Quantum theory describes our universe incredibly successfully. To our classically-inclined brains, however, it is a bizarre description that requires a reimagining of what fundamental reality, or “ontology”, could look like. This thesis examines different ontological features in light of the success of quantum theory, what it requires, and what it rules out. While these investigations are primarily foundational, they also have relevance to quantum information, quantum communication, and experiments on quantum systems. The way that quantum theory describes the state of a system is one of its most unintuitive features. It is natural, therefore, to ask whether a similarly strange description of states is required on an ontological level. This thesis proves that almost all quantum superposition states for d > 3 dimensions must be real—that is, present in the ontology in a well-defined sense. This is a strong requirement which prevents intuitive explanations of the many quantum phenomena which are based on superpositions. A new theorem is also presented showing that quantum theory is incompatible with macro-realist ontologies, where certain physical quantities must always have definite values. This improves on the Leggett-Garg argument, which also aims to prove incompatibility with macro-realism but contains loopholes. Variations on both of these results that are error-tolerant (and therefore amenable to experimentation) are presented, as well as numerous related theorems showing that the ontology of quantum states must be somewhat similar to the quantum states themselves in various specific ways. Extending these same methods to quantum communication, a simple proof is found showing that an exponential number of classical bits are required to communicate a linear number of qubits. That is, classical systems are exponentially bad at storing quantum data. Causal influences are another part of ontology where quantum theory demands a revision of our classical notions. This follows from the outcomes of Bell experiments, as rigorously shown in recent analyses. Here, the task of constructing a native quantum framework for reasoning about causal influences is tackled. This is done by first analysing the simple example of a common cause, from which a quantum version of Reichenbach’s principle is identified. This quantum principle relies on an identification of quantum conditional independence which can be defined in four ways, each naturally generalising a corresponding definition for classical conditional independence. Not only does this allow one to reason about common causes in a quantum experiments, but it can also be generalised to a full framework of quantum causal models (mirroring how classical causal models generalise Reichenbach’s principle). This new definition of quantum causal models is illustrated by examples and strengthened by it’s foundation on a robust quantum Reichenbach’s principle. An unusual, but surprisingly fruitful, setting for considering quantum ontology is found by considering time travel to the past. This provides a testbed for different ontological concepts in quantum theory and new ways to compare classical and quantum frameworks. It is especially useful for comparing computational properties. In particular, time travel introduces non-linearity to quantum theory, which brings (sometimes implicit) ontological assumptions to the fore while introducing strange new abilities. Here, a model for quantum time travel is presented which arguably has fewer objectionable features than previous attempts, while remaining similarly well-motivated. This model is discussed and compared with previous quantum models, as well as with the classical case. Together, these threads of investigation develop a better understanding of how quantum theory affects possible ontologies and how ontological prejudices influence quantum theory.
Quantum theory describes our universe incredibly successfully. To our classically-inclined brains, however, it is a bizarre description that requires a reimagining of what fundamental reality, or “ontology”, could look like. This thesis examines different ontological features in light of the success of quantum theory, what it requires, and what it rules out. While these investigations are primarily foundational, they also have relevance to quantum information, quantum communication, and experiments on quantum systems. The way that quantum theory describes the state of a system is one of its most unintuitive features. It is natural, therefore, to ask whether a similarly strange description of states is required on an ontological level. This thesis proves that almost all quantum superposition states for d > 3 dimensions must be real—that is, present in the ontology in a well-defined sense. This is a strong requirement which prevents intuitive explanations of the many quantum phenomena which are based on superpositions. A new theorem is also presented showing that quantum theory is incompatible with macro-realist ontologies, where certain physical quantities must always have definite values. This improves on the Leggett-Garg argument, which also aims to prove incompatibility with macro-realism but contains loopholes. Variations on both of these results that are error-tolerant (and therefore amenable to experimentation) are presented, as well as numerous related theorems showing that the ontology of quantum states must be somewhat similar to the quantum states themselves in various specific ways. Extending these same methods to quantum communication, a simple proof is found showing that an exponential number of classical bits are required to communicate a linear number of qubits. That is, classical systems are exponentially bad at storing quantum data. Causal influences are another part of ontology where quantum theory demands a revision of our classical notions. This follows from the outcomes of Bell experiments, as rigorously shown in recent analyses. Here, the task of constructing a native quantum framework for reasoning about causal influences is tackled. This is done by first analysing the simple example of a common cause, from which a quantum version of Reichenbach’s principle is identified. This quantum principle relies on an identification of quantum conditional independence which can be defined in four ways, each naturally generalising a corresponding definition for classical conditional independence. Not only does this allow one to reason about common causes in a quantum experiments, but it can also be generalised to a full framework of quantum causal models (mirroring how classical causal models generalise Reichenbach’s principle). This new definition of quantum causal models is illustrated by examples and strengthened by it’s foundation on a robust quantum Reichenbach’s principle. An unusual, but surprisingly fruitful, setting for considering quantum ontology is found by considering time travel to the past. This provides a testbed for different ontological concepts in quantum theory and new ways to compare classical and quantum frameworks. It is especially useful for comparing computational properties. In particular, time travel introduces non-linearity to quantum theory, which brings (sometimes implicit) ontological assumptions to the fore while introducing strange new abilities. Here, a model for quantum time travel is presented which arguably has fewer objectionable features than previous attempts, while remaining similarly well-motivated. This model is discussed and compared with previous quantum models, as well as with the classical case. Together, these threads of investigation develop a better understanding of how quantum theory affects possible ontologies and how ontological prejudices influence quantum theory.
Quantum mechanics has achieved unparalleled success as an operational theory, describing a wide range of experiments to remarkable accuracy. However, the physical foundations on which it rests remain as puzzling as they were a century ago, and a concise statement of the physical principles that underlie quantum mechanics is still outstanding. One promising approach holds that these principles should be formulated in terms of information, since many of the counter-intuitive effects in quantum theory concern questions such as what one can know about a quantum system and how the information encoded therein can be processed and distributed between parties. Another challenging feature of quantum theory is its incompatibility with the other cornerstone of modern physics, general relativity. In order to reconcile the two, one must identify and retain only the essential concepts and principles of each theory, and in the case of general relativity, causality has been identified as such a concept. This raises the question of how our classical understanding of causality must change when quantum theory is taken into account. In order to address these questions about information, knowledge and causality, I turn to the framework of causal models. In classical statistics, causal models explain the relations among a set of variables in terms of causal influences, which makes them a powerful tool for structuring our knowledge about complex systems and developing strategies for interacting with them. More importantly, the framework provides the conceptual underpinnings and mathematical methods for addressing questions about causation, information and knowledge in a rigorous manner. In this thesis, I develop a version of the classical causal models framework that is compatible with quantum theory and explore its physical implications. \n \n \nA first step is to define quantum versions of fundamental elements such as variables, conditionals and belief propagation rules. This allows one to consider the question of what one can come to know about a quantum variable from the point of view of causal modelling. The conditionals relating quantum variables are found to have a richer structure than their classical counterparts, which can be exploited for the task of discerning causal relations given limited data -- a central problem in classical causal modelling. The mathematical properties of quantum conditionals also establish a correspondence between various classes of two-party correlations, such as bound and distillable entanglement, and the types of causal structures that can give rise to them, which may become a useful tool for entanglement theory and quantum information processing. In the context of open quantum systems dynamics, quantum causal models provide a clear physical explanation of not completely positive maps and, more broadly, of non-Markovian quantum dynamics. Finally, I consider the possibility of non-classical effects in the way that different causal mechanisms are combined -- that is, non-classical causal structures. For the simple case of two causally ordered variables, I propose indicators that witness different classes of combinations of causal mechanisms, including a non-classical mixture, and describe an experiment realizing examples of the different classes. \n \n \nAs these results illustrate, the framework of quantum causal models provides both greater conceptual clarity and a comprehensive mathematical formalism for studying a diverse set of problems, ranging from foundational questions to applications in open systems dynamics and the exploration of non-classical causal structures, which are likely to feature in a future theory of quantum gravity. The material presented in this thesis is intended as a foundation and inspiration for further applications of quantum causal models.
Existence of physical reality in the classical world is a well-established fact from day-to-day observations. However within quantum theory, it is not straightforward to reach such a conclusion. A framework to analyse how observations can be described using some physical states of reality in a theory independent way was recently developed, known as ontological framework. Different principles when imposed on the ontological level give rise to different observations in physical experiments. Using the ontological framework, we formulate a novel notion of termed classicality which is based upon the physical principles that in classical theories pure states are physical states of reality and every projective measurement just observes the state of the system. We construct a communication task in which the success probability is bounded from above for ontological models satisfying the notion of universal classicality. Contrary to previous notions of which either required systems of dimension strictly greater than two or atleast three preparations, a violation of classicality can be observed using just a pair of qubits and a pair of incompatible measurements. We further show that violations of previously known notions of such as preparation non-contexuality and Bell's local causality is a violation of universal classicality.
Quantum nonlocality has been a long-standing and fascinating problem in the foundations of quantum theory since its proof by the Bell inequality. It seems to contradict our intuitive picture of space-time and thus urges us to reconsider its foundation. With the advent of quantum information science, it has attracted renewed interest from a fundamental point of view as well as from a quantum information-theoretic one. Another fundamental question on the nature of quantum theory is how we understand what quantum states represent. (Quantum states hereafter refer to pure states.) This is also a long-standing problem since the early days of quantum theory. Roughly speaking, there are two conflicting views on this matter: one is ontology and the other is epistemology. Ontological models of quantum theory are models in which we assume some underlying reality for physical systems and require that all the predictions of quantum theory should be reproduced. The ontological models are divided into two categories, depending on which views the models are based on, ontology or epistemology. In the models based on ontology, quantum states represent the underlying reality in some sense, and different quantum states correspond to different realities. In the models based on epistemology, quantum states do not necessarily correspond to the underlying realities, and even different quantum states can be consistent with a common underlying reality. The former type of ontological models of quantum theory is called 1⁄4-ontic. The latter is called 1⁄4-epistemic. Thus, it might be rather confusing that ontological models are classified further into 1⁄4-ontic models and 1⁄4-epistemic ones. We use these terms here in accordance with the recent literature on quantum foundations. (For details of these notions in the ontological models of quantum theory, see the paper by Harrigan and Spekkens.) Quite recently, the question just mentioned has been answered by Pusey et al., and one of the above models has been refuted. It was shown that 1⁄4-epistemic models are inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. In other words, epistemological views on quantum states turned out to be false as long as we assume some underlying reality for physical systems. Therefore, only 1⁄4-ontic models of quantum theory are valid for describing quantum systems. This significantly advances our understanding on the nature of quantum states. It is expected that various conclusions will be drawn from this fact. In this paper, we will discuss a connection with nonlocality. The above two fundamental questions, nonlocality and the nature of quantum states, are intimately connected, and the connection was first implicitly recognised by Einstein in the early days of quantum theory. In a private correspondence with Schrodinger, Einstein constructed a fascinating argument that relates the above two. (That argument is distinctly different from the well-known EPR argument.) Recently, it was revisited and reconstructed in accordance with more rigorous notions in quantum foundations. Nonlocality is usually shown by violations of Bell inequalities. (Bell inequalities hereafter include all the subsequent developments such as the CHSH inequality.) Even if it is not clear whether the models of quantum theory are 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic, we can prove nonlocality just by showing the violation of Bell inequalities. However, the above argument originated by Einstein implies that if we know the models are 1⁄4-ontic in advance (as we do now), we can prove nonlocality in a simpler way without Bell inequalities. (This argument had been known in quantum foundations before the refutation of 1⁄4-epistemic models.) Nonlocality is rigorously defined as a violation of the notion of local causality defined by Bell. Showing the violation of Bell inequalities is one way of demonstrating the violation of local causality. Since the simpler proof initiated by Einstein directly demonstrates the violation of local causality, it is a more straightforward proof of nonlocality from a conceptual point of view. In the following, we will see that this simple argument of nonlocality without Bell inequalities can be used to show multipartite nonlocality as well. Before moving onto multipartite cases, first let us define the necessary notions for presenting our result. First of all, we assume that there exists a complete specification of the properties of a physical system, which we refer to as the ontic state of that system. The ontic states represent the underlying realities and are not necessarily equal to ordinary quantum states. (In other words, the ontic states correspond to hidden variables.) Ontological models of quantum theory are models that assume ontic states and reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory. An important question is how ontic states correspond to quantum states in quantum theory. In order to frame the question accurately, we need the notion of an epistemic state, which represents the relation between them. Suppose we prepare a physical system in a quantum state 1⁄4. Although the system is uniquely specified as 1⁄4 in quantum theory, there still remains a possibility that it allows a more detailed specification in the ontic state space, in which case many different ontic states turn out to be consistent with 1⁄4. The relation between ontic states and the preparation procedure, P1⁄4, is described by a conditional probability distribution over the ontic state space, pð jP1⁄4Þ, which we refer to as an epistemic state. In general, the preparation P can be a preparation of a physical system in a mixed sate. Unless there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ontic states and quantum states, the probability distribution spreads over . (See Fig. 1.) The question of whether an ontological model is 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic is concerned with the behaviour of the epistemic states for two distinct preparations of quantum states. Consider two distinct preparations of quantum states, Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 82 (2013) 055003
A key aim of quantum foundations is to characterize the sense in which nature goes beyond classical physics. Understanding nonclassicality is one of our best avenues towards finding a satisfactory interpretation of quantum theory. By determining which classical principles cannot be satisfied in any empirically adequate physical theory, we begin to see which principles can be preserved, which in turn gives us insight into the ontology of the world. These insights then guide us in determining which questions to ask and which experiments to perform next. Furthermore, it is these nonclassical aspects of nature that give rise to new technologies such as the speed-ups of quantum computation or the security of quantum key distribution. \n \nThe gold standard for establishing that a phenomenon is truly nonclassical is to prove that it violates the principle of local causality or the principle of noncontextuality. Much of this thesis reports on my research relating to these two principles. This research primarily involves (i) finding new justifications for our notions of nonclassicality; (ii) refining their fundamental definitions; (iii) quantifying and characterizing their various manifestations; and (iv) finding applications where nonclassical phenomena act as resources for information processing. \n \nUltimately, all of this work on nonclassicality is woven together into a novel framework for physical theories introduced by myself, John Selby, and Rob Spekkens. Its main advantage over preexisting frameworks is that it maintains a clear distinction between which elements of a given physical theory directly describe causal processes, and which refer only to one’s inferences about causal processes. This clarifies a number of confusions in the literature which arose precisely because previous frameworks scrambled causal and inferential concepts. Furthermore, local causality and noncontextuality emerge in this framework as the assumptions that the causal and inferential structures (respectively) that are operationally observed must be respected in the underlying ontology. This work constitutes a first step in developing a new interpretation of quantum theory—the first interpretation designed to satisfy the spirit of both local causality and noncontextuality.
I will discuss realism of classical and quantum theories, assessing the untenability of the object ontology, and proposing its substitution with the notion of system used in operational theories, notion that represents a theoretical connection between two events. Within operational theories the distinction between theory and objective reality is well defined: the theory provides the mathematical description of systems and events, and predicts the joint probability of the events; objective reality is identified with the collection of events that actually occurred. I then analyse some cases of realification of the theory – namely the fallacy of identifying theory with reality. In particular, the cases of the notion of causality and causal connection between events are analysed, emphasising their purely theoretical nature, contrarily to the widespread connotation of objectivity. I re-establish the role of causality in physics as a theorem of quantum theory, and hence also of classical theory (which is a restriction of quantum theory), showing how it represents a probabilistic generalisation of the same concept used in special relativity, and discussing why such notion may trivialise in the classical case. I end with a critique of David Albert’s Past Hypothesis about the nature of time, and of the resulting Block Universe vision of space-time, to reaffirm Reality of Time.
Causality has never gained the status of a 'law' or 'principle' in physics. Some recent literature has even popularized the false idea that causality is a notion that should be banned from theory. Such misconception relies on an alleged universality of the reversibility of the laws of physics, based either on the determinism of classical theory, or on the multiverse interpretation of quantum theory, in both cases motivated by mere interpretational requirements for realism of the theory. Here, I will show that a properly defined unambiguous notion of causality is a theorem of quantum theory, which is also a falsifiable proposition of the theory. Such a notion of causality appeared in the literature within the framework of operational probabilistic theories. It is a genuinely theoretical notion, corresponding to establishing a definite partial order among events, in the same way as we do by using the future causal cone on Minkowski space. The notion of causality is logically completely independent of the misidentified concept of 'determinism', and, being a consequence of quantum theory, is ubiquitous in physics. In addition, as classical theory can be regarded as a restriction of quantum theory, causality holds also in the classical case, although the determinism of the theory trivializes it. I then conclude by arguing that causality naturally establishes an arrow of time. This implies that the scenario of the 'block Universe' and the connected 'past hypothesis' are incompatible with causality, and thus with quantum theory: they are both doomed to remain mere interpretations and, as such, are not falsifiable, similar to the hypothesis of 'super-determinism'.This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Foundations of quantum mechanics and their impact on contemporary society'.