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arXiv:1705.04140

Comment on "Cosmic Bell Test: Measurement Settings from Milky Way Stars"

Nathan Argaman

Published May 11, 2017• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This Comment argues that two assumptions, which are presented as basic assumptions of Bell's theorem in [J. Handsteiner et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 118, 060401 (2017)] and elsewhere, in fact follow from more basic premises. Measurement independence follows from (i) the use of free variables and (ii) the causal arrow of time. Determinism follows from (i) local causality and (ii) perfect correlations (predicted by quantum mechanics). In particular, it is pointed out that the measurement-independence violating toy model of [M.J.W. Hall, Phys. Rev. Lett. 105, 250404 (2010)], is based on a retro-causal model. While this may be controversial, it should be possible to achieve concensus on the much simpler matter of what the basic assumptions of Bell's theorem are.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1705.04140

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This Comment argues that two assumptions, which are presented as basic assumptions of Bell's theorem in [J. Handsteiner et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 118, 060401 (2017)] and elsewhere, in fact follow from more basic premises. Measurement independence follows from (i) the use of free variables and (ii) the causal arrow of time. Determinism follows from (i) local causality and (ii) perfect correlations (predicted by quantum mechanics). In particular, it is pointed out that the measurement-independence violating toy model of [M.J.W. Hall, Phys. Rev. Lett. 105, 250404 (2010)], is based on a retro-causal model. While this may be controversial, it should be possible to achieve concensus on the much simpler matter of what the basic assumptions of Bell's theorem are.
Bell's theorem states that some predictions of quantum mechanics cannot be reproduced by a local-realist theory. That conflict is expressed by Bell's inequality, which is usually derived under the assumption that there are no statistical correlations between the choices of measurement settings and anything else that can causally affect the measurement outcomes. In previous experiments, this "freedom of choice" was addressed by ensuring that selection of measurement settings via conventional "quantum random number generators" was spacelike separated from the entangled particle creation. This, however, left open the possibility that an unknown cause affected both the setting choices and measurement outcomes as recently as mere microseconds before each experimental trial. Here we report on a new experimental test of Bell's inequality that, for the first time, uses distant astronomical sources as "cosmic setting generators." In our tests with polarization-entangled photons, measurement settings were chosen using real-time observations of Milky Way stars while simultaneously ensuring locality. Assuming fair sampling for all detected photons, and that each stellar photon's color was set at emission, we observe statistically significant ≳7.31σ and ≳11.93σ violations of Bell's inequality with estimated p values of ≲1.8×10^{-13} and ≲4.0×10^{-33}, respectively, thereby pushing back by ∼600 years the most recent time by which any local-realist influences could have engineered the observed Bell violation.
One of the basic assumptions underlying Bell's theorem is the causal arrow of time, having to do with temporal order rather than spatial separation. Nonetheless, the physical assumptions regarding causality are seldom studied in this context, and often even go unmentioned, in stark contrast with the many different possible locality conditions which have been studied and elaborated upon. In the present work, some retrocausal toy-models which reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics for Bell-type correlations are reviewed. It is pointed out that a certain toy-model which is ostensibly superdeterministic-based on denying the free-variable status of some of quantum mechanics' input parameters-actually contains within it a complete retrocausal toy-model. Occam's razor thus indicates that the superdeterministic point of view is superfluous. A challenge is to generalize the retrocausal toy-models to a full theory-a reformulation of quantum mechanics-in which the standard causal arrow of time would be replaced by a more lenient one: an arrow of time applicable only to macroscopically-available information. In discussing such a reformulation, one finds that many of the perplexing features of quantum mechanics could arise naturally, especially in the context of stochastic theories.
Bell's theorem is 50 years old. Still there is a controversy about its implications. Much of it has its roots in confusion regarding the premises from which the theorem can be derived. Some claim that a derivation of Bell's inequalities requires just locality assumption, and nothing more. Violations of the inequalities are then interpreted as ``nonlocality'' or ``quantum nonlocality''. We show that such claims are unfounded and that every derivation of Bell's inequalities requires a premise -- in addition to locality and freedom of choice -- which is either assumed tacitly, or unconsciously, or is embedded in a single compound condition (like Bell's ``local causality''). The premise is equivalent to the assumption of existence of additional variables which do not appear in the quantum formalism (in form of determinism, or joint probability for outcomes of all conceivable measurements, or ``additional causes`'', or ``hidden variables'', ``complete description of the state'' or counterfactual definiteness, etc.). A certain irony is that perhaps the main message of violation of Bell's inequalities is that our notion of locality should be based on an operationally well-defined no-signalling condition, rather than on local causality.
This is a polemical response to Howard Wiseman's recent paper, "The two Bell's theorems of John Bell". Wiseman argues that, in 1964, Bell established a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and the joint assumptions of determinism and (what is now usually known as) "parameter independence". Only later, in 1976, did Bell, according to Wiseman, first establish a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and locality alone (in the specific form that Bell would sometimes call "local causality"). Thus, according to Wiseman, the long-standing disagreements about what, exactly, Bell's theorem does and does not prove can be understood largely as miscommunications resulting from the fact that there are really two quite distinct "Bell's theorems". My goal here is to lay out what Wiseman briefly describes as an "alternate reading" of Bell's 1964 paper, according to which (quoting Wiseman here) "the first paragraph of Bell's `Formulation' section [should be seen] as an essential part of his 1964 theorem, the first part of a two-part argument." I will argue in particular that this "alternate reading" is the correct way to understand Bell's 1964 paper and that Wiseman's reading is strongly inconsistent with the available evidence.
We argue that the concepts of "freedom of choice" and of "causal order" are intrinsically linked: a choice is considered "free" if it is correlated only to variables in its causal future. We discuss the implications of this to Bell-type scenarios, where two separate measurements are carried out, neither of which lies in the causal future of the other, and where one typically assumes that the measurement settings are chosen freely. Furthermore, we refute a recent criticism made by Ghirardi and Romano in [arXiv:1301.5040] and [arXiv:1302.1635] that we used an unphysical freedom of choice assumption in our previous works, [Nat. Commun. 2, 411 (2011)] and [Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 150402 (2012)].