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arXiv:2210.05377

The Multiverse Pandemic

Nicolas Gisin

Published Oct 10, 2022• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

I argue against the many-world interpretation (MWI) of quantum theory by emphasizing that when everything is entangled with everything else, in one big monstrous piece, there is no room left for creativity. Since the MWI was invented, it proves itself wrong (appeared first in French in [N. Gisin, L'épidémie du multivers, in Le plus grand des hasards, p. 184, eds J.F. Dars et A. Papillault, Belin 2010]).

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2210.05377

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I argue against the many-world interpretation (MWI) of quantum theory by emphasizing that when everything is entangled with everything else, in one big monstrous piece, there is no room left for creativity. Since the MWI was invented, it proves itself wrong (appeared first in French in [N. Gisin, L'épidémie du multivers, in Le plus grand des hasards, p. 184, eds J.F. Dars et A. Papillault, Belin 2010]).
Abstract I analyze the possibility of free-will in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), arguing for their compatibility. I use as a starting point Nicolas Gisin’s “The Multiverse Pandemic” (preprint arXiv:2210.05377 , 2022, after Gisin, N., “L’épidémie du multivers”, in “Le Plus Grand des Hasards”, Belin, Paris, 2010), in which he makes an interesting case that MWI is contradicted by our hard to deny free-will. The counts he raised are: (1) MWI is deterministic, forcing choices on us, (2) in MWI all our possible choices happen, and (3) MWI limits creativity, because everything is entangled with everything else. I argue that each of these features of MWI is in fact compatible with more freedom than it may seem. In particular, MWI allows compatibilist free-will, but also free-will very much like the libertarian free-will defined by Chisholm. I argue that the position that alternative choices exist as possibilities does not make sense from a physical point of view, but MWI offers a physical ground for alternatives.
Since the 1970s, the Everett-Wheeler many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of Quantum Mechanics (1955) has been much in the news. One wonders about the worlds in question, their branches, their splittings, their number. It is most often ignored that this language is not that of Everett, whom Wheeler very quickly stopped supporting. Moreover, for some interpreters, the real meaning of Everett ideas is not the coexistence of many worlds, but the existence of a single quantum one. In this context, what should we think of attempts to verify Everett thesis? What about the connexion between MWI and the cosmological multiverse? How to understand the links between the quantum world and the classical one? This article tries to answer some of these questions.
The Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) famously avoids the issue of wave function collapse. Different MWI trees representing the same quantum events can have different topologies, depending upon the observer. However, they are all isomorphic to the group of block universes containing all of the outcomes of all of the events, and so, in that sense, the group of block universes is a more fundamental representation. Different branches of the MWI tree, representing different universes in MWI, ultimately share the same quantum state in a common ancestor branch. This branching topology is incompatible with that of the Minkowski block universe; the resolution is to replace the branches with discrete, parallel block universes, each of which extends from the trunk to the outermost twigs. The number of universes in a branch is proportional to its thickness which, in turn, depends upon the absolute square of the probability amplitude for the state in that branch. Every quantum event may be represented by a kernel of universes, which is the smallest group of universes that will reproduce the quantum probabilities of the outcomes of that event. By considering the ratios of the probabilities of the outcomes of any event, it can be shown that the number of universes in every kernel must finite, as must be the total number of universes in the multiverse. Further, every universe in the multiverse must be finite both in space and time. Another consequence is that quantum probabilities must be rational, which suggests that quantum mechanics is only an approximation to a discrete theory. A corollary is that not every conceivable universe exists in the multiverse, no doubt to the disappointment of those who enjoy alternate-history novels.