We reanalyze from a modern perspective the bold idea of G. Helm, W. Ostwald, P. Duhem and others that energy is the fundamental entity composing the physical world. We start from a broad perspective reminding the search for a fundamental ``substance'' (perhaps better referred to as ous\'ıa, the original Greek word) from the pre-Socratics to the important debate between Ostwald and Boltzmann about the energy vs. atoms at the end of the 19th century. While atoms were eventually accepted (even by Ostwald himself), the emergence of Quantum Mechanics and Relativity were crucial to suggest that the dismissal of energy in favor of atoms was perhaps premature, and should be revisited. We discuss how the so-called primitive ontology programme can be implemented with energy as the fundamental entity, and why fields (and their quanta, particles) should rather be considered as non-fundamental. We sketch some of the difficulties introduced by the attempt to include gravitation in the general scheme.
We reanalyze from a modern perspective the bold idea of G. Helm, W. Ostwald, P. Duhem and others that energy is the fundamental entity composing the physical world. We start from a broad perspective reminding the search for a fundamental ``substance'' (perhaps better referred to as ous'ıa, the original Greek word) from the pre-Socratics to the important debate between Ostwald and Boltzmann about the energy vs. atoms at the end of the 19th century. While atoms were eventually accepted (even by Ostwald himself), the emergence of Quantum Mechanics and Relativity were crucial to suggest that the dismissal of energy in favor of atoms was perhaps premature, and should be revisited. We discuss how the so-called primitive ontology programme can be implemented with energy as the fundamental entity, and why fields (and their quanta, particles) should rather be considered as non-fundamental. We sketch some of the difficulties introduced by the attempt to include gravitation in the general scheme.
The core of my doctoral thesis consists in the establishment and evaluation of different ontological interpretations of quantum field theory. I thus seek for an ontological picture of the most fundamental level of the physical world, under the assumption that quantum field theory provides a true description. I defend the view that algebraic quantum field theory is the most important formulation when ontological questions are concerned. Some of my more extensive studies deal with different substance ontologies as well as with process-ontological approaches. Eventually, I propose a dispositional trope ontology, according to which particularized properties and not substances are the most basic entities, in terms of which all other entities are to be analysed.
In my dissertation I analyze the structure of fundamental physical theories. I start with an analysis of what an adequate primitive ontology is, discussing the measurement problem in quantum mechanics and theirs solutions. It is commonly said that these theories have little in common. I argue instead that the moral of the measurement problem is that the wave function cannot represent physical objects and a common structure between these solutions can be recognized: each of them is about a clear three-dimensional primitive ontology that evolves according to a law determined by the wave function. The primitive ontology is what matter is made of while the wave function tells the matter how to move. One might think that what is important in the notion of primitive ontology is their three-dimensionality. If so, in a theory like classical electrodynamics electromagnetic fields would be part of the primitive ontology. I argue that, reflecting on what the purpose of a fundamental physical theory is, namely to explain the behavior of objects in three--dimensional space, one can recognize that a fundamental physical theory has a particular architecture. If so, electromagnetic fields play a different role in the theory than the particles and therefore should be considered, like the wave function, as part of the law.Therefore, we can characterize the general structure of a fundamental physical theory as a mathematical structure grounded on a primitive ontology. I explore this idea to better understand theories like classical mechanics and relativity, emphasizing that primitive ontology is crucial in the process of building new theories, being fundamental in identifying the symmetries. Finally, I analyze what it means to explain the word around us in terms of the notion of primitive ontology in the case of regularities of statistical character. Here is where the notion of typicality comes into play: we have explained a phenomenon if the typical histories of the primitive ontology give rise to the statistical regularities we observe.
I combine the idea of a primitive ontology with the metaphysics of laws of nature. In so doing, I examine the theoretical entities that are postulated in Newtonian mechanics, classical electrodynamics, and the de Broglie–Bohm quantum theory. I argue that the existence of mass, forces, fields, and the wave-function depends on the status of laws. The three major theories on laws of nature I treat are Humeanism, dispositionalism, and primitivism about laws. I point out that properties are notoriously ignored in debates on primitive ontologies. In fact, I show that properties, both intrinsic and relational, aren’t needed in physics; therefore, I replace the primitive ontology with a primitive stuff ontology, whose elements have no properties. Recently, a debate has started on the ontological status of forces in classical mechanics; I criticize the major positions and present my own idea that focuses on the status of laws of nature. Another hot topic is the status of the wave-function. Here, I develop a new interpretation in the framework of Humeanism that crucially differs from that advocated by David Albert and Barry Loewer, in that our world is not an illusion of a reality in configuration space. In addition, I propose a hitherto unconsidered way in which the wave–function can be construed as a holistic disposition.
ABSTRACT This article surveys recent work on primitive ontology (PO) approaches to quantum mechanics, focusing on proposals that seek to integrate this approach with the metaphysics of causal powers. PO approaches aim to provide a clear metaphysical picture in which the world consists of local entities such as particles, matter density fields or flashes, and these entities compose macroscopic objects, such as scientists and their measuring devices. To account for the behaviour of these local entities, some PO theories invoke the metaphysics of powers. After motivating PO approaches and contrasting them with wave function realism, I consider the development of power‐based POs, contrasting them with both Humean POs and POs which invoke primitive laws. I explain how different power‐based frameworks address key quantum phenomena, and I survey some difficulties, including the Problem of Holism, of small worlds and of top‐down causation. Such challenges are best confronted, I suggest, by drawing on Aristotelian hylomorphism: If powers are grounded in forms that unify physical systems, then power‐based POs can accommodate holistic and context‐sensitive behaviour.
The core dilemma of modern physics stems from two unproven ontological presuppositions: that spacetime is an innate container preceding matter, and that matter is an entity composed of indivisible particles. These presuppositions have led to the fundamental split between general relativity and quantum mechanics, giving rise to a series of century-old unsolved problems such as wave-particle duality, the quantum measurement paradox, the nature of gravity, and dark matter and dark energy. Based on the sole unfalsifiable first principle that "the essence of cognition is succession", this paper deduces a complete ontological system through pure a priori reasoning: the authentic physical world consists solely of one-dimensional successive rays and their transverse coupling relations; time is the successive extension of rays, space is the network of coupling relations, matter is the steady state of closed coupling, and all interactions are different manifestations of coupling actions. Particles are not authentically existing entities, but rather point-like endpoint phenomena presented in the observer's phenomenal world when two rays undergo an all-or-nothing coupling. Based on this framework, this paper uniformly explains all core phenomena in both the microscopic quantum domain and the macroscopic relativistic domain in one go, resolves all traditional physical paradoxes at the ontological level, achieves the ontological unification of the four fundamental forces, and proposes three falsifiable core predictions. This paper demonstrates that all theories of traditional physics are approximate descriptions of the authentic physical world at the phenomenal level, and their fundamental error lies in mistaking "coupling endpoints" for "primitive entities", thereby reversing the causal relationship. Cognitive Succession Ontology provides a logically consistent and universally unified ultimate foundation for physics.
In this paper I present the common structure of quantum theories with a primitive ontology, and discuss in what sense the classical world emerges from quantum theories as understood in this framework. In addition, I argue that the primitive ontology approach is better at answering this question than the rival wave function ontology approach or any other approach in which the classical world is non-reductively ‘emergent:’ even if the classical limit within this framework needs to be fully developed, the difficulties are technical rather than conceptual, while this is not true for the alternatives.