arXiv:1911.10874 · Oxford University Press eBooks

On the Status of Quantum State Realism

Wayne C. Myrvold

Published Feb 27, 2020• 11 citations

Abstract

Chapter 12 argues that there is good reason for being realist about quantum states. Though a research programme of attempting to construct a plausible theory that accounts for quantum phenomena without ontic quantum states is well motivated, that research programme is confronted by considerable obstacles. Two theorems are considered that place restrictions on a theory of that sort: a theorem due to Barrett, Cavalcanti, Lal, and Maroney, and an extension, by the author, of the Pusey-BarrettRudolph theorem, that employs an assumption weaker than their Cartesian Product Assumption. These theorems have assumptions, of course. If there were powerful evidence against the conclusion that quantum states correspond to something in physical reality, it might be reasonable to reject these assumptions. But the current situation is the opposite: there is no evidence at all supporting irrealism about quantum states.

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198814979.003.0012

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