A projective measurement cannot decrease the von Neumann entropy if the outcome is ignored. However, under certain sound assumptions and using the quantum violation of Leggett-Garg inequalities, we have previously demonstrated that this property is not inherited by a classical simulation of such a measurement process. In the simulation, a measurement erases prior information by partially resetting the system, suggesting that the quantum-state update following a measurement cannot be entirely epistemic. The erasure of information has been proved by assuming that the maximally mixed quantum state corresponds to maximal ignorance of the classical state. A more intricate proof employed the weaker hypothesis that the entropy is finite at some stage of the simulation. In this paper, we focus on the quantum-foundational implications of this theorem. We first provide a simple proof by directly using the second hypothesis. Second, we identify information erasure as the mechanism breaking the time symmetry in ontological theories. This symmetry break has been previously proved by Pusey and Leifer. Third, we show that information erasure and, thus, symmetry break can be avoided by employing a branching a la many-worlds theory. The information flow and the time asymmetry are transferred to the measurement devices and the subsequent comparison of results, which inherently involve time-asymmetric processes. Thus, causality and the absence of information erasure suggest that measurements have multiple actual outcomes. Similarly, Deutsch and Hayden argued that Bell's theorem leads to the same conclusion if locality is given for granted. We conclude by showing that the problem of the clumsiness loophole in an experimental Leggett-Garg test of macrorealism is mitigated by the information-erasure theorem.
A projective measurement cannot decrease the von Neumann entropy if the outcome is ignored. However, under certain sound assumptions and using the quantum violation of Leggett-Garg inequalities, we have previously demonstrated that this property is not inherited by a classical simulation of such a measurement process. In the simulation, a measurement erases prior information by partially resetting the system, suggesting that the quantum-state update following a measurement cannot be entirely epistemic. The erasure of information has been proved by assuming that the maximally mixed quantum state corresponds to maximal ignorance of the classical state. A more intricate proof employed the weaker hypothesis that the entropy is finite at some stage of the simulation. In this paper, we focus on the quantum-foundational implications of this theorem. We first provide a simple proof by directly using the second hypothesis. Second, we identify information erasure as the mechanism breaking the time symmetry in ontological theories. This symmetry break has been previously proved by Pusey and Leifer. Third, we show that information erasure and, thus, symmetry break can be avoided by employing a branching a la many-worlds theory. The information flow and the time asymmetry are transferred to the measurement devices and the subsequent comparison of results, which inherently involve time-asymmetric processes. Thus, causality and the absence of information erasure suggest that measurements have multiple actual outcomes. Similarly, Deutsch and Hayden argued that Bell's theorem leads to the same conclusion if locality is given for granted. We conclude by showing that the problem of the clumsiness loophole in an experimental Leggett-Garg test of macrorealism is mitigated by the information-erasure theorem.
While quantum theory has been tested to an incredible degree on microscopic scales, quantum effects are seldom observed in our everyday macroscopic world. The curious results of applying quantum mechanics to macroscopic objects are perhaps best illustrated by Erwin Schrödinger's famous thought experiment, where a cat can be put into a superposition state of being both dead and alive. Obviously, these quantum predictions are in stark contradiction to our common experience. Even with plenty of theoretical explanations put forward to explain this discrepancy, a large number of questions about the frontier between the quantum and the classical world remain unanswered. To distinguish between classical and quantum behavior, two fundamental concepts inherent to classical physics have been established over the years: The world view of local realism limits the power of classical experiments to establish correlations over space, while the world view of macroscopic realism (or macrorealism) restricts temporal correlations. Necessary conditions for both world views have been formulated in the form of Bell and Leggett-Garg inequalities, and Bell inequalities have been shown to be violated by quantum mechanics through increasingly conclusive experiments. Furthermore, many challenging steps towards convincing violations of macrorealism have been taken in a number of recent experiments. In the first part of this thesis, conditions for macrorealism are analyzed in detail. Two necessary conditions for macrorealism, the original Leggett-Garg inequality and the recently proposed no-signaling in time condition, are presented. It is then shown that a combination of no-signaling in time conditions is not only necessary but also sufficient for the existence of a macrorealistic description. Finally, an operational formulation of no-signaling in time, in terms of positive-operator valued measurements and Hamiltonians, is derived. In the next part, we argue that these results lead to a suitable definition of classical behavior. In particular, we provide a formalism to judge the classicality of measurements and time evolutions. We then proceed to apply it to a number of exemplary measurement operators and Hamiltonians. Finally, we argue for the importance of spontaneously realized Hamiltonians in our intuition of classical behavior. Next, differences between local realism and macrorealism are analyzed. For this purpose, the probability polytopes for spatially and temporally separated experiments are compared, and a fundamental difference in the power of quantum mechanics to build both types of correlations is discovered. This result shows that Fine's theorem, which states that a set of Bell inequalities is necessary and sufficient for local realism, is not transferable to macrorealism. Thus, (Leggett-Garg) inequalities are in principle not well-suited for tests of macrorealism, as they can never form a necessary and sufficient condition, and unnecessarily restrict the violating parameter space. No-signaling in time is both better suited and more strongly motivated from the underlying physical theory. In the final part of this thesis, a concrete experimental setup for implementing quantum experiments with macroscopic objects is proposed. It consists of a superconducting micro-sphere in the Meißner state, which is levitated by magnetic fields. Through its expelled magnetic field, the sphere's center-of-mass motion couples to a superconducting quantum circuit. Properly tuned, ground state cooling can be realized, since the sphere's motion is extremely well isolated from the surrounding environment. This setup therefore is a promising candidate for the observation of quantum effects in macroscopic systems.
Quantum theory describes our universe incredibly successfully. To our classically-inclined brains, however, it is a bizarre description that requires a reimagining of what fundamental reality, or “ontology”, could look like. This thesis examines different ontological features in light of the success of quantum theory, what it requires, and what it rules out. While these investigations are primarily foundational, they also have relevance to quantum information, quantum communication, and experiments on quantum systems. The way that quantum theory describes the state of a system is one of its most unintuitive features. It is natural, therefore, to ask whether a similarly strange description of states is required on an ontological level. This thesis proves that almost all quantum superposition states for d > 3 dimensions must be real—that is, present in the ontology in a well-defined sense. This is a strong requirement which prevents intuitive explanations of the many quantum phenomena which are based on superpositions. A new theorem is also presented showing that quantum theory is incompatible with macro-realist ontologies, where certain physical quantities must always have definite values. This improves on the Leggett-Garg argument, which also aims to prove incompatibility with macro-realism but contains loopholes. Variations on both of these results that are error-tolerant (and therefore amenable to experimentation) are presented, as well as numerous related theorems showing that the ontology of quantum states must be somewhat similar to the quantum states themselves in various specific ways. Extending these same methods to quantum communication, a simple proof is found showing that an exponential number of classical bits are required to communicate a linear number of qubits. That is, classical systems are exponentially bad at storing quantum data. Causal influences are another part of ontology where quantum theory demands a revision of our classical notions. This follows from the outcomes of Bell experiments, as rigorously shown in recent analyses. Here, the task of constructing a native quantum framework for reasoning about causal influences is tackled. This is done by first analysing the simple example of a common cause, from which a quantum version of Reichenbach’s principle is identified. This quantum principle relies on an identification of quantum conditional independence which can be defined in four ways, each naturally generalising a corresponding definition for classical conditional independence. Not only does this allow one to reason about common causes in a quantum experiments, but it can also be generalised to a full framework of quantum causal models (mirroring how classical causal models generalise Reichenbach’s principle). This new definition of quantum causal models is illustrated by examples and strengthened by it’s foundation on a robust quantum Reichenbach’s principle. An unusual, but surprisingly fruitful, setting for considering quantum ontology is found by considering time travel to the past. This provides a testbed for different ontological concepts in quantum theory and new ways to compare classical and quantum frameworks. It is especially useful for comparing computational properties. In particular, time travel introduces non-linearity to quantum theory, which brings (sometimes implicit) ontological assumptions to the fore while introducing strange new abilities. Here, a model for quantum time travel is presented which arguably has fewer objectionable features than previous attempts, while remaining similarly well-motivated. This model is discussed and compared with previous quantum models, as well as with the classical case. Together, these threads of investigation develop a better understanding of how quantum theory affects possible ontologies and how ontological prejudices influence quantum theory.
We present a new psi-ontology theorem demonstrating that the quantum wave function is ontic (real) rather than epistemic (representing knowledge) in single-world unitary quantum theories (SUQTs). By leveraging a protocol of repeated reversible measurements on a single quantum system, we show that any two distinct quantum states produce different statistical distributions of (erased) measurement outcomes. This theoretical distinguishability implies that different quantum states correspond to different physical realities, supporting the ontic nature of the quantum state. Unlike previous psi-ontology theorems, such as the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem, our proof relies solely on the unitary evolution and Born rule of SUQTs, without additional assumptions like preparation independence. This strengthens its implications for quantum foundations, particularly in restricting non-psi-ontic interpretations like QBism without assuming an underlying ontic state and its dynamics. The theorem applies to any pair of distinct states in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, with extensions to infinite-dimensional systems, offering a robust and general argument for the reality of the quantum state.
We introduce information erasure and quantum imprint as two properties that classify quantum instruments. Information erasure is the property that an appropriate postselection can render the distribution of earlier measurement outcomes independent of the initial quantum state while retaining all outcome branches. Quantum imprint is the complementary property that no admissible postselection can eliminate this state dependence. We show that this classification has a nontrivial structure and that the natural intuition that measurements providing more information about the initial quantum state should be less likely to exhibit information erasure does not hold in general. We further show that, under a sufficiently reliable postselection, information erasure enables first-order separation of state-preparation and measurement (SPAM) errors. Specifically, the first-order contribution of state-preparation error vanishes from the posterior distribution, whereas visible first-order contributions of measurement error remain. This result recasts SPAM error separation from the problem of simultaneously characterizing state preparation and measurement into the problem of realizing a reliable postselection.
I compare the role of the information in classical and quantum dynamics by examining the relation between information flows in measurements and the ability of observers to reverse evolutions. I show that in the Newtonian dynamics reversibility is unaffected by the observer's retention of the information about the measurement outcome. By contrast-even though quantum dynamics is unitary, hence, reversible-reversing quantum evolution that led to a measurement becomes, in principle, impossible for an observer who keeps the record of its outcome. Thus, quantum irreversibility can result from the information gain rather than just its loss-rather than just an increase of the (von Neumann) entropy. Recording of the outcome of the measurement resets, in effect, initial conditions within the observer's (branch of) the Universe. Nevertheless, I also show that the observer's friend-an agent who knows what measurement was successfully carried out and can confirm that the observer knows the outcome but resists his curiosity and does not find out the result-can, in principle, undo the measurement. This relativity of quantum reversibility sheds new light on the origin of the arrow of time and elucidates the role of information in classical and quantum physics. Quantum discord appears as a natural measure of the extent to which dissemination of information about the outcome affects the ability to reverse the measurement.This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Foundations of quantum mechanics and their impact on contemporary society'.
The Leggett-Garg inequalities were originally intro-duced for experimentally testing a possible break of the quantum evolution in meso scopic systems. In this paper, we take a different point of view by focusing on faithful classical simulations of sequential quantum measurements. In this context, the violation of Leggett-Garg inequalities implies that classically simulated quantum measurements induce perturbations into the subsequent evolution of the classical variables. We show that the implication is even stronger and a measurement erases previous information by performing a partial reset on the classical state. Thus, the measuring device acts as a low-temperature bath absorbing entropy from the measured system. Information erasure is a form of preparation contextuality. Our proof is straightforward if one assumes that maximal ignorance of the quantum state is compatible with maximal ignorance of the classical state. We also employ a weaker hypothesis.