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arXiv:1609.07473

A Comment on the One Step Quantum Key Distribution Based on EPR Entanglement

Anirban Pathak, Kishore Thapliyal

Published Sep 23, 2016• 2 citations
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Abstract

Recently, in Sci. Rep. \textbf{6} (2016) 28767, Li et al., have proposed a scheme for quantum key distribution using Bell states. This comment provides a proof that the proposed scheme of Li et al., is insecure as it involves leakage of information. Further, it is also shown that all the error rates computed in the Li et al.'s paper are incorrect as the authors failed to recognize the fact that any eavesdropping effort will lead to entanglement swapping. Finally, it is established that Li et al.'s scheme can be viewed as an incrementally (but incorrectly)modified version of the existing schemes based on Goldenberg Vaidman (GV) subroutine.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1609.07473

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Recently, in Sci. Rep. \textbf{6} (2016) 28767, Li et al., have proposed a scheme for quantum key distribution using Bell states. This comment provides a proof that the proposed scheme of Li et al., is insecure as it involves leakage of information. Further, it is also shown that all the error rates computed in the Li et al.'s paper are incorrect as the authors failed to recognize the fact that any eavesdropping effort will lead to entanglement swapping. Finally, it is established that Li et al.'s scheme can be viewed as an incrementally (but incorrectly)modified version of the existing schemes based on Goldenberg Vaidman (GV) subroutine.
In the preceding Comment it has been claimed that an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Zhang, Li, and Gao [Phys. Rev. A 64, 024302 (2001)] and its generalization to ddd-level systems by Karimipour, Bahraminasab, and Bagherinezhad [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331 (2002)] are insecure against an attack devised by the authors of the Comment. We invalidate the arguments of the Comment and show that the protocols are still secure.
Li et al. presented a protocol [International Journal of Quantum Information4(6) (2006) 899–906] for quantum key distribution based on entanglement swapping. In this protocol, they use random and certain bits to construct a classical key, and they claim that this key is secure. In our article, we show that the protocol by Li et al. is insecure, presenting a new type of attack strategy which gives an adversary full information about the key without being detected. This strategy is based on entanglement swapping, too, and manages to preserve the correlation between the measurement results of the legitimate parties. Further, we present a modified version of the protocol and show that it is secure against this new attack strategy.