This is a polemical response to Howard Wiseman's recent paper, "The two Bell's theorems of John Bell". Wiseman argues that, in 1964, Bell established a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and the joint assumptions of determinism and (what is now usually known as) "parameter independence". Only later, in 1976, did Bell, according to Wiseman, first establish a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and locality alone (in the specific form that Bell would sometimes call "local causality"). Thus, according to Wiseman, the long-standing disagreements about what, exactly, Bell's theorem does and does not prove can be understood largely as miscommunications resulting from the fact that there are really two quite distinct "Bell's theorems". My goal here is to lay out what Wiseman briefly describes as an "alternate reading" of Bell's 1964 paper, according to which (quoting Wiseman here) "the first paragraph of Bell's `Formulation' section [should be seen] as an essential part of his 1964 theorem, the first part of a two-part argument." I will argue in particular that this "alternate reading" is the correct way to understand Bell's 1964 paper and that Wiseman's reading is strongly inconsistent with the available evidence.
This is a polemical response to Howard Wiseman's recent paper, "The two Bell's theorems of John Bell". Wiseman argues that, in 1964, Bell established a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and the joint assumptions of determinism and (what is now usually known as) "parameter independence". Only later, in 1976, did Bell, according to Wiseman, first establish a conflict between the quantum mechanical predictions and locality alone (in the specific form that Bell would sometimes call "local causality"). Thus, according to Wiseman, the long-standing disagreements about what, exactly, Bell's theorem does and does not prove can be understood largely as miscommunications resulting from the fact that there are really two quite distinct "Bell's theorems". My goal here is to lay out what Wiseman briefly describes as an "alternate reading" of Bell's 1964 paper, according to which (quoting Wiseman here) "the first paragraph of Bell's `Formulation' section [should be seen] as an essential part of his 1964 theorem, the first part of a two-part argument." I will argue in particular that this "alternate reading" is the correct way to understand Bell's 1964 paper and that Wiseman's reading is strongly inconsistent with the available evidence.
Yes. That is my polemical reply to the titular question in Travis Norsen's self-styled "polemical response to Howard Wiseman's recent paper." Less polemically, I am pleased to see that on two of my positions --- that Bell's 1964 theorem is different from Bell's 1976 theorem, and that the former does not include Bell's one-paragraph heuristic presentation of the EPR argument --- Norsen has made significant concessions. In his response, Norsen admits that "Bell's recapitulation of the EPR argument in [the relevant] paragraph leaves something to be desired," that it "disappoints" and is "problematic". Moreover, Norsen makes other statements that imply, on the face of it, that he should have no objections to the title of my recent paper ("The Two Bell's Theorems of John Bell"). My principle aim in writing that paper was to try to bridge the gap between two interpretational camps, whom I call 'operationalists' and 'realists', by pointing out that they use the phrase "Bell's theorem" to mean different things: his 1964 theorem (assuming locality and determinism) and his 1976 theorem (assuming local causality), respectively. Thus, it is heartening that at least one person from one side has taken one step on my bridge. That said, there are several issues of contention with Norsen, which we (the two authors) address after discussing the extent of our agreement with Norsen. The most significant issues are: the indefiniteness of the word 'locality' prior to 1964; and the assumptions Einstein made in the paper quoted by Bell in 1964 and their relation to Bell's theorem.
Many of the heated arguments about the meaning of 'Bellʼs theorem' arise because this phrase can refer to two different theorems that John Bell proved, the first in 1964 and the second in 1976.His 1964 theorem is the incompatibility of quantum phenomena with the dual assumptions of locality and determinism.His 1976 theorem is the incompatibility of quantum phenomena with the unitary property of local causality.This is contrary to Bellʼs own later assertions, that his 1964 theorem began with that single, and indivisible, assumption of local causality (even if not by that name).While there are other forms of Bellʼs theorems-which I present to explain the relation between Jarrett-completeness, 'fragile locality', and EPR-completeness-I maintain that Bellʼs two versions are the essential ones.Although the two Bellʼs theorems are logically equivalent, their assumptions are not, and the different versions of the theorem suggest quite different conclusions, which are embraced by different communities.For realists, the notion of local causality, ruled out by Bellʼs 1976 theorem, is motivated implicitly by Reichenbachʼs principle of common cause and explicitly by the principle of relativistic causality, and it is the latter which must be forgone.Operationalists pay no heed to Reichenbachʼs principle, but wish to keep the principle of relativistic causality, which, bolstered by an implicit 'principle of agent-causation', implies their notion of locality.Thus for operationalists, Bellʼs theorem is the 1964 one, and implies that it is determinism that must be forgone.I discuss why the two 'camps' are drawn to these different conclusions, and what can be done to increase mutual understanding.
In papers published in the 25 years following his famous 1964 proof, John Bell refined and reformulated his views on locality and causality. Although his formulations of local causality were in terms of probability, he had little to say about that notion. But assumptions about probability are implicit in his arguments and conclusions. Probability does not conform to these assumptions when quantum mechanics is applied to account for the particular correlations Bell argues are locally inexplicable. This account involves no superluminal action and there is even a sense in which it is local, but it is in tension with the requirement that the direct causes and effects of events be nearby. Introduction I never met John Bell, but his writings have supplied me with a continual source of new insights as I read and reread them over 40 years. As I worked toward a rather different understanding of quantum mechanics he was foremost in my mind as a severe but honest critic of such attempts. We all would love to know what Einstein would have made of Bell's theorem. I confess that the deep regret I feel that Bell cannot respond to this paper is sometimes assuaged by a sense of relief. Locality and Local Causality In his seminal 1964 paper [1], John Bell expressed locality as the requirement that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past. [2, p. 14] This seems to require that the result of a measurement would have been the same, no matter what operations had been performed on such a distant system. But suppose the result of a measurement were the outcome of an indeterministic process. Then the result of the measurement might have been different even if exactly the same operations (if any) had been performed on that distant system. So can no indeterministic theory satisfy the locality requirement? Bell felt no need to address that awkward question in his 1964 paper [1], since he took the EPR argument to establish that any additional variables needed to restore locality and causalitywould have to determine a unique result of ameasurement.
J.S. Bell believed that his famous theorem entailed a deep and troubling conflict between the empirically verified predictions of quantum theory and the notion of local causality that is motivated by relativity theory. Yet many physicists continue to accept, usually on the reports of textbook writers and other commentators, that Bell's own view was wrong, and that, in fact, the theorem only brings out a conflict with determinism or the hidden-variables program or realism or some other such principle that (unlike local causality), allegedly, nobody should have believed anyway. (Moreover, typically such beliefs arise without the person in question even being aware that the view they are accepting differs so radically from Bell's own.) Here we try to shed some light on the situation by focusing on the concept of local causality that is the heart of Bell's theorem, and, in particular, by contrasting Bell's own understanding with the analysis of Jon Jarrett which has been the most influential source, in recent decades, for the kinds of claims mentioned previously. We point out a crucial difference between Jarrett's and Bell's own understanding of Bell's formulation of local causality, which turns out to be the basis for the erroneous claim, made by Jarrett and many others, that Bell misunderstood the implications of his own theorem.
John Stewart Bell’s famous theorem is widely regarded as one of the most important developments in the foundations of physics. Yet even as we approach the 50th anniversary of Bell’s discovery, its meaning and implications remain controversial. Many workers assert that Bell’s theorem refutes the possibility suggested by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) of supplementing ordinary quantum theory with “hidden” variables that might restore determinism and/or some notion of an observer-independent reality. But Bell himself interpreted the theorem very differently—as establishing an “essential conflict” between the well-tested empirical predictions of quantum theory and relativistic local causality. Our goal is to make Bell’s own views more widely known and to explain Bell’s little-known formulation of the concept of relativistic local causality on which his theorem rests. We also show precisely how Bell’s formulation of local causality can be used to derive an empirically testable Bell-type inequality and to recapitulate the EPR argument.
Does determinism (or even the incompleteness of quantum mechanics) follow from locality and perfect correlations? In a 1964 paper, John Bell gave the first demonstration that quantum mechanics is incompatible with local hidden variables. Since then, a vigorous debate has rung out over whether he relied on an assumption of determinism or instead, as he later claimed in a 1981 paper, derived determinism from assumptions of locality and perfect correlation. This paper aims to bring clarity to the debate via simple examples and rigorous results. It is first recalled, via quantum and classical counterexamples, that the weakest statistical form of locality consistent with Bell’s 1964 paper (parameter independence) is insufficient for the derivation of determinism. Attention is then turned to critically assess Bell’s appeal to the Einstein–Rosen–Podolsky (EPR) incompleteness argument to support his claim. It is shown that this argument is itself incomplete, via counterexamples that expose two logical gaps. Closing these gaps via a strong “counterfactual” reality criterion enables a rigorous derivation of both determinism and parameter independence, and in this sense justifies Bell’s claim. Conversely, however, it is noted that whereas the EPR argument requires a weaker “measurement choice” assumption than Bell’s demonstration, it nevertheless leads to a similar incompatibility with quantum predictions rather than quantum incompleteness.