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Counterfactuals and non-locality of quantum mechanics

Tomasz Bigaj

Published May 1, 2002• 1 citation

Abstract

In the paper the proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics, given recently by H. Stapp and D. Bedford, and appealing to the GHZ example, is analyzed. The proof does not contain any explicit assumption of realism, but instead it uses formal methods and techniques of the Lewis calculus of counterfactuals. To ascertain the validity of the proof, a formal semantic model for counterfactuals is constructed. With the help of this model it can be shown that the proof is faulty, because it appeals to the unwarranted principle of Elimination of Eliminated Conditions (EEC). As an additional way of showing unreasonableness of the assumption (EEC), it is argued that yet another alleged and highly controversial proof of non-locality of QM, using the Hardy example, can be made almost trivial with the help of (EEC). Next the question is considered whether the validity of the proof in the GHZ case can be restored by adopting the assumption of partial realism. It is argued that although this assumption makes the crucial step of the original reasoning valid, it nevertheless renders another important transition unjustified, therefore the entire reasoning collapses.

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This book uses the formal semantics of counterfactual conditionals to analyze the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics. Counterfactual conditionals (subjunctive conditionals) enter the analysis of quantum entangled systems in that they enable us to precisely formulate the locality condition that purports to exclude the existence of causal interactions between spatially separated parts of a system. They also make it possible to speak consistently about alternative measuring settings, and to explicate what is meant by quantum property attributions. The book develops the possible-world semantics of quantum counterfactuals using David Lewis’s famous approach as a starting point but modifying it significantly in order to achieve compatibility with the demands of the special theory of relativity as well as quantum mechanics. There have been several attempts to use counterfactual semantics to strengthen Bell’s theorem and its cognates such as the GHZ and Hardy theorems. These are critically evaluated in the book. Finally, a counterfactual reconstruction of the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem is proposed that sheds a new light on their philosophical consequences regarding the relations between realism and local causation.

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Stapp [Am. J. Phys. 65, 300 (1997)] has recently argued from a version of the Hardy-type experiments that quantum mechanics must be nonlocal, independent of any additional assumptions such as realism or hidden variables. I argue either that his conclusions do not follow from his assumptions or that his assumptions are not true of quantum mechanics and can be interpreted as assigning an unwarranted level of reality to the value of certain quantum attributes.

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Recent discussions by Mermin [1] and Stapp [2] in this journal on non-locality and counterfactuality are shown to contain linguistic problems that require verification. As such they can at most provide us with two subjective choices for the meaning of 'counterfactual statements' in quantum mechanics. We shall show that the word 'counterfactual' is in fact inappropriate here and should be replaced by the word 'hypothetical'. Mermin's choice imposes a strictly contextual meaning based upon an interpretation of counterfactuality which he used to refute, without proof as we shall see, Stapp's logical proof [3] of non-locality in quantum theory. In linguistic theory both authors' choices of meaning: counterfactual versus hypothetical are equally acceptable and therefore some of the issues they discussed lie outside the domain of physics. The issues they discussed are further confused by the fact that in his reply Stapp [2] seems to have adopted Mermin's counterfactual interpretation against his own original [3] hypothetical interpretation. In the rest of this paper we shall adopt the hypothetical sense of Stapp's original statements but we modify his crucial statement LOC2 appropriately, then following his argumentations, we shall show that there is no conflict between relativity and quantum mechanics. We suggest that this should be the natural (pragmatic) choice of meaning in defining the predictions of events in the Hardy experiment.

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The debate about the non-locality of quantum mechanics is old, but still lively. Numerous people use non-locality as (bad) shorthand for quantum entanglement. But some have a long-standing commitment to the validity of this characterization. This paper examines two separate streams in this debate. The first is the arguments of Stapp, and especially his recent paper where he simplifies his contractual argument in the Hardy situation to argue for the non-locality of quantum mechanics. He has maintained his contention that an analysis of a Hardy-type correlation between two spatially separated observers proves that quantum mechanics itself is non-local, without any additional assumption of realism or hidden variables. In the second section, I try to carefully examine the Bell argument in the CHSH variant to see where the difference between the quantum and classical situations differ. Asher Peres was one of the great physicists of the late 20th century, especially for his intense concern with the fundamental nature of quantum mechanics. His courage in devoting his life to an area many considered "philosophical" (i.e. non-physical) paved the way for the rest of us to reveal our interests and confusions about this area. I am not sure that he would agree with everything in this paper, but I offer it as a tribute to him.

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Stapp has recently argued from a version of the Hardy type experiments that quantum mechanics must be non-local, independent of any additional assumptions like realism or hidden variables. I argue that either his conclusions do not follow from his assumptions, or that his assumptions are not true of quantum mechanics and can be interpreted as assigning an unwarranted level of reality to the value of certain quantum attributes.

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This is an extended critique of comments made by Abner Shimony and Howard Stein on Henry Stapp’s proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics. Although I claim that ultimately Stapp’s proof does not establish its purported conclusion, yet Shimony and Stein’s criticism contains a number of weak points, which need to be clarified.

•May 1, 2004•2 citations

In the paper the proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics, given recently by H. Stapp and D. Bedford, and appealing to the GHZ example, is analyzed. The proof does not contain any explicit assumption of realism, but instead it uses formal methods and techniques of the Lewis calculus of counterfactuals. To ascertain the validity of the proof, a formal semantic model for counterfactuals is constructed. With the help of this model it can be shown that the proof is faulty, because it appeals to the unwarranted principle of Elimination of Eliminated Conditions (EEC). As an additional way of showing unreasonableness of the assumption (EEC), it is argued that yet another alleged and highly controversial proof of non-locality of QM, using the Hardy example, can be made almost trivial with the help of (EEC). Next the question is considered whether the validity of the proof in the GHZ case can be restored by adopting the assumption of partial realism. It is argued that although this assumption makes the crucial step of the original reasoning valid, it nevertheless renders another important transition unjustified, therefore the entire reasoning collapses.

This book uses the formal semantics of counterfactual conditionals to analyze the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics. Counterfactual conditionals (subjunctive conditionals) enter the analysis of quantum entangled systems in that they enable us to precisely formulate the locality condition that purports to exclude the existence of causal interactions between spatially separated parts of a system. They also make it possible to speak consistently about alternative measuring settings, and to explicate what is meant by quantum property attributions. The book develops the possible-world semantics of quantum counterfactuals using David Lewis’s famous approach as a starting point but modifying it significantly in order to achieve compatibility with the demands of the special theory of relativity as well as quantum mechanics. There have been several attempts to use counterfactual semantics to strengthen Bell’s theorem and its cognates such as the GHZ and Hardy theorems. These are critically evaluated in the book. Finally, a counterfactual reconstruction of the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem is proposed that sheds a new light on their philosophical consequences regarding the relations between realism and local causation.

Recent discussions by Mermin [1] and Stapp [2] in this journal on non-locality and counterfactuality are shown to contain linguistic problems that require verification. As such they can at most provide us with two subjective choices for the meaning of 'counterfactual statements' in quantum mechanics. We shall show that the word 'counterfactual' is in fact inappropriate here and should be replaced by the word 'hypothetical'. Mermin's choice imposes a strictly contextual meaning based upon an interpretation of counterfactuality which he used to refute, without proof as we shall see, Stapp's logical proof [3] of non-locality in quantum theory. In linguistic theory both authors' choices of meaning: counterfactual versus hypothetical are equally acceptable and therefore some of the issues they discussed lie outside the domain of physics. The issues they discussed are further confused by the fact that in his reply Stapp [2] seems to have adopted Mermin's counterfactual interpretation against his own original [3] hypothetical interpretation. In the rest of this paper we shall adopt the hypothetical sense of Stapp's original statements but we modify his crucial statement LOC2 appropriately, then following his argumentations, we shall show that there is no conflict between relativity and quantum mechanics. We suggest that this should be the natural (pragmatic) choice of meaning in defining the predictions of events in the Hardy experiment.

The debate about the non-locality of quantum mechanics is old, but still lively. Numerous people use non-locality as (bad) shorthand for quantum entanglement. But some have a long-standing commitment to the validity of this characterization. This paper examines two separate streams in this debate. The first is the arguments of Stapp, and especially his recent paper where he simplifies his contractual argument in the Hardy situation to argue for the non-locality of quantum mechanics. He has maintained his contention that an analysis of a Hardy-type correlation between two spatially separated observers proves that quantum mechanics itself is non-local, without any additional assumption of realism or hidden variables. In the second section, I try to carefully examine the Bell argument in the CHSH variant to see where the difference between the quantum and classical situations differ. Asher Peres was one of the great physicists of the late 20th century, especially for his intense concern with the fundamental nature of quantum mechanics. His courage in devoting his life to an area many considered "philosophical" (i.e. non-physical) paved the way for the rest of us to reveal our interests and confusions about this area. I am not sure that he would agree with everything in this paper, but I offer it as a tribute to him.