Does determinism (or even the incompleteness of quantum mechanics) follow from locality and perfect correlations? In a 1964 paper, John Bell gave the first demonstration that quantum mechanics is incompatible with local hidden variables. Since then, a vigorous debate has rung out over whether he relied on an assumption of determinism or instead, as he later claimed in a 1981 paper, derived determinism from assumptions of locality and perfect correlation. This paper aims to bring clarity to the debate via simple examples and rigorous results. It is first recalled, via quantum and classical counterexamples, that the weakest statistical form of locality consistent with Bell’s 1964 paper (parameter independence) is insufficient for the derivation of determinism. Attention is then turned to critically assess Bell’s appeal to the Einstein–Rosen–Podolsky (EPR) incompleteness argument to support his claim. It is shown that this argument is itself incomplete, via counterexamples that expose two logical gaps. Closing these gaps via a strong “counterfactual” reality criterion enables a rigorous derivation of both determinism and parameter independence, and in this sense justifies Bell’s claim. Conversely, however, it is noted that whereas the EPR argument requires a weaker “measurement choice” assumption than Bell’s demonstration, it nevertheless leads to a similar incompatibility with quantum predictions rather than quantum incompleteness.
Does determinism (or even the incompleteness of quantum mechanics) follow from locality and perfect correlations? In a 1964 paper, John Bell gave the first demonstration that quantum mechanics is incompatible with local hidden variables. Since then, a vigorous debate has rung out over whether he relied on an assumption of determinism or instead, as he later claimed in a 1981 paper, derived determinism from assumptions of locality and perfect correlation. This paper aims to bring clarity to the debate via simple examples and rigorous results. It is first recalled, via quantum and classical counterexamples, that the weakest statistical form of locality consistent with Bell’s 1964 paper (parameter independence) is insufficient for the derivation of determinism. Attention is then turned to critically assess Bell’s appeal to the Einstein–Rosen–Podolsky (EPR) incompleteness argument to support his claim. It is shown that this argument is itself incomplete, via counterexamples that expose two logical gaps. Closing these gaps via a strong “counterfactual” reality criterion enables a rigorous derivation of both determinism and parameter independence, and in this sense justifies Bell’s claim. Conversely, however, it is noted that whereas the EPR argument requires a weaker “measurement choice” assumption than Bell’s demonstration, it nevertheless leads to a similar incompatibility with quantum predictions rather than quantum incompleteness.
A 1964 paper by John Bell gave the first demonstration that quantum mechanics is incompatible with local hidden variables. There is an ongoing and vigorous debate on whether he relied on an assumption of determinism, or instead, as he later claimed, derived determinism from assumptions of locality and perfect correlation. This paper aims to bring clarity to the debate via simple examples and rigorous results. It is shown that the weak form of locality used in Bell's 1964 paper (parameter independence) is insufficient for such a derivation, whereas an independent form called outcome independence is sufficient even when weak locality does not hold. It further follows that outcome independence, by itself, implies that standard quantum mechanics is incomplete. It is also shown that an appeal by Bell to the Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky argument to support his claim fails, via examples that expose logical gaps in this argument. However, replacing the reality criterion underpinning the argument by a stronger criterion enables a rigorous derivation of both weak locality and determinism, as required for Bell's 1964 paper. Consequences for quantum interpretations, locality, and classical common causes are briefly discussed, with reference to an example of local classical indeterminism.
Most physicists agree that the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bell paradox exemplifies much of the strange behavior of quantum mechanics, but argument persists about what assumptions underlie the paradox. To clarify what the debate is about, we employ a simple and well-known thought experiment involving two correlated photons to help us focus on the logical assumptions needed to construct the EPR and Bell arguments. The view presented in this paper is that the minimal assumptions behind Bell’s inequality are locality and counterfactual definiteness but not scientific realism, determinism, or hidden variables as are often suggested. We further examine the resulting constraints on physical theory with an illustration from the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics—an interpretation that we argue is deterministic, local, and realist but that nonetheless violates the Bell inequality.
Maudlin has claimed that no local theory can reproduce the predictions of standard quantum mechanics that violate Bell’s inequality for Bohm’s version (two spin-half particles in a singlet state) of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen problem. It is argued that, on the contrary, standard quantum mechanics itself is a counterexample to Maudlin’s claim, because it is local in the appropriate sense (measurements at one place do not influence what occurs elsewhere there) when formulated using consistent principles in place of the inconsistent appeals to “measurement” found in current textbooks. This argument sheds light on the claim of Blaylock that counterfactual definiteness is an essential ingredient in derivations of Bell’s inequality.
J.S. Bell's remarkable 1964 theorem showed that any theory sharing the empirical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics would have to exhibit a surprising – and, from the point of view of relativity theory, very troubling – kind of nonlocality. Unfortunately, even still on this 50th anniversary, many commentators and textbook authors continue to misrepresent Bell's theorem. In particular, one continues to hear the claim that Bell's result leaves open the option of concluding either nonlocality or the failure of some unorthodox “hidden variable” (or “determinism” or “realism”) premise. This mistaken claim is often based on a failure to appreciate the role of the earlier 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in Bell's reasoning. After briefly reviewing this situation, I turn to two alternative versions of quantum theory – the “many worlds” theory of Everett and the quantum Bayesian interpretation of Fuchs, Schack, Caves, and Mermin – that purport to provide actual counterexamples to Bell's claim that nonlocality is required to account for the empirically verified quantum predictions. After analyzing each theory's grounds for claiming to explain the EPR–Bell correlations locally, however, one can see that (despite a number of fundamental differences) the two theories share a common for-all-practical-purposes (FAPP) solipsistic character. This dramatically undermines such theories’ claims to provide a local explanation of the correlations and thus, by concretizing the ridiculous philosophical lengths to which one must go to elude Bell's own conclusion, reinforces the assertion that nonlocality really is required to coherently explain the empirical data. Introduction Fifty years ago, in 1964 [1], John Stewart Bell first proved the theorem that has become widely known as “Bell's Theorem” but that Bell himself instead referred to as the “locality inequality theorem” [2]. In Bell's own view, the theorem showed that the empirical predictions of local theories will be constrained by Bell's inequality (or as Bell himself preferred to call it, the “locality inequality”). Hence, nonlocality is a necessary feature of any theory that shares the empirical predictions of standard quantum mechanics.
It is shown that when properly analyzed using principles consistent with the
use of a Hilbert space to describe microscopic properties, quantum mechanics is
a local theory: one system cannot influence another system with which it does
not interact. Claims to the contrary based on quantum violations of Bell
inequalities are shown to be incorrect. A specific example traces a violation
of the CHSH Bell inequality in the case of a spin-3/2 particle to the
noncommutation of certain quantum operators in a situation where (non)locality
is not an issue. A consistent histories analysis of what quantum measurements
measure, in terms of quantum properties, is used to identify the basic problem
with derivations of Bell inequalities: the use of classical concepts (hidden
variables) rather than a probabilistic structure appropriate to the quantum
domain. A difficulty with the original Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument
for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics is the use of a counterfactual
argument which is not valid if one assumes that Hilbert-space quantum mechanics
is complete; locality is not an issue. The quantum correlations that violate
Bell inequalities can be understood using local quantum common causes.
Wavefunction collapse and Schr\odinger steering are calculational procedures,
not physical processes. A general Principle of Einstein Locality rules out
nonlocal influences between noninteracting quantum systems. Some suggestions
are made for changes in terminology that could clarify discussions of quantum
foundations and be less confusing to students.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.