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arXiv:1605.00796

On the Possibility of Quantum Circuits -- Part I: the Epistemic Level

Olivier Brunet

Published Jan 1, 2016• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We present a formulation of quantum circuits where the focus is set on whether a given circuit (made of unitary operators and projective measurements with definite outcomes) does reflect an actually realizable physical experiment. In order to do this, we introduce verifications statements which are purely epistemic assertions indicating whether a outcome is possible at some point and develop our formalism which, in the end, consists in a set of logical rules about verification statements. Finally, we argue that our formalism provides a Lorentz-invariant realistic formulation of quantum circuits and illustrate this by considering a circuit corresponding to Hardy's paradox and showing how our formalism prevents making contradictory assertions regarding our knowledge about the circuit.

DOI
10.13140/rg.2.1.4182.5683

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We present a formulation of quantum circuits where the focus is set on whether a given circuit (made of unitary operators and projective measurements with definite outcomes) does reflect an actually realizable physical experiment. In order to do this, we introduce verifications statements which are purely epistemic assertions indicating whether a outcome is possible at some point and develop our formalism which, in the end, consists in a set of logical rules about verification statements. Finally, we argue that our formalism provides a Lorentz-invariant realistic formulation of quantum circuits and illustrate this by considering a circuit corresponding to Hardy's paradox and showing how our formalism prevents making contradictory assertions regarding our knowledge about the circuit.
The notion of state vector is, in quantum mechanics, as central as it is problematic, as illustrates the wealth of publications about the sub- jects, including in particular the many attempts to obtain an acceptable interpretation of quantum mechanics. In this article, we propose a different approach, and initiate the study of a formulation of quantum mechanics, where the notion of state is entirely replaced by assertions about measurement outcomes. We define a notion of "verification" which represents the knowledge that one may have about the possible outcomes of the measurements performed on a quantum system, and express a set of logical rules which allow to reason about quantum systems using verification assertions only, and thus making no reference to the problematic notion of state.
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We derive the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics from epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. An epistemic formalism is developed, where concepts like individual and collective knowledge are used, and knowledge may be actual or potential. The physical state SSS corresponds to the collective potential knowledge. The state SSS is a subset of a state space S={Z}\mathcal{S}=\{Z\}S={Z}, such that SSS always contains several elements ZZZ, which correspond to unattainable states of complete potential knowledge of the world. The evolution of SSS cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements ZZZ, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of SSS is described in terms of sequential time n∈Nn\in \mathbf{\mathbb{N}}n∈N, which is updated according to n→n+1n\rightarrow n+1n→n+1 each time potential knowledge changes. In certain experimental contexts CCC, there is initial knowledge at time nnn that a given series of properties P,P′,…P,P',\ldotsP,P′,… will be observed within a given time frame, meaning that a series of values p,p′,…p,p',\ldotsp,p′,… of these properties will become known. At time nnn, it is just known that these values belong to predefined, finite sets {p},{p′},…\{p\},\{p'\},\ldots{p},{p′},…. In such a context CCC, it is possible to define a complex Hilbert space HC\mathcal{H}_{C}HC​ on top of S\mathcal{S}S, in which the elements are contextual state vectors SˉC\bar{S}_{C}SˉC​. Born's rule to calculate the probabilities to find the values p,p′,…p,p',\ldotsp,p′,… is derived as the only generally applicable such rule. Also, we can associate a self-adjoint operator Pˉ\bar{P}Pˉ with eigenvalues {p}\{p\}{p} to each property PPP observed within CCC. These operators obey [Pˉ,Pˉ′]=0[\bar{P},\bar{P}']=0[Pˉ,Pˉ′]=0 if and only if the precise values of PPP and P′P'P′ are simultaneoulsy knowable.
Precise rules are developed in order to formalize the reasoning processes involved in standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics, with the help of analogies from classical physics. A classical or quantum description of a mechanical system involves a {\it framework}, often chosen implicitly, and a {\it statement} or assertion about the system which is either true or false within the framework with which it is associated. Quantum descriptions are no less ``objective'' than their classical counterparts, but differ from the latter in the following respects: (i) The framework employs a Hilbert space rather than a classical phase space. (ii) The rules for constructing meaningful statements require that the associated projectors commute with each other and, in the case of time-dependent quantum histories, that consistency conditions be satisfied. (iii) There are incompatible frameworks which cannot be combined, either in constructing descriptions or in making logical inferences about them, even though any one of these frameworks may be used separately for describing a particular physical system. A new type of ``generalized history'' is introduced which extends previous proposals by Omnès, and Gell-Mann and Hartle, and a corresponding consistency condition which does not involve density matrices or single out a direction of time. Applications which illustrate the formalism include: measurements of spin, two-slit diffraction, and the emergence of the classical world from a fully quantum description.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of certain measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of contextuality is related to a purely formal understanding of contextuality as exposed by the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual (definite valued) properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observable A when measured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A, B] = [A, C] = 0, and [B, C] /= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread epistemic reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes.
Logical paradoxes and inconsistent information pose deep challenges in epistemology and the philosophy of logic. Classical systems typically handle contradictions only through external checks or by altering the logical framework, as in Tarski's hierarchy or paraconsistent logics. We propose a novel approach: a quantum circuit architecture that intrinsically enforces logical consistency during its unitary evolution. By encoding self-referential or contradictory propositions into a quantum state, the circuit uses interference effects to suppress inconsistent outcomes while preserving coherent ones. We demonstrate this with the Liar Paradox ("This statement is false"), showing that the quantum model naturally stabilizes truth values that would be paradoxical classically. The framework builds on orthomodular quantum logic treating logical propositions as subspace projectors and connects to belief revision and cognitive modeling by providing a physical mechanism for coherence restoration in epistemic states. This work bridges formal logic and quantum computation, suggesting that consistency can be embedded as a structural property of reasoning systems rather than imposed externally.