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Particles and Laws of Nature in Classical and Quantum Physics

Mario Hubert

Published Nov 18, 2016• 2 citations

Abstract

I combine the idea of a primitive ontology with the metaphysics of laws of nature. In so doing, I examine the theoretical entities that are postulated in Newtonian mechanics, classical electrodynamics, and the de Broglie–Bohm quantum theory. I argue that the existence of mass, forces, fields, and the wave-function depends on the status of laws. The three major theories on laws of nature I treat are Humeanism, dispositionalism, and primitivism about laws. I point out that properties are notoriously ignored in debates on primitive ontologies. In fact, I show that properties, both intrinsic and relational, aren’t needed in physics; therefore, I replace the primitive ontology with a primitive stuff ontology, whose elements have no properties. Recently, a debate has started on the ontological status of forces in classical mechanics; I criticize the major positions and present my own idea that focuses on the status of laws of nature. Another hot topic is the status of the wave-function. Here, I develop a new interpretation in the framework of Humeanism that crucially differs from that advocated by David Albert and Barry Loewer, in that our world is not an illusion of a reality in configuration space. In addition, I propose a hitherto unconsidered way in which the wave–function can be construed as a holistic disposition.

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I combine the idea of a primitive ontology with the metaphysics of laws of nature. In so doing, I examine the theoretical entities that are postulated in Newtonian mechanics, classical electrodynamics, and the de Broglie–Bohm quantum theory. I argue that the existence of mass, forces, fields, and the wave-function depends on the status of laws. The three major theories on laws of nature I treat are Humeanism, dispositionalism, and primitivism about laws. I point out that properties are notoriously ignored in debates on primitive ontologies. In fact, I show that properties, both intrinsic and relational, aren’t needed in physics; therefore, I replace the primitive ontology with a primitive stuff ontology, whose elements have no properties. Recently, a debate has started on the ontological status of forces in classical mechanics; I criticize the major positions and present my own idea that focuses on the status of laws of nature. Another hot topic is the status of the wave-function. Here, I develop a new interpretation in the framework of Humeanism that crucially differs from that advocated by David Albert and Barry Loewer, in that our world is not an illusion of a reality in configuration space. In addition, I propose a hitherto unconsidered way in which the wave–function can be construed as a holistic disposition.

The article sets out a primitive ontology of the natural world in terms of primitive stuff—that is, stuff that has as such no physical properties at all—but that is not a bare substratum either, being individuated by metrical relations. We focus on quantum physics and employ identity-based Bohmian mechanics to illustrate this view, but point out that it applies all over physics. Properties then enter into the picture exclusively through the role that they play for the dynamics of the primitive stuff. We show that such properties can be local (classical mechanics), as well as holistic (quantum mechanics), and discuss two metaphysical options to conceive them, namely, Humeanism and modal realism in the guise of dispositionalism.

The article points out that the modern formulation of Bohm’s quantum theory, known as Bohmian mechanics, is committed only to particles’ positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces, according to which Bohm’s theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general. 1 Introduction2 What is the Ontological Status of the Wave-Function?3 Humeanism about Laws4 Laws Grounded in Dispositions5 Advantages of Dispositionalism6 Conclusion

The paper points out that the modern formulation of Bohm's quantum theory known as Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles' positions and a law of motion. We explain how this view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces according to which Bohm's theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology approaches to quantum mechanics in general.

The article sets out a primitive ontology of the natural world in terms of primitive stuff—that is, stuff that has as such no physical properties at all—but that is not a bare substratum either, being individuated by metrical relations. We focus on quantum physics and employ identity-based Bohmian mechanics to illustrate this view, but point out that it applies all over physics. Properties then enter into the picture exclusively through the role that they play for the dynamics of the primitive stuff. We show that such properties can be local (classical mechanics), as well as holistic (quantum mechanics), and discuss two metaphysical options to conceive them, namely, Humeanism and modal realism in the guise of dispositionalism.

In recent literature, it has become clear that quantum physics does not refute Humeanism. This point has so far been made with respect to Bohms quantum theory. Against this background, this paper seeks to achieve the following four results: to generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from Bohmian mechanics to primitive ontology theories in general, to show that this option applies also to classical mechanics, to establish that it requires a commitment to matter as primitive stuff, but no commitment to natural properties (physicalism without properties, to point out that by removing the commitment to properties, the stock metaphysical objections against Humeanism from quidditism and humility no longer apply. In that way, quantum physics strengthens Humeanism instead of refuting it.

ABSTRACT This article surveys recent work on primitive ontology (PO) approaches to quantum mechanics, focusing on proposals that seek to integrate this approach with the metaphysics of causal powers. PO approaches aim to provide a clear metaphysical picture in which the world consists of local entities such as particles, matter density fields or flashes, and these entities compose macroscopic objects, such as scientists and their measuring devices. To account for the behaviour of these local entities, some PO theories invoke the metaphysics of powers. After motivating PO approaches and contrasting them with wave function realism, I consider the development of power‐based POs, contrasting them with both Humean POs and POs which invoke primitive laws. I explain how different power‐based frameworks address key quantum phenomena, and I survey some difficulties, including the Problem of Holism, of small worlds and of top‐down causation. Such challenges are best confronted, I suggest, by drawing on Aristotelian hylomorphism: If powers are grounded in forms that unify physical systems, then power‐based POs can accommodate holistic and context‐sensitive behaviour.