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arXiv:1809.03911 · Laser Physics Letters

Comment on ‘Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks’ (2018 Laser Phys. Lett . 15 095203)

Aleksey K. Fedorov, Ilja Gerhardt, Anqi Huang, Jonathan Jogenfors, Yury Kurochkin, Antı́a Lamas-Linares, Jan-Åke Larsson, Gerd Leuchs, Lars Lydersen, Vadim Makarov, Johannes Skaar

Published Dec 14, 2018• 12 citations
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Abstract

This is a brief comment on the Letter by Balygin and his coworkers [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]. We point out an error that invalidates the Letter's conclusions.
DOI
10.1088/1612-202x/aaf22d

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Vahid Karimipour

In the preceding Comment it has been claimed that an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Zhang, Li, and Gao [Phys. Rev. A 64, 024302 (2001)] and its generalization to $d$-level systems by Karimipour, Bahraminasab, and Bagherinezhad [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331 (2002)] are insecure against an attack devised by the authors of the Comment. We invalidate the arguments of the Comment and show that the protocols are still secure.

arXiv:quant-ph/0509189•Physical Review A•Dec 20, 2005•2 citations
Abstract An attack exploiting single-photon avalanche diode (SPAD) blinding is one of the effective methods of ‘quantum hacking’ (Lydersen et al 2010 Nat. Photon . 4 686) or cracking quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. This attack was experimentally demonstrated for various QKD systems based on both phase and polarization coding. After such an attack, the eavesdropper knows the whole key, has not produced errors, and is not detected. So far this attack is the only one that was demonstrated in the explicit form on many real QKD systems. It is important that these demonstrations were actually performed in reality, i.e. not in speculations as some other attacks. Therefore, the presence of vulnerability in QKD systems based on polarization coding is an existing fact, rather than just a potential threat. It is often assumed that all systems regardless of the encoding method are vulnerable to such an attack. However, in the case of phase coding, some essential features of photocount statistics on the receiving side make a difference. In this Letter we prove that detector blinding attack, when acts on QKD systems with phase coding, leads to a distortion of the photocounts statistics so the eavesdropper may always be detected. Moreover, one does not need to change the design of the QKD system and/or its control electronics, as it is sufficient to amend only the processing of the quantum states registration results to make the system secure. At the same time, polarization coding-based systems remain vulnerable to such an attack and do not guarantee key security.
In the preceding Comment it has been claimed that an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Zhang, Li, and Gao [Phys. Rev. A 64, 024302 (2001)] and its generalization to ddd-level systems by Karimipour, Bahraminasab, and Bagherinezhad [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331 (2002)] are insecure against an attack devised by the authors of the Comment. We invalidate the arguments of the Comment and show that the protocols are still secure.