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arXiv:1705.08287 · Erkenntnis

Counterfactual Reasoning, Realism and Quantum Mechanics: Much Ado About Nothing?

Federico Laudisa

Published Apr 3, 2018• 15 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s10670-018-9997-4

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In the paper the proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics, given recently by H. Stapp and D. Bedford, and appealing to the GHZ example, is analyzed. The proof does not contain any explicit assumption of realism, but instead it uses formal methods and techniques of the Lewis calculus of counterfactuals. To ascertain the validity of the proof, a formal semantic model for counterfactuals is constructed. With the help of this model it can be shown that the proof is faulty, because it appeals to the unwarranted principle of Elimination of Eliminated Conditions (EEC). As an additional way of showing unreasonableness of the assumption (EEC), it is argued that yet another alleged and highly controversial proof of non-locality of QM, using the Hardy example, can be made almost trivial with the help of (EEC). Next the question is considered whether the validity of the proof in the GHZ case can be restored by adopting the assumption of partial realism. It is argued that although this assumption makes the crucial step of the original reasoning valid, it nevertheless renders another important transition unjustified, therefore the entire reasoning collapses.

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Skyrms's formulation of the argument against stochastic hidden variables in quantum mechanics using conditionals with chance consequences suffers from an ambiguity in its “conservation“ assumption. The strong version, which Skyrms needs, packs in a “no-rapport” assumption in addition to the weaker statement of the “experimental facts.“ On the positive side, I argue that Skyrms's proof has two unnoted virtues (not shared by previous proofs): (1) it shows that certain difficulties that arise for deterministic hidden variable theories that exploit a non-classical probability theory extend to the stochastic case; (2) the use of counterfactual conditionals relates the Bell puzzle to Dummett's (1976) discussion of realism in quantum mechanics.

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In the paper the proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics, given recently by H. Stapp and D. Bedford, and appealing to the GHZ example, is analyzed. The proof does not contain any explicit assumption of realism, but instead it uses formal methods and techniques of the Lewis calculus of counterfactuals. To ascertain the validity of the proof, a formal semantic model for counterfactuals is constructed. With the help of this model it can be shown that the proof is faulty, because it appeals to the unwarranted principle of Elimination of Eliminated Conditions (EEC). As an additional way of showing unreasonableness of the assumption (EEC), it is argued that yet another alleged and highly controversial proof of non-locality of QM, using the Hardy example, can be made almost trivial with the help of (EEC). Next the question is considered whether the validity of the proof in the GHZ case can be restored by adopting the assumption of partial realism. It is argued that although this assumption makes the crucial step of the original reasoning valid, it nevertheless renders another important transition unjustified, therefore the entire reasoning collapses.
Abstract. Counterfactual reasoning and contextuality is defined and critically evaluated with regard to its nonempirical content. To this end, a uniqueness property of states, explosion views and link observables are introduced. If only a single context associated with a particular maximum set of observables can be operationalized, then a context translation principle resolves measurements of different contexts. COUNTERFACTUALS With the rise of quantum mechanics [1, 2, 3, 4] physics proper entered an ancient and sometimes fierce debate in theology and philosophy: the controversy between realism versus idealism. Whereas realism has been subsumed by the proposition that [5] “some entities sometimes exist without being experienced by any finite mind, ” idealism put forward that “we have not the faintest reason for believing in the existence of unexperienced entities. [[Realism]] has been adopted... solely because it simplifies our view of the universe. ” And whereas these issues can be considered nonoperational and thus metaphysical or even ideological, it is also true that they have inspired a great number of minds, to the effect of stimulating new approaches to quantum mechanics, revealing many theoretical details, quantum phenomena and quantum technologies. The Kochen-Specker theorem [6], for example, was motivated from the onset by scholasticism, as in an early programmatic article [7] Ernst Specker related the discussion on the foundations of quantum mechanics to scholastic
Skyrms's formulation of the argument against stochastic hidden variables in quantum mechanics using conditionals with chance consequences suffers from an ambiguity in its “conservation“ assumption. The strong version, which Skyrms needs, packs in a “no-rapport” assumption in addition to the weaker statement of the “experimental facts.“ On the positive side, I argue that Skyrms's proof has two unnoted virtues (not shared by previous proofs): (1) it shows that certain difficulties that arise for deterministic hidden variable theories that exploit a non-classical probability theory extend to the stochastic case; (2) the use of counterfactual conditionals relates the Bell puzzle to Dummett's (1976) discussion of realism in quantum mechanics.