Any new picture of quantum mechanics will be acceptable, if the Schrodinger state vectors and operators are subjected to a transformation, which does not alter: the spectrum of the eigenvalues of the operators and the scalar product of an arbitrary state vector with the eigenstate vectors. These two conditions are easily fulfilled by means of the unitary transformations. The authors show that a unitary operator represents an isomorph mapping of a certain unitary vector space onto itself. Since the physical quantities measured in the experiment are, in fact, a measure of the scalar product, as implied by the definition of the probability W through the scalar product in, it is clear that the predictions based upon the new, Heisenberg picture must be identical to those obtained in the Schrodinger picture.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.
The description of the time evolution of systems is technically known as the "Schrodinger picture." An important alternative description is the "Heisenberg picture," which indeed was the one Heisenberg used when he first formulated quantum mechanics. The Schrodinger and Heisenberg pictures represent two different but equivalent sets of rules. In other words, when applied to a given physical situation they lead to the same observable predictions. In some respects, the Heisenberg picture presents definite technical advantages. It is particularly convenient, for instance, in quantum field theory. The chapter discusses work consistently with the equivalent Schrodinger set of rules. For this reason, it describes briefly the Heisenberg formulation. The chapter shows that the expressions used in the Schrodinger picture can be carried over to the Heisenberg picture. It implies, however, that the kets associated with the possible values that can be found upon measurement of an observable are themselves time-dependent kets.
J.S. Bell's remarkable 1964 theorem showed that any theory sharing the empirical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics would have to exhibit a surprising – and, from the point of view of relativity theory, very troubling – kind of nonlocality. Unfortunately, even still on this 50th anniversary, many commentators and textbook authors continue to misrepresent Bell's theorem. In particular, one continues to hear the claim that Bell's result leaves open the option of concluding either nonlocality or the failure of some unorthodox “hidden variable” (or “determinism” or “realism”) premise. This mistaken claim is often based on a failure to appreciate the role of the earlier 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in Bell's reasoning. After briefly reviewing this situation, I turn to two alternative versions of quantum theory – the “many worlds” theory of Everett and the quantum Bayesian interpretation of Fuchs, Schack, Caves, and Mermin – that purport to provide actual counterexamples to Bell's claim that nonlocality is required to account for the empirically verified quantum predictions. After analyzing each theory's grounds for claiming to explain the EPR–Bell correlations locally, however, one can see that (despite a number of fundamental differences) the two theories share a common for-all-practical-purposes (FAPP) solipsistic character. This dramatically undermines such theories’ claims to provide a local explanation of the correlations and thus, by concretizing the ridiculous philosophical lengths to which one must go to elude Bell's own conclusion, reinforces the assertion that nonlocality really is required to coherently explain the empirical data. Introduction Fifty years ago, in 1964 [1], John Stewart Bell first proved the theorem that has become widely known as “Bell's Theorem” but that Bell himself instead referred to as the “locality inequality theorem” [2]. In Bell's own view, the theorem showed that the empirical predictions of local theories will be constrained by Bell's inequality (or as Bell himself preferred to call it, the “locality inequality”). Hence, nonlocality is a necessary feature of any theory that shares the empirical predictions of standard quantum mechanics.
The article examines the controversial relation of scientific realism with quantum mechanics. To this end, two distinct discussions are invoked: the discussion about ‘realism’ in the context of quantum mechanics and the discussion about ‘scientific realism’ in the context of the general philosophy of science. The aim is to distinguish them in order, first, to argue that the former—revolving around ‘local realism’ and the theorems of Bell and Kochen–Specker—unjustifiably identifies realism with features of a particular worldview, and thereby fosters the impression that the failure of ‘local realism’ in quantum experiments constitutes a failure of scientific realism too; and, second, in light of the latter discussion, to claim that scientific realism and quantum mechanics can be compatible—there is ground for dealing with quantum measurement simply as a physical mind-independent interaction. Therefore, a realist approach to the theory is possible despite its notorious measurement problem, even if the issue of its interpretation is still disputed.