We argue that the concepts of "freedom of choice" and of "causal order" are intrinsically linked: a choice is considered "free" if it is correlated only to variables in its causal future. We discuss the implications of this to Bell-type scenarios, where two separate measurements are carried out, neither of which lies in the causal future of the other, and where one typically assumes that the measurement settings are chosen freely. Furthermore, we refute a recent criticism made by Ghirardi and Romano in [arXiv:1301.5040] and [arXiv:1302.1635] that we used an unphysical freedom of choice assumption in our previous works, [Nat. Commun. 2, 411 (2011)] and [Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 150402 (2012)].
We argue that the concepts of "freedom of choice" and of "causal order" are intrinsically linked: a choice is considered "free" if it is correlated only to variables in its causal future. We discuss the implications of this to Bell-type scenarios, where two separate measurements are carried out, neither of which lies in the causal future of the other, and where one typically assumes that the measurement settings are chosen freely. Furthermore, we refute a recent criticism made by Ghirardi and Romano in [arXiv:1301.5040] and [arXiv:1302.1635] that we used an unphysical freedom of choice assumption in our previous works, [Nat. Commun. 2, 411 (2011)] and [Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 150402 (2012)].
Bell inequalities may only be derived, if hidden variables do not depend on the experimental settings. The stochastic independence of hidden and setting variables is called: freedom of choice, free will, measurement independence or no conspiracy. By imbedding the Bell causal structure in a larger causal network the authors correctly prove, that one can explain and quantify possible violation of measurement independence without evoking the super-determinism. They assume the independence of the variables that causally determine the settings and investigate how they might become correlated with hidden variables. Using their extended causal networks they derive a contextual probabilistic model on which their further correct results are based. The authors seem to ignore that contextual probabilistic model may be derived directly using only probabilistic concepts and incorporating correctly setting dependent variables describing measuring instruments. In these contextual probabilistic models experimenters freedom of choice is not compromised and the results of Bell Tests including an apparent violation of Einsteinian nonsignaling may be explained in a locally causal way. Talking about freedom of choice is misleading and is rooted in incorrect understanding of Bayes Theorem. We explain why freedom of choice should be called noncontextuality and why its violation in Bell Tests confirms only the contextual character of quantum observables. Therefore, contextuality and not experimenters freedom of choice are important resources in quantum information.
Abstract Free choice (or statistical independence) assumption in a hidden variable model (HVM) means that the settings chosen by experimenters do not depend on the values of the hidden variable. The assumption of context-independent (CI) mapping in an HVM means that the results of a measurement do not depend on settings for other measurements. If the measurements are spacelike separated, this assumption is known as local causality. Both free choice and CI mapping assumptions are considered necessary for derivation of the Bell-type criteria of contextuality/nonlocality. It is known, however, for a variety of special cases, that the two assumptions are not logically independent. We show here, in complete generality, for any system of random variables with or without disturbance/signaling, that an HVM that postulates CI mapping is equivalent to an HVM that postulates free choice. If one denies the possibility that a given empirical scenario can be described by an HVM in which measurements depend on other measurements’ settings, free choice violations should be denied too, and vice versa.
Bell’s theorem is based on the assumptions of local causality and measurement independence. The last assumption is identified by many authors as linked to the freedom of choice hypothesis. In this sense the human free will ultimately can ensure the measurement independence assumption. The incomplete experimental conditions for supporting this assumption are known in the literature as “freedom-of-choice loophole” (FOCL). Although there is no consensus among the scientists that the measurement independence is linked to human choices, in a recent paper, published in a prestigious journal, signed by more than a hundred authors, this assumption was seriously taken for the first time in an experiment known as Big Bell Test (Abellán et al. 2018). Using photons, single atoms, atomic ensembles and superconducting devices, this experiment was performed in five continents, and involved twelve laboratories, adopting human choices to close the FOCL. Nevertheless, the possibility of human freedom of choice has been a matter of philosophical debate for more than 2000 years, and there is no consensus among philosophers on this topic. If human choice is not free, this solution would not be sufficient to close FOCL. Therefore, in order to support the basic assumption of this experiment, it is necessary to argue that human choice is indeed free. In this paper, we present a Kantian position on this topic and defend the view that this philosophical position is the best way to ensure that Big Bell Test can in fact close the loophole.
The apparent incompatibility between foreknowledge and free will is traditionally formulated in terms of the implication of knowledge of a future event for the freedom of that event. This paper reexamines the problem using the notions of causal order and physical determination provided by modern physics. I consider measurements of two entangled particles at spacelike-separated events, where a measurement outcome is taken to be free if it is not determined by the previous history of the part of the universe accessible to it. Relativity allows the temporal order of the two measurements to be reversed between reference frames while preserving their causal independence. Quantum correlations nevertheless allow an observer at one measurement event to know the outcome at the other. I show that there is, therefore, a frame in which an observer possesses foreknowledge of a measurement outcome that remains free in this sense. The argument demonstrates that epistemic access to a future event need not be grounded in physical conditions that determine it.
Superdeterminism has received recent attention as a possible path toward a locally causal explanation of the entanglement correlations that appear in experimental tests of Bell's theorem. While the term `superdeterminism' was coined by Bell to refer to restrictions on the free will of experimenters, it was not rigorously defined until recently. It has now been defined as a property of any physical theory that produces systematic violations of statistical independence. Here we focus on formalizing the requirements that being nonsuperdeterministic places on a physical theory, and setting a standard that must be met before we can conclude that a given theory is not superdeterministic. We begin by carefully examining how a physical theory determines what outcomes we observe when performing measurements in terms of ontic states and response functions, and how this differs between superdeterministic and nonsuperdeterministic theories, in terms of the behavior of the types of vetted random sampling procedures that we use in experiments. The core result is that individual samples and measurement outcomes must be representative of the observed distributions, which is explained in detail. This also has a bearing on how measurement settings are chosen by agents, whether freely or randomly, and we argue that this standard ultimately defines what freedom/independence actually mean. We then discuss contextuality, and show that in most cases, superdeterminism is contextual. Finally, we discuss how different physical theories, with different notions of ontic states and response functions, can give rise to the same empirical data, and how the same operational contextuality may appear in different forms.
This Comment argues that two assumptions, which are presented as basic assumptions of Bell's theorem in [J. Handsteiner et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 118, 060401 (2017)] and elsewhere, in fact follow from more basic premises. Measurement independence follows from (i) the use of free variables and (ii) the causal arrow of time. Determinism follows from (i) local causality and (ii) perfect correlations (predicted by quantum mechanics). In particular, it is pointed out that the measurement-independence violating toy model of [M.J.W. Hall, Phys. Rev. Lett. 105, 250404 (2010)], is based on a retro-causal model. While this may be controversial, it should be possible to achieve concensus on the much simpler matter of what the basic assumptions of Bell's theorem are.