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Fundamental physical theories: mathematical structures grounded on a primitive ontology

Valia Allori

Published Jan 1, 2007• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In my dissertation I analyze the structure of fundamental physical theories. I start with an analysis of what an adequate primitive ontology is, discussing the measurement problem in quantum mechanics and theirs solutions. It is commonly said that these theories have little in common. I argue instead that the moral of the measurement problem is that the wave function cannot represent physical objects and a common structure between these solutions can be recognized: each of them is about a clear three-dimensional primitive ontology that evolves according to a law determined by the wave function. The primitive ontology is what matter is made of while the wave function tells the matter how to move. One might think that what is important in the notion of primitive ontology is their three-dimensionality. If so, in a theory like classical electrodynamics electromagnetic fields would be part of the primitive ontology. I argue that, reflecting on what the purpose of a fundamental physical theory is, namely to explain the behavior of objects in three--dimensional space, one can recognize that a fundamental physical theory has a particular architecture. If so, electromagnetic fields play a different role in the theory than the particles and therefore should be considered, like the wave function, as part of the law.Therefore, we can characterize the general structure of a fundamental physical theory as a mathematical structure grounded on a primitive ontology. I explore this idea to better understand theories like classical mechanics and relativity, emphasizing that primitive ontology is crucial in the process of building new theories, being fundamental in identifying the symmetries. Finally, I analyze what it means to explain the word around us in terms of the notion of primitive ontology in the case of regularities of statistical character. Here is where the notion of typicality comes into play: we have explained a phenomenon if the typical histories of the primitive ontology give rise to the statistical regularities we observe.

DOI
10.7282/t3pk0gkk

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In my dissertation I analyze the structure of fundamental physical theories. I start with an analysis of what an adequate primitive ontology is, discussing the measurement problem in quantum mechanics and theirs solutions. It is commonly said that these theories have little in common. I argue instead that the moral of the measurement problem is that the wave function cannot represent physical objects and a common structure between these solutions can be recognized: each of them is about a clear three-dimensional primitive ontology that evolves according to a law determined by the wave function. The primitive ontology is what matter is made of while the wave function tells the matter how to move. One might think that what is important in the notion of primitive ontology is their three-dimensionality. If so, in a theory like classical electrodynamics electromagnetic fields would be part of the primitive ontology. I argue that, reflecting on what the purpose of a fundamental physical theory is, namely to explain the behavior of objects in three--dimensional space, one can recognize that a fundamental physical theory has a particular architecture. If so, electromagnetic fields play a different role in the theory than the particles and therefore should be considered, like the wave function, as part of the law.Therefore, we can characterize the general structure of a fundamental physical theory as a mathematical structure grounded on a primitive ontology. I explore this idea to better understand theories like classical mechanics and relativity, emphasizing that primitive ontology is crucial in the process of building new theories, being fundamental in identifying the symmetries. Finally, I analyze what it means to explain the word around us in terms of the notion of primitive ontology in the case of regularities of statistical character. Here is where the notion of typicality comes into play: we have explained a phenomenon if the typical histories of the primitive ontology give rise to the statistical regularities we observe.
The aim of this paper is to summarize a particular approach of doing \nmetaphysics through physics - the primitive ontology approach. The idea is that any \nfundamental physical theory has a well-defined architecture, to the foundation of which \nthere is the primitive ontology, which represents matter. According to the framework \nprovided by this approach when applied to quantum mechanics, the wave function is not \nsuitable to represent matter. Rather, the wave function has a nomological character, given that its role in the theory is to implement the law of evolution for the primitive ontology.
What is quantum mechanics about? The most natural way to interpret quantum mechanics realistically as a theory about the world might seem to be what is called wave function ontology: the view according to which the wave function mathematically represents in a complete way fundamentally all there is in the world. We argue that: • Strictly speaking, it is not possible to interpret quantum theories as theories about the wave function; • Even if the wave function is supplemented by additional non-ontological structures, there are reasons not to take the resulting theory seriously; • All quantum theories should be regarded as theories in which physical objects are constituted by a primitive ontology. The primitive ontology is mathematically represented in the theory by a mathematical entity in three-dimensional space, or space-time.
The scientific realist wants to read the metaphysical picture of reality through our best fundamental physical theories. The traditional way of doing so is in terms of objects, properties, and laws of nature. For instance, there are families of fundamental particles individuated by their properties of mass and charge, which determine how they move. One could call this view an object-oriented metaphysics grounded on properties. In this paper, I wish to present an alternative view that one can dub a thin object-oriented metaphysics grounded on structure: there are fundamental entities with no fundamental properties other than the one(s) needed to specify their nature. I argue that my view has several advantages over the received one. In particular, I compare my proposal to the traditional view in the quantum domain and I argue that my view provides a better fit for both approaches to quantum metaphysics, namely the primitive ontology program and wave-function realism.
I combine the idea of a primitive ontology with the metaphysics of laws of nature. In so doing, I examine the theoretical entities that are postulated in Newtonian mechanics, classical electrodynamics, and the de Broglie–Bohm quantum theory. I argue that the existence of mass, forces, fields, and the wave-function depends on the status of laws. The three major theories on laws of nature I treat are Humeanism, dispositionalism, and primitivism about laws. I point out that properties are notoriously ignored in debates on primitive ontologies. In fact, I show that properties, both intrinsic and relational, aren’t needed in physics; therefore, I replace the primitive ontology with a primitive stuff ontology, whose elements have no properties. Recently, a debate has started on the ontological status of forces in classical mechanics; I criticize the major positions and present my own idea that focuses on the status of laws of nature. Another hot topic is the status of the wave-function. Here, I develop a new interpretation in the framework of Humeanism that crucially differs from that advocated by David Albert and Barry Loewer, in that our world is not an illusion of a reality in configuration space. In addition, I propose a hitherto unconsidered way in which the wave–function can be construed as a holistic disposition.
This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book explores the minimalist ontology of matter points and their dynamics in general philosophical as well as mathematical terms, independently of any particular physical theory. It shows how this ontology fits both classical mechanics of gravitation and quantum mechanics, as long as the latter includes a primitive ontology of matter distributed in ordinary space, as in Bohmian mechanics. The book points out the similarities between these two theories as well as their differences. It explains how in both cases one gets from an ontology and a dynamics defined for the universe as a whole to a description of subsystems of the universe and a dynamics for them. The book shows how an ontology of persisting particles that move according to a deterministic law can explain the characteristic phenomena of quantum field theory and ground its empirical predictions.